Canada and the EU’s geopolitical enlargement

Maria Popova, McGill University

maria.popova@mcgill.ca 

April 9, 2025

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 jolted the EU into a new enlargement wave now known as the “geopolitical enlargement”. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, as well as the Western Balkans are inching closer to accession as the EU seeks unity and strength to contain Russian expansionism. In contrast to Russia’s long history of aggression in Eastern Europe, the Trump Administration’s threats to the sovereignty of Canada and Greenland (Denmark) might be only three-months old, but they have been so persistent that Canadians and Europeans have come to take them seriously enough to discuss increased security and trade cooperation to check the US. Frederic Mérand’s article in Policy Options has triggered a thoughtful debate about whether the process could lead to full EU membership for Canada. My take is that the moment calls for Canada to join the geopolitical enlargement wave with an application bid, even if the accession process might drag out or never end in full membership.

I pick up where Tommaso Pavone’s enthusiastic take leaves off: “in a world of betrayed alliances, liberal-democratic retreat, and the collapse of the rules-based international order, what was once deemed impossible is quickly being recast as possible, and soon Canadian accession to the EU may even appear necessary.”  First, a Canadian application will bolster the EU’s enduring identity as an alliance of liberal democracies at a time when democratic backsliding is the zeitgeist. Second, a bid by Canada to join the EU would stymie the emerging Russo-American alliance and undermine attempts to forge a new international order organized around great power spheres of influence, inhabited by contiguous vassals and satellites.

Let me start by pointing out that, like Mérand and Pavone, I do not view the European Union strictly and exclusively as a geographic alliance on the European continent. There is, of course, a solid basis for the limited conceptualization in the treaties, as Thomas Verellen points out  but, like Milada Vachudova, I think the EU’s success and normative power lie in its identity as an alliance of liberal democracies, united by the rule of law, human rights and freedom of movement. Ever louder calls to freeze voting rights, sanction, or even expel European states that violate these principles suggests that geography has gradually become secondary to democratic governance and thus membership for non-European states that align with EU values is likely coming on the agenda.

In addition, the lesson from Ukraine’s road to the EU is that the geostrategic imperative is real and it can very swiftly lead to the conceptual recategorization of countries vis-à-vis the EU. After decades of developing closer relations with the EU without any membership perspective, Ukraine put together and filed an application to join within a few short days in February 2022. Why did Ukraine’s President prioritize this task while Russia’s invading army was right outside Kyiv? Because instead of considering submission to Russia’s violent reincorporation attempt, Ukraine was determined to save its independent state and its democratic regime and while armed resistance saved the state. Nothing could say “we are a European democracy, not a Russian vassal” more clearly than EU membership. The war also swiftly changed European perceptions of Ukraine—the country is now widely seen as an integral part of Europe that fights for the core values of democracy and the rule of law and bolsters European security by thwarting Russia’s expansion. Political will built up in the member states and in the supranational institutions and Ukraine was recategorized from a neighbourhood ally to a potential member state much quicker than anyone expected. In June 2022, Ukraine received official candidate status and in 2024, it started accession negotiations.

Nothing clarifies and speeds things up, both for the EU and for the potential candidate, as an existential threat to sovereignty and democracy from a hostile power. Canada suddenly finds itself in an eerily similar position as Ukraine was in early 2022. It faces a threat to its independence and sovereignty by a powerful neighbour who refuses to respect Canada’s insistence on its separate statehood. The geostrategic benefits of EU membership for Canada are thus clear. By joining the EU, Canada would deepen economic ties to its European NATO partners and increase its capacity to withstand economic and strategic hostility by the US. The benefits for the EU of Canada joining could also prove significant. The EU would be adding a member with a healthy consolidated democracy, one that could participate in rule-making from a position of reliable alignment with liberal democratic values. Canada also has a strong economy that would contribute rather than tax the budget. Just as Ukraine’s enthusiastic quest for membership reinvigorated support for EU integration across Europe, Canada’s bid could also boost EU legitimacy.

The biggest winner from a Canadian bid to join the EU would be the moribund international order. Enlargement to North America would make the EU a stronger counterweight than it is now to the emerging Russo-American alliance. The shocking American pivot to Russia that we are observing since Trump took office in January seems to seek a return to a world divided into great power spheres of influence populated by vassals. As Seva Gunitsky laid it out succinctly in a recent piece: “Trump’s approach to the international system is a strange blend of neo-feudal hierarchy with transactional politics guided by five principles: dominance of great powers, conditionality of alliances, weaponization of trade, irrelevance of institutions, and personalization of diplomacy.” Russia considers the EU an American vassal or a doomed dead-end project, but a transcontinental EU that includes Canada and safeguards its members’ sovereignty from both Russian and American diktat would prevent Trump and Putin from creating the neat maps they desire. Neither the US would be able to dominate the Americas, nor Russia would be able to re-establish its hold over half of Europe. Instead, the enlarged EU would continue to be a powerful independent pole committed to international law and the territorial integrity norm.

This course is not without pitfalls, though. Other contributions in this series discuss the economic, social, and political obstacles to Canada’s EU accession, but even a geostrategic move towards membership can be complicated. The current pivot by the US administration towards autocracies and territorial expansionism might prove to be short-lived, an idiosyncratic predilection of President Trump, rather than a durable foreign policy realignment. What if in a few short years, while Canada is working out its complex EU accession, a new Democratic American administration corrects course and seeks forgiveness from its European and Canadian allies? Would Canada then scrap its EU bid and return to renegotiate NAFTA or even a currency union with the US, the third option in Kurt Hübner’s contribution? The long-term implications of a Canadian EU membership must be thought through carefully. From today’s vantage point, however, a Canadian bid for EU accession would benefit democracy and the international order, while undermining anachronistic plans to plunge the world back into an Orwellian rendering of competing imperial blocks, so we need to give it serious consideration.