Take One For The Team?

A Study Of The Individual Bases For European Solidarity In Times Of Crisis.

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Abstract: As a supranational system grows larger, the questions of solidarity and cost-benefit allocation arise with increased salience and consequences for political legitimacy. The current economic crisis, which has spread into a political crisis in the European Union (EU), has dramatically increased the salience of these issues in European public opinion. After fifty years of integration, this a unique opportunity to see if the EU has succeeded in generating a "we-feeling" among its citizens, with very tangible consequences.

This study investigates the political and economic determinants of European solidarity at the individual level, using survey data (Eurobarometer 74.1) and contextual data (OECD dataset), to test whether European solidarity proceeds from rational interest or from preferences for a specific political project for Europe. European solidarity is here operationalized in two ways: a) are citizens in favor of financial help within the EU, and b) do they declare themselves in solidarity with other European citizens and member states. The multi-level analysis shows that these preferences are first, affected by economic cost/benefit calculation as well as political preferences, and second are strongly impacted by the Euro membership.

Keywords: Public Opinion, Support for Europe, European integration, Economic crisis, Redistribution

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1. Introduction

By its extent, its consequences on institutions and policies (European and national) and on public opinion, the current Eurozone crisis is unique. The chain of events and their consequences for European institutions and integration have been studied (among others see: Drudi et al., 2012; Quaglia et al. 2012), with public and academic attention focused in particular on the series of bailouts that occurred between 2010 and 2013. Successively, a third of the Eurozone obtained EU bailouts (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the Republic of Cyprus). The decision-making processes that lead to these actions has been studied (Dinan, 2011; Paterson, 2011; Ross 2013), as well as the impact of the Eurozone crisis on general trust in the European Union and democratic deficit (Armingeon and Ceka, 2013; Debomy, 2013; Serricchio et al., 2013). However, no study has yet documented citizens' preferences for financial help between member states. Despite the crisis being delt with through intergovernmental and institutional channels, it raised the issue of solidarity between Member states and citizens of different countries. Such an issue might have strong implications for European identity, but also national politics, in particular political parties' strategies given the importance of redistribution for political support (Easton 1965, Ferrera 2005, Bartolini 2005). This paper addresses this issue by investigating the potential spillover of the notion of solidarity from the national to the European level in the current context of economic hardship. The economic crisis provides a unique opportunity to test the extent of solidarity among European citizens, as measured in a very tangible way: who should pay the bill?

To investigate the determinants of European solidarity, contributes to our knowledge of attitudes towards European integration in two ways. First, this allows for an updated test of the utilitarian logic of support for Europe, by investigating the extent to which national and individual economic interest determine preferences for financial help within the EU. Second, it provides a test for the political logic of support for Europe, a logic that until now has not been strongly confirmed by empirical analysis. Evidence of a politicization of the European issue, conceptualized as either as an overlap between the left/right and the pro/anti integration dimensions or as support for different European projects, remains scarce (Lubbers and Scheepers

2007; Crespy 2008; De Vries and Edwards 2009; Binzer Hobolt and Brouard 2012; Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers 2012).

This paper contributes to this debate by, first, providing evidence that preferences for financial help between member states are driven by rational logics as much as a feeling of solidarity with other Europeans. Second, the analysis shows that economic interest is not always determined by the possibility to directly benefit, except within the Eurozone. Finally, preferences for a specific European project, with a social dimension, is a strong determinant of European solidarity.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical frame and hypotheses, while section 3 provides details on the data and operationalization. Finally, section 4 presents and discusses the results of empirical analysis.

2. Theorizing European solidarity in times of crisis

Since 2007, the economic situation in the European Union has been continuously worsening, entering into recession in 2009 for the first time since the 1990s (Hodson and Quaglia 2009; Foucault, 2013). The deep economic turmoil has unraveled strong disparities in European economies as well as in the Member states' willingness to deal with the crisis with common political initiatives. The strong economic interdependence within the Eurozone and beyond, as well as the variation in the crisis' impact on national economies, has raised the question of a common answer of the EU's members, and of financial solidarity among them. As it became clear that the Euro zone could only survive with a collective strategy, political inertia transformed the economic crisis into a political one, while austerity measures stired up resentment against the EU in several countries: Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland (Crum 2013). Economic cost and benefit calculations have long been acknowledged as a basis of support for European integration, and have been theorized as such with the argument of utilitarian support (Dalton and Eichenberg, 1993; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinski, 2002). At the aggregate level, support for European integration is a function of a country's benefit in terms of trade balance, economic prosperity, but also political power. The same cost/benefit calculation has been documented at the micro level, where support is didetermined by an individual's ability to benefit from economic integration, such ability being a function of professional skills, social and financial capital. Economic hardship and threats to the viability of the Eurozone has increased even more the salience of this cost-benefit allocation among the EU's members. This question has been on the top of the media and political agenda for the past 4 years, and while research has been done on this issue, we still lack conclusive evidence of its consequences for citizens, in terms of attitudes towards European integration.

The cost-benefit logic

In the context of economic crisis, two logics, derived from the theories of general support for European integration, can explain the citizens' preferences for European solidarity. First, being in favor of financial help among EU's member states can be determined by the traditional cost-benefit calculation. We know that two types of economic factors impact such calculation, in the case of diffuse support for Europe.[1] On the one hand, the economic benefit for the country induces support for European integration. Such economic benefit is traditionally measured with trade balance, economic growth, inflation and net transfer from the EU to the member state (Dalton and Eichenberg 1993; 2007; Gabel 1998). On the other hand, we know that utilitarian support is conditioned to the individual's capacity to personally benefit from European integration (and in particular from economic integration and increased mobility): high levels of education and income as well as occupational status such as managers and professionals induce higher benefits from integration, in turn inducing higher levels of support (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinski, 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004). In line with this reasoning, we should expect preferences for financial help within the EU to be positively influenced by a) the respondent's perception of the country's interest, and b) by the personal interest of the respondent.

In the context of economic crisis, this mechanism presented above can play in opposite directions. On the one hand, following the classic interpretation, those most in need of financial help (i.e. countries most hardly hit by the crisis or individuals most financially insecure) should

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[1] Diffuse support is here understood in the sense of Easton's definition (1965): diffuse support is based on political allegiance to a political regime, when one recognizes its legitimacy and identifies with.

support financial help between member states as they would be prime beneficiaries (following here the same logic as the traditional positive impact of net transfer through regional and structural funds on support for Europe). To the contrary, countries whose economy remains afloat would be the first to finance this European solidarity, support for financial help in these countries (and among individuals with higher income) should be lower.

On the other hand, we could expect the opposite relationship for two reasons. First economies in the EU and especially within the Eurozone are strongly interdependent. Due to economic interdependence, citizens in steady economies could support financial help at the EU level as a way to content the crisis (the argument was for instance used to explain the strong support of the French government for a rapid Greek bailout, French banks being strongly exposed to Greek default (Ross, 2013). Beyond the immediate financial cost, a solidarity mechanism on the European scale might be percerveid as being in the interest of the country. Going in the same direction but following a different logic, the luxury good theory tells us that in times of crisis, people withdraw their support from non-vital expenses (Stevenson, 2003). Under such circumstances and given the widespread weakness of European identity in comparison to national and local attachments, solidarity with the members of the supranational community is likely to be lower in countries in strong economic turmoil and among the citizens most at risk. For them, sharing any extra expenditure might seem unreasonable. Following McLaren's argument about national resources (McLaren 2006), to allocate a share of already scarce national resources would be considered a threat to the group’s own well-being.

The analysis will thus use two sets of alternative hypotheses to test the rational logic:

H1a: the *worse* the national economy situation, the *higher* the preferences for European solidarity;

H2a: the *higher* the financial insecurity of one individual, the *higher* her preferences for European solidarity;

H1b: the *worse* the national economic situation, the *lower* the preferences for European solidarity;

H2b: the *higher* the financial insecurity of one individual, the *lower* her preferences for European solidarity;

Additionnally, the crisis and the subsequent issue of contagion and financial solidarity is first and foremost an issue for the countries that share the common currency. Accordingly, we can expect the effect of national economic situation on preferences for financial help to be stronger within the Eurozone (hypothesis H3)

The political logic

Aside from economic rationality, preferences for financial help can be explained with political motivations of two kinds. First, depending on citizens' preferences for the European project, they might be more or less willing to share the burden of the economic crisis. The political logics behind support for European integration and the degree of structure in attitudes towards Europe are still questioned in the academic debate, and empirical evidence remains rare (Hooghe and Marks 2007; 2009; Stoekel, 2013; Gaxie et al., 2013). However, the distinction between diffuse and specific support for Europe, between hard and soft Euroscepticism, and the conceptualization of *critical Europeans* have shown that citizens and political parties expect different outputs from the integration process, and condition their support to the achievement of specific goals (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003; Taggart 1998; Weβels 2007; Lubbers and Scheepers 2007; De Vries and Edwards 2009; Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers 2012). More recently, Serrichio et al. showed that the economic crisis has reinforced the effect of political extremism and exclusive identity on Eurosceptic attitudes. In particular, for those wanting a *Social Europe*, financial solidarity might seem essential to achieve this goal. On the contrary, for those in favor of a strict Economic Union, such solidarity might seem unnecessary.

Second, this specific type of financial help (solidarity at the European level) is grounded on more general attitudes towards redistribution. Following a spillover mechanism, those generally in favor of redistribution could tend to be more in favor of redistribution within the EU (even in this specific form of financial transfer in the context of economic crisis), while those against it, with preferences for lower taxes and reduced public spending will see European financial help as an additional and undesirable expenditure. The centrality of redistribution can also be measured as an ideological position (Inglehart 1977; Kitschelt 1994; Kaltenthaler et al. 2008), we can therefore expect that the further to the left one is, the more central this issue is, and the more in favor of financial help within the EU one is.

Obviously, the question of solidarity brings in the issue of identification with a given political regime and a given community. Indeed, solidarity relies on a sense of "we-feeling". It is thus essential to acknowledge the importance of European identity in this causal chain. Many studies have shown the importance of inclusive identities in the formation of support for Europe and the link between threat to national and group resources and euroscepticism (Carey 2002; McLaren 2002; 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2004; 2005). Unfortunately, due to data's availability, it is not possible to test this dimension in the present analysis. For this reason, the conceptualization of this logic is left to future research.

The political logic is tested through two hypotheses:

H4: Preferences for a *social Europe* yield *stronger* preferences for solidarity at the European level.

H5: The *more important* redistribution is for an individual, the *more in favor* of solidarity at the European level one is.

3. Research design

Data

I rely on Eurobarometer study 74.1 (2010) to investigate individual determinants of European solidarity. This survey dataset includes attitudes towards the economic crisis, its impact on national and European economies, preferences regarding policy options and redistribution. In addition, it includes a direct measure of European solidarity: a variable on preferences for financial help within the EU, together with questions about the motivations for these preferences. The timing of the study is quite peculiar: the survey was fielded between August and September 2010, so three months after the first Greek bailout, and during the negociations for the Irish one (which would occur in November 2010). So the concrete question of financial help within the EU was very high on media and political agenda throughout the Eurozone. Unfortunately, the question about financial help was not replicated in other studies, preventing from analyzing these preferences over time.

Additionnally, Eurobarometer 74.1 has two important limitations. First, it does not include questions about general support for European integration. More details are provided about variables in the enxt sub-section, but it was not possible to control for general support for

Europe using the tradional measiures (the image of the EU, the opinion about EU membership, Trust in the EU an in European institutions in particular). Second, no question about European identity were asked, it is therefore not possible to include this dimension in the potential determinants of European solidarity for the time being.

Dependent variables

The second important limitation of the data used in this paper comes from the way the questions about preferences and motivations for financial help within the EU were asked. Respondents were first asked the following: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: In times of crisis, it is desirable for (our country) to give financial help to another EU Member State facing severe economic and financial difficulties", with a 4-point scale (ranging from 1 "totally disagree" to 4"totally agree"). This variable was standardized and used as the first dependent variable in model 1 (Table 1 displayed in section 4). I use multilevel linear regression to model these preferences while accounting for the non-independence of individual observations within a same country (model is specified with random effects).

In order to know the motivations behind these preferences for financial solidarity at the European level, respondents were then asked a second question: "What is the main reason why you think it is un/desirable that (our country) gives financial help to another EU Member State facing severe economic and financial difficulties?", with different answer categories, depending on their answers to the previous question. Those in favor of financial help were proposed with option a), and could choose between 1 "It is in the financial interests of (our country) to help another EU Member State", and 2 "In the name of European solidarity between Member States", while those against financial help were proposed with option b) and could choose between 1 "It is not in the economic interest of (our country) to help another EU Member State" and 2 "(nationality) citizens should not have to pay for the economic problems of the other EU Member States". So answer categories in the two subsequent questions are conditioned to the answers to the first question on financial help. For this reason it is not possible to include the questions on motivations for preferences about financial help in model 1. The determinants for motivations are thus tested in model 2 (displayed in Table 2 in section 4). Options a) and b) were combined into a one variable, recoded into three categories: 1 "In favor of financial help because in the financial interest of the country", 2 "In favor of financial help in the name of European solidarity" and 3 "not in favor of financial help". The dependent variable is thus a categorical one, and is used in a multilevel multinomial regression with the third category used as the reference one (model is specified with random effects).

Independent variables

In order to test the two logics described with hypotheses 1 and 2, several independent variables are included in the models. First, economic determinants for the rational logic (hypothesis 1) are tested with three sets of variables: opinions on the economic crisis, economic insecurity, and contextual factors. The individual opinions about the economic crisis is measured with two variables. First, with the perceptions of the impact of the crisis on national economy, measured with a three-category variable: fairly significant impact, very significant and no impact. As we want to distinguish between those who perceive their country as strongly hit by the crisis and those who perceived it as inculated, “fairly significant” is the reference category. Second, a measure of pessimism regarding the state of the economy is included: prospective opinion about the return to growth is measured with a 4-point scale, ranging from optimistic prediction ("We are already returning to growth"), to pessimistic prediction ("The crisis is going to last for many years").

Economic insecurity is measured with a continuous measure of financial insecurity (the extent to which household makes ends meet, recoded into 4 categories, ranging from "very easily or easily" to "with difficulty or great difficulty"), and with an ordinal measure of the household's situation (coded 1"poor", 2"neither poor nor rich", and 3"rich", with the middle category used as the reference).

The national economic situation is measured with GDP growth (from 2009 to 2010) (Source: Eurostat) and a binary variable for countries belonging the Eurozone. In model 1, to test the mediating effect of the Eurozone (hypothesis H3, an interaction term (Eurozone*GDP growth) is included.

To test the political logic, political determinants (hypothesis H4) are measured with preferences about the European project, policy preferences about redistribution and ideology. Preferences about the European project are captured through a variable about what should be the policy priority of the European Parliament (EP). Models include three dummy variables: one for an economic project (with the EP's priority being the coordination of economies, budgets and taxes), and two for a social project (with the EP's priority being the building of a European social model, and tackling poverty). Policy preferences regarding redistribution are measured with a binary variable, coded 1 for preferences for higher levels of social spending (conditioned to tax increase), and 0 for lower levels of social spending (conditioned to taxes decrease). Preferences for financial policy response to the crisis is measured with a binary variable, coded 1 for reducing public spending, and 0 for investing or investing and reducing public spending at the same time. Finally, ideology is measured with a 5-point left-right self-positioning scale, used as an ordinal variable.

Additionally, the following controls are included: a binary measure of trust in the EU for fighting poverty (trusting the EU is the reference category)[2], gender (male is the reference category), high level of education age (people who were 22 year old or older when they left school), and age (in years, standardized).

All continuous variables are standardized in order to compare coefficients. Missing values ("don't know" answers and refusals) are, for the time being, recoded as missing and therefore excluded from the analysis.

4. Results

The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps, by replicating the same model on two different dependent variables: first, preferences for financial help within the EU, and second motivations for such preferences. As explained in the previous section, due to the questionnaire's structure, it was not possible to include a direct measure for rational versus solidarity-oriented motivations in the first model. The second analysis provides additional information on how preferences are organized according to these two logics, without producing spurious results. Table 1 below

[2] As explained earlier, Eurobarometer 74.1 does not include other variables tapping general support for Europe, so this specific measure of trust is the only possible measure to control for general support for the EU.

presents the results of model 1: the multilevel linear regression (dependent variable = preferences for financial help within the EU).

The rational logic was operationalized with rival hypotheses, according to which bad economic situation, negative perceptions of the national economic situation, and financial insecurity had a positive effect on preferences for financial help (hypotheses H1a and H2a), or a negative one (hypotheses H1b and H2b). At the individual level, people who perceive the crisis to have had a very negative impact on their national economy (as opposed to having a smaller effect or no effect) are less prone to help other European member states (coefficient of -.05). Prospective evaluation of the crisis yields similar results: the less optimistic people are regarding economic prospect, the less in favor of financial help within the EU (with an effect twice larger: -0.1). In line, those who are financially insecure are have lower preferences for financial help (-0.08). This supports the second set of hypotheses (H1b and H2b), according to which negative perception of the economy and difficult personal situation yield lower preferences for financial help within the EU. European solidarity is not likely to be seen as a compensation mechanism by those who might most benefit from it, but as an unaffordable expense (in line with the luxury good hypothesis) and as a potential threat to already scarce national resources.

Regarding national context, the membership to the Eurozone is key to understand the mechanism at stake. Outside the Eurozone, the higher the growth, the stronger preferences for financial help. The objective economic situation of the country, measured with GDP growth is only significant at the 0.1 level (P value = 0.07), and thus should be treated with caution. A one point increase in growth yields a tenth of a point increase in preferences for financial help (coefficient = +0.1). This would tend to say that individuals in coutries less hit by the crisis tend to be in favor of European solidarity, either because national resources are not threatened by the economic crisis to the same extent thant in countries with worse economic situation, or because financial help is seen as a mean to avoid contagion. The story within the Eurozone is however quite different. Within the Eurozone, groth has a negative effect on preferences for financial help. Figure 1 displays the marginal effect of being in a Eurozone country as growth increases (or to be more accurate, recession decreases).[3] Among countries whose growth is below the mean (below 0), being in the Eurozone yields stronger support for financial help: for a country with a GDP growth of -3, being a member of the Eurozone increases preferences for financial help by more than half a point (.06). However, we see that this marginal effect decreases as growth increases (the difference in terms of preferences for financial help between a Euromember and a non member is only 0.2 for a country with a GDP growth of -.05. And for countries with growth rate above the mean, being a member of the Eurozone does not make a statistically significant difference. It is thus likely that, despite the greater economic dependence within the Eurozone, individuals in countries with better economic situation are more concerned with the cost of financial help than by the importance of containing the crisis by rescuinig other members. Outside the Eurozone, having a better economy might yield a stronger preference for financial help because it is more abstract and less constraining.

For European citizens, financial help within the EU seems to be conditioned to the good state of their own national economy, instead of being determined by a direct cost-benefit calculation according to which those in the worst economic situation would be in favor of redistribution at the European level because they would be the first ones to benefit from it. The rational logic at work here is thus much closer to what we know about national resources, as investigated by McLaren (2006), than to utilitarian support operationalized through net transfer (Gabel 1998). It is likely that individuals are willing to support financial solidarity with other member states when national resources are not too scarce. This shows some support for Hypothesis H1b and H2b. We see that it is not the prospect of potentially benefiting from European financial help that triggers preferences, but on the contrary, it is the threat of having to spend extra money because of such European solidarity.

Turning now to the effect of political determinants in the analysis, results support hypotheses H4 and H5 as formulated in the theory section. First, we see a strong difference in

[3] To facilitate the comparison of coefficients, the GDP growth measure was standardized, yielding values between -3 and +2.5. The reader should however keep in mind that all GDP growth rate in that time were negative, and that the [-3;+2.5] range of values is a mathematical artefact.

preferences for financial help depending on what political project people want for Europe (Hypothesis H3). People for whom the priority of the European Parliament should be to tackle poverty or to coordinate economies and budgets do not express any particular preferences for financial help. On the contrary, those in favor of a European social model have stronger preferences for financial help within the EU (coefficient of +0.12). One can argue that there is a gap between assessing the EP's policy priority and the general direction that European integration should take. This is true, and this measurement is not perfect. However, it still tells us that, in the middle of the Euro crisis, those most in favor of joined financial action are not the one most committed to the Economic and Monetary Union (as captured by the first EP's priority variable, coordinating economies, budgets and taxes), but those committed to a social Europe. In line with this result, preferences for redistribution, whether in the context of the crisis or in general have stronger preferences for financial help. Indeed, to be in favor of more social spending (conditioned to higher taxes) increases by about a tenth of a point the preferences for financial help (as opposed to those in favor of less social spending and lower taxes) (coefficient = +0.09), while being in favor of reducing public expenses to overcome the crisis decreases the preferences by about the same amount (coefficient of -.07). When it comes to redistribution in times of crisis, there seems to be a spillover effect from the national to the European level, and people hold similar views about national and European redistribution. It is further validated with the effect of ideology. We see that people declaring themselves on the right and far right of the ideology scale have lower support for financial help within the EU (coefficient =-0.07 for right, and -0.2 for far right) than those positioning themselves in the center (reference category). Being on the far right yields the stronger effect with a negative effect of -.2. In this case, it is clear that it is not so much that redistribution is not an important issue for these citizens, but that national logic prevent them from feeling in solidarity with other European citizens.

In order to further investigate the motivations in terms of European solidarity and national interest, the effect of these determinants is tested in a second model (model 2 in Table 2 below). The dependent variable has three categories: not being in favor of financial help (base category), being in favor of financial help because it is in the interest of one's country, and being in favor of financial help by solidarity with other European citizens. This helps refine the mechanism revealed in the first analysis.

Due to the specificity of the model (multinomial logit), I report Relative Risk Ratios (RRR). For each answer category on the dependent variable, RRR tells us the predicted risk of chosing this category rather than the reference one (being in favor of financial help for other reason than the country`s benefit or European solidarity). Values below 1 indicate a decrease in the probability of chosing the answer category, while RRRs above 1 indicate an increase in the probability of chosing this answer category over the reference one.

To continue with political determinants, we see that preferences for an Economic Union have no significant effect on the motivations for financial help. However, preferences for a social Europe has a negative effect on economic motivations. In line with Hypothesis 3, those wanting a European social (respondents who want the EP`s priority to be the European social model) are 15% less likely to support financial help because it is in their national financial interest. Additionnally, people who want the EP to tackle poverty are slightly more likely to be in favor of financial help by solidarity with other Europeans (19%, RRR=1.19) than by national interest (13%, RRR=1.13).

The impact of preferences for redistribution confirms what was previously established: there is a spillover effect from preferences for redistribution at the national level to preferences for redistribution at the European level, in accordance with hypothesis H5. Those in favor of more social spending have 19% less chance to support financial help by interest, while those in favor of reducing public spending have 19% less chances to do so by European solidarity (both RRR = 0.81). Regarding ideology, we see that it has a slightly different effect on the two motivations (national financial interest versus European solidarity). On the one hand, people on the far left have 20% more chances to be motivated by a feeling of solidarity (RRR of 1.2). Additionnally, those on the left have 18% less chances to be motivated by national financial interest as compared to respondents who position themselves on the center of the left-right scale. We see no significant different between those in the center and those on the right. However, people who position themselves on the far right of the scale have more chances to support financial help for national economic reason. It is quite surprising that . Part of this group also supports financial help based on a feeling of solidarity with other Europeans (they have 20% more chances to do so than people at the center of the scale). Given the well-established relationship between the far right, exclusive naitonal identity and euroscepticism, this result is quite surprising and deserves more attention (and would require information about attachment to the different communities and more extensive measure of general attitudes towards the EU). Neverthelss, while studies about general support for European integration have not yet produced clear empirical evidence of some congruence between left-right positioning and the amount of support for Europe, these results show that, under the specific context of economic crisis and when citizens are asked a direct question on financial solidarity, the left-right scale strongly matters.

Finally, turning to the effect of economic determinants, we see that Hypotheses H1b and H2b still hold. The the perception of the crisis' impact on national economy, as well as the prospective evaluation of the crisis have a similar effect on both types of motivations, and are in line with what was found in the first analysis: the more negatively people evaluate the economic situation (whether it is retrospective or prospective), the less likely they are to feel in solidarity with other Europeans. Those who find that the crisis have had a very significant impact on national economy are 10% less likely to support financial help based on solidarity. When those who are pessimistic about the crisis support financial help within the EU, they have 25% more chances to be motivated by national economic interest, and this lieklyhood goes up to a third in the case of financially insecure citizens (RRR=1.29). On the contrary, people who declare themselves as rich are 10% less likely to support financial help because they think it is in the interest of their country. In line with the results of model 1, the feeling of solidarirty with other Europeans is a luxury: it motivates preferences for financial help but mostly among citizens who are not worried about their personal situation or their country's. At the contextual level, we find the same logic than establisehd with model 1: citizens from countries that suffer less from the crisis are more prone to exhibit solidarity (10% more likely, RRR=1.1, while having 13% less chances to be motivated by economic interest. Although it is not possible to test this explanation with the present data, it is likely that when the national economy is not performing too badly, or when individuals feels secure about their personal financial situation, they are willing to allocate a share of national resources to solve the economic crisis in the European Union. Generally speaking, there is an effect of the Eurozone membership, with respondents whose countries share the currency to be 10% more likely to support financial help by solidarity.However, the interaction term shows a reverse logic (in line with Model 1): within the Eurozone, the more resilient the country is to recession (the higher its GDP growth), the more likely its respondents are to support financial help for economic reason, being aware of the strong interdependence of national economies wihtin the common currency area. A one point increase in growth yields almost 30% more chances to express an economic motivation (RRR=1.28), while the same amount of change decreases by 20% the chances to express a feeling of solidarity with Europeans (RRR=0.8).

To conclude, preferences for financial help within the EU are influenced by a cost/benefit calculation as well as by political attitudes. European solidarity, as expressed by support for a financial mechanism to help other European members to overcome the economic crisis, can be triggered by preferences for redistribution at the national level, pointing at a spillover mechanism from political attitudes constructed within the national arena and related to national policy, to the EUropean level. Citizens most in favor of redistribution seem to naturally extent their preferences to European redistribution in the context of the current economic crisis. However, such feeling of solidarity is a luxury: those most likely to exhibit it are the ones less likely to directly benefit from such financial transfer. On the contrary, for financially insecure citizens and those with negative prospects, European solidarity is an unaffordable expense. The situation within the Eurozone is particular, with a reversed logic that seemed to be determined by direct financial cost/benefit calculation. The highest support for a financial help is found among the countries undergoing the strongest recession, while those doing better are a) less likely to support financial help, and b) when doing so they are more likley to be motivated by economic interest than a feeling of solidarity with other Europeans.

The analysis presented here suffers from several caveats. First and foremost, the absence of information about individual attachment to the different levels of governance and of general measure of support for Europe made it ipossible to properly study the role national and identities are lilely playing in the formation of these opinions. Second, three years and four additional bailouts later, those attitudes are likely to have evolved, especially due to the increased gap between national economies within the Eurozone and after the hypothetical question of financial help became a reality with the announcement of Eurobonds in December 2010. Further research is in particular needed to investigate in a more comprehensive manner the impact of economic conditions on preferences for financial help within and outside the Eurozone.

Table 1. Individual and contextual determinants of preferences for financial help within the EU

	Coef.	Sd. Error
*Economic determinants:		
Crisis' impact on national economy: very significant impact	**-0.054*** **	(0.016)
Crisis' impact on national economy: no impact	-0.040	(0.030)
Prospective evaluation of the crisis (optimistic)	**-0.100*** **	(0.008)
Financial insecurity (no insecurity)	**-0.081*** **	(0.010)
Household situation: poor	-0.007	(0.021)
Household situation: rich	0.027	(0.018)
Growth	0.104	(0.058)
Euro zone	0.114	(0.073)
Euro zone * Growth	**-0.165* **	(0.074)
*Political determinants:		
EP political priority: economy	-0.001	(0.016)
EP political priority: European social model	**0.124*** **	(0.021)
EP political priority: tackling poverty	-0.004	(0.015)
Preferred action against crisis: reduce public spending	**-0.060*** **	(0.015)
Policy preferences: more social spending	**0.091*** **	(0.016)
Ideology: Left	0.014	(0.030)
Ideology: Center	-0.045	(0.027)
Ideology: Right	**-0.069* **	(0.030)
Ideology: Far right	**-0.203*** **	(0.037)
*Controls		
Trust EU for fighting poverty	**-0.269*** **	(0.015)
Gender: female	-0.026	(0.015)
Education age: 22+	**0.111*** **	(0.018)
Age	-0.014	(0.008)
Constant	0.411***	(0.072)
Observations	15,953	
Groups (country)	27	
Log-Likelihood	-21410.72	
AIC	42871.44	
BIC	43063.37	

Empty model: Log-Likelihood (-22987.24), AIC (45980.49), BIC (46003.66).

Entries are unstandardized coefficient from multilevel linear regression. Reference categories: Crisis' impact on national economy (fairly significant impact), Household situation (neither poor nor rich), Ideology (Far left). All continuous variables are standardized
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure 1. Marginal effect of GDP growth on preferences for financial help within the EU, for Euro zone members



Table 2. Individual and contextual determinants of motivation for financial help within the EU

	Motivation:national economic interest		Motivation: European solidarity	
	RRR	**Sd. Error**	**RRR**	**Sd. Error**
***Economic determinants:**				
Crisis' impact on national economy: very significant impact	1.0916	0.0504	**0.9094***	0.043
Crisis' impact on national economy: no impact	1.0513	0.0906	0.9772	0.0835
Prospective evaluation of the crisis	**1.2479*****	0.0292	1.0163	0.0241
Financial insecurity	**1.2873*****	0.0351	**1.0956****	0.031
Household situation: poor	0.9596	0.0581	0.9444	0.0605
Household situation: rich	**0.8997***	0.0468	0.9605	0.05
Growth	**0.8729*****	0.0317	**1.1130****	0.04
Euro zone	0.9483	0.0425	**1.1015***	0.0516
Euro zone * Growth	**1.2777*****	0.057	**0.8030*****	0.0354
***Political determinants:**				
EP political priority: economy	1.0382	0.0487	0.9863	0.0478
EP political priority: European social model	**0.8710***	0.0533	1.0917	0.0665
EP political priority: tackling poverty	**1.1308****	0.0493	**1.1905*****	0.0532
Preferred action against crisis: reduce public spending	1.0868	0.0477	**0.8180*****	0.0374
Policy preferences: more social spending	**0.8110*****	0.0381	0.923	0.0453
Ideology: Far left	0.9625	0.0789	**1.2061***	0.0996
Ideology: Left	**0.8277*****	0.0472	0.9566	0.055
Ideology: Right	1.1068	0.0634	0.9788	0.0578
Ideology: Far right	**1.6405*****	0.1486	**1.2107***	0.1162
***Controls**				
Trust EU for fighting poverty	**1.0660****	0.0241	**1.0589***	0.0246
Gender: female	**1.1012***	0.0473	1.0761	0.0474
Education age: 22+	**0.7376*****	0.0384	1.0623	0.0539
Age	**1.6939*****	0.0738	**0.9112***	0.041
Constant	0.8458	0.0992	1.4823**	0.1776
Observations	15,201			
Groups (country)	27			
Log-Likelihood	-15612.48			
AIC	31316.97			
BIC	31667.91			

Empty model: Log-Likelihood (-16694.46), AIC (33394.92), BIC (33417.94).
Entries are Relative Risk Ratios, obtained with a multilevel multinomial logit model
Reference categories: Dependent variable (not in favor of financial help), Crisis' impact on national economy (fairly significant impact), Household situation (neither poor nor rich), Ideology (center). All continuous variables are standardized.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

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