Not so much a Rupture, as a War: European Defence and Collective Security in the Age of Putin and Trump

By Willem H. Buckley

Not so much a rupture^[i], as a war^[ii]. History has not ended: there is no global consensus, and the military-industrial complex thrives. The United States (US) is secure and geographically insulated, while Europe anticipates increasing vulnerability to Russia from 2030. Middle powers still need collective security. Trump’s statecraft is confrontational, transactional and conditional. Successive US administrations have reasonably criticised Western Europe’s decades of underinvestment in defence and security. Angered by Europe’s refusal to support his narcissistic project against Iran, Trump continues to reduce US forces in Europe and has even threatened to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)^[iii]. Putin rejects the Western values-based approach to sovereignty and human rights; his personal and nationalistic ambitions may extend beyond Ukraine. We may be past ‘Peak Trump’, and Putin will not live forever; their autocratic flirtation will pass: the ‘Great Man’ theory of history is a myth. The US has a long and acquisitive tradition of ‘America First’, deep in the ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA) zeitgeist. US and Russian threats to Euro-Atlantic security extend beyond the hubris of Trump and Putin: the underlying drivers are imperial, economic, domestic and enduring. The strategic environment is complicated by the rise of ‘Big Tech’ companies whose power and influence already exceed those of all but the strongest nation states.

The middle powers need to promote the global commons and a rules-based order (RBO)[iv]. Indeed, most international interactions are still based on an accepted framework[v]. Whilst great powers have always ignored the RBO when it does not suit them, the US may be seceding from the international order they helped establish and can no longer be trusted to lead the western world. Trump often refers to the US and China as the ‘G2’, and the US National Security and Defence Strategies highlight the US-China dynamic. Europeans tend to see China as a competitor, rather than an enemy; for Americans, Cold War 2.0 is US v China. In this context, the US pivot from Europe to the Asia-Pacific is entirely rational^[vi].

Effective security arrangements need a robust political basis, an institution, military command structures, doctrine and interoperable forces. NATO has provided this since 1949 but is looking increasingly fragile. NATO’s Secretary General (SecGen) maintains that Europe cannot defend herself without the US^[vii]: as SecGen, he is naturally obliged to keep the US ‘in’^[viii]. His informal term ‘NATO 3.0’ means reduced US involvement and more European spending^[ix].Whilst NATO’s annual summit in Ankara in July 2026 reaffirmed the centrality of the Treaty’s Article 5, there is much behind the scenes activity to make up for perceived shortcomings. The nascent ‘sub-NATO alliance of the willing’ omits the US, forming regional coalitions based on the extant Joint Force Commands (JFCs) in Europe^[x]. Quite separately, a ‘coalition of the willing’ to build a shared European anti-ballistic missile was announced on 13 July^[xi].Such coalitions become necessary only when existing arrangements have proven inadequate. A year earlier, France and the United Kingdom (UK) had stated that they will offer joint protection to Europe in addition to NATO’s Article 5, and the formation of a joint Nuclear Steering Group^[xii]. Whilst not part of NATO, all adherents of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) ^[xiii] are NATO member states, a tacit recognition of a further NATO faultline^[xiv].

These groupings, rather than US-led and aimed at bypassing international law, are European-led, bypass Washington and aim to affirm collective European action in compliance with international law. However, coalitions of the willing outside NATO or the European Union (EU)^[xv] offer no security guarantee, have no political strategic decision-making body, no operational chain of command, and lack the permanence needed to build a European way of war and reassure their publics: they could serve as the basis for a new Euro-Atlantic collective security structure only with very significant investment. NATO could feasibly continue with the US dormant. However, a negative US would effectively hold a veto, which would then have to be ignored: it is difficult to see how NATO could survive such an eventuality. Whilst Article 13 of The Washington (NATO) Treaty provides a ‘denunciation’ mechanism for a member state to leave NATO, there is no ejection mechanism: unless the US leaves, she stays, potentially fatally limiting NATO’s freedom of action^[xvi].

A New Euro-Atlantic Treaty (NEAT) would entail lengthy negotiation and risk strategic failure. However, the Atlantic confers mutual strategic depth: Canada has a role in protecting the Euro-Atlantic area’s northern and western flanks, and Europe can help secure Canada’s exposure to the Arctic/High North. With a widening US-Canada schism, this would strengthen Canada’s sovereignty, economy and security^[xvii]. However, a fundamental question, unresolved by NATO, is the extent to which a global dimension is implied and China implicated^[xviii]. Europe relies on imports, many of which originate from outside the Euro-Atlantic area: ensuring secure lines of communication may be a legitimate task.

The EU’s political and economic basis is already well developed. The EU has a Global Strategy and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Article 42.7 of the EU’s Treaty on European Union is a direct equivalent of NATO’s Article 5. The EU has a Collective Self-defence and Permanent Structured Cooperation mechanism. The EU provides an approach to industrial integration and a European Defence Fund (EDF). The EU has an External Action Service and Military Staff. This extant EU politico-military platform could in principle deliver the NATO core tasks^[xix].

However, the EU does not presently include the current NATO member states of Albania, Canada, Iceland, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Turkey and the UK^[xx]. Furthermore, due to their neutrality, Ireland, Austria and Malta are likely to oppose joint initiatives on principle. EU-run military missions have been small-scale and the EU is not yet ready to meet the demands of warfighting. The EU has no permanent or standing military HQs or infrastructure below the strategic level.

However, under the ‘Berlin+’ agreement the EU is currently able to make use of NATO facilities in Europe and these could provide the basis for the necessary expansion of the EU’s military command structure. Additional infrastructure would nonetheless be required, including in Canada. Although there would be no US leadership, NATO’s SecGen and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) have always been Europeans; Chairs of the Military Committee have been either European or Canadian^[xxi]. A security structure based on the EU plus the eight NATO members who are not currently members of the EU (EU+8), including Turkey^[xxii] and feasibly Ukraine, but excluding the US, would be an extension of and built on the EU’s CSDP. Leadership could be in an ‘E5+ format’ of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK^[xxiii]. Notwithstanding the UK’s difficulties gaining participation in the EDF, given political will such an agreement would be easier and quicker to negotiate than a ‘NEAT’.

Global reach could be extended through relationships with inter alia Japan, Australia and New Zealand. NATO is currently set up to fight a US-led war. Non-availability of US capabilities would be Europe’s opportunity to move towards strategic autonomy, founded on her geography, political culture, strategic priorities and resources. Whilst Europe will not need to be better than the US, Europe must be better than Russia. Warfighting capabilities are required: a robust command and control (C2) structure, a nuclear deterrent, and maritime forces to secure strategic lines of communication. Ballistic missile defence, air defence and long range fires will also be essential. German and Polish expansion of their conventional forces shows what might be achieved and points the way to burden-sharing through national role specialisation. Ukraine has shown what can be done to defend against an invading continental neighbour, with the merits of a distributed and adaptive approach, using drones, artificial intelligence, robotics and entrenchments. Ukraine did need access to the internet and satellite space-based surveillance and communications capabilities. All of which provides the basis for a programme of capability development^[xxiv].

The requirement for security will persist post Trump-Putin. NATO remains a functioning alliance, but risks becoming permanently moribund. Trust is key and more reliable arrangements must be developed as a matter of urgency. The basic geo-political conundrum is that the US is focusing on Asia-Pacific and specifically China, while Europe looks to a weakened and desperate Russia. Mindful that their security has a global dimension, Europe and Canada must embrace each other across the Atlantic. Europeans must take greater responsibility for their security and the EU should be the platform: re-balancing will require political will^[xxv], a public information campaign to persuade electorates and an end to national protectionism^[xxvi]. On the upside, there is scope for a new and tailored approach to managing conflict.

Bio: Willem H. Buckley had over 30 years’ service as a British Army officer, retiring as a Colonel. He attended the NATO Defense College and was on the staff of NATO HQs at 2, 3 and 4-star level.

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^[i] There has been a ‘rupture’ and a ‘new order’ is required. Mark Carney, Davos, 20 January 2026.

^[ii] “You’re at war when you’re attacked, and we got attacked.” Mark Carney, 22 August 2026.

^[iii] In an interview published in Britain’s Daily Telegraph newspaper in April 2026. 

^[iv] A list of shared values might include sovereignty and territorial integrity; sustainable development; respect for human rights; and security, of energy, technology, water, food and clean air.

^[v] For example, financial payments (SWIFT), civil aviation, shipping, customs; and most trade.

^[vi] Asia and the Pacific have to manage a complex US-China relationship, where Russia is far away. By contrast, for Europeans, Russia is the primary threat, with US-China issues seeming far away.

^[vii] “If anyone thinks here again that the European Union, or Europe as a whole, can defend itself without the US, keep on dreaming. You can’t. We can’t. We need each other.” Mark Rutte, Brussels, 26 January 2026.

^[viii] NATO’s first Secretary General famously – and apocryphally - said that the purpose of NATO was "to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." The US is central to NATO, as the term ‘Washington Treaty’ and its Articles 10 and 11 imply.

^[ix] Trump says ‘buy American’, but Europe has already been sent to the back of the queue, behind the US, Israel and other Middle Eastern countries, and Ukraine, for the delivery of existing weapons orders.

^[x] In Brunssum and Naples.

^[xi] Ukraine, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and the UK.

^[xii] The Northwood Declaration, 10 July 25.

^[xiii] The JEF: a multi-national military partnership established in 2014 and designed for rapid response and expeditionary operations. Members are the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Netherlands.

^[xiv] There are also potential NATO European North-South and East-West schisms. 

^[xv] For example, the Nordic Defence Cooperation (Nordefco).

^[xvi] A US decision to leave NATO would require a vote of 75% of Congress. Given Trump’s ability to ignore an in any case polarised Congress, it is difficult to envisage how this might be achieved. 

^[xvii] Mark Carney is widely considered to be an ‘honorary European’. This extends to include Canada as a whole.

^[xviii] NATO outreach and AUKUS are clear examples of this dilemma.

^[xix] Deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and co-operative security.

^[xx] The EU and Iceland signed a Security and Defence Partnership in March 2026.

^[xxi] SACEUR has always been a US officer.

^[xxii] Turkey’s unfruitful initiatives seeking to join the EU have been abandoned.

^[xxiii]The European Group of Five (E5) is a meeting of the defence ministers of Europe's five biggest defence spenders and largest military powers, inaugurated in November 2024 in response to increased calls for European rearmament and increased leadership by Europe in providing support to Ukraine. NATO and EU representatives are usually also present at their meetings.

^[xxiv] The potential to move towards European capabilities is exemplified by the F-22 and F-35 possibly giving way to the Gripen and/or multilateral Global Combat Air Programme.

^[xxv] The UK government’s attempts during 2025 and 2026 to formulate a Defence Investment Plan do not augur well.

^[xxvi] The New Generation Fighter aircraft, a key part of the European Future Combat Air System project, was cancelled by France and Germany in June 2026.