

# **International Organizations, Transatlantic Cooperation and the 'Globalization' of Homeland Security**

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## **Abstract**

The present paper seeks to critically examine the claim that homeland security is becoming a 'globalized' policy field. Despite the growing standardization of key policies and practices at international level and the greater profile and impact of international organizations (IOs), powerful national players with a direct stake in security matters (i.e. the United States and European governments) have continued to control the policy agenda and used IOs to cajole other partners to follow their lead. Using as case studies the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the World Customs Organization (WCO), and focusing on their activities in two issue-areas (aviation and supply chain security), the paper illustrates how, thanks to the efforts of European and North American policy-makers within these organizations, the emerging global homeland security field has acquired a distinctive 'transatlantic' imprint.

## **Introduction**

Encouraging greater engagement with foreign partners, be it governments or international organizations, in areas such as intelligence, law enforcement and border security has become a recurring mantra in national security strategies formulated around the world in the last decade

(Bowman, 2007)<sup>1</sup>. The internationalization of homeland security - a policy field traditionally focused on 'internal' matters - has been presented as a necessary move in order to address the complexity and cross border nature of contemporary threats and justified on the grounds that governments have a common interest in addressing them (Nemeth 2010).

Despite these proclamations of intent, in practice the extent of this policy shift has been limited. Rather than a strategic priority, international cooperation has tended to be reactive and half-hearted, often imposed on other partners, and practiced mostly through informal bilateral channels. This has been especially the case for the main policy player in this area, namely the United States, whose actions have been described as making "only a brief genuflection to the need for international cooperation" (Echevarria and Tussing 2003). This ambiguous attitude towards internationalization, combined with the highly political nature of the issues at stakes, has led to frequent tensions, even between purported allies (e.g. the US and Europe). It is not surprising, then, that the level of cooperation achieved has generally been shallow.

Since 9/11 recurrent and ever evolving threats (e.g. the attempts to use 'dirty bombs' on planes, cyberterrorism) have kept homeland security at the top of political agendas. After a decade of frenetic activity, however, this policy field is entering a new phase. This phase's key feature is the quest to formalize and standardize existing security policies and practices and to expand their geographical reach to include an ever larger number of countries around the world. This 'globalization' of homeland security is not a new phenomenon, but it has visibly accelerated in recent times and it has acquired distinctive features. First, it involves a deeper level of cooperation among governments and other interested parties than the one that characterized the initial post 9/11 responses. The premise for this enhanced cooperation is the assumption that there is a general consensus on the identification and responses to current security threats and a greater awareness that governments around the world have a shared responsibility to act collectively in this policy area. Second, international policy actors not traditionally involved with security matters are playing a more prominent role in this domain. This is especially the case for functional international organizations affiliated with the United Nations (e.g. the World Customs

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<sup>1</sup> Exemplary in this regard are the cases of the 2002 US National Strategy for Homeland Security (p. 59) and the 2004 Canada National Security Policy (pp. 37-40).

Organizations, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Maritime Organization). In recent years, these organizations have expanded their remit and introduced new strategies and institutional arrangements related to security. They have also actively supported the standardization of security practices and help diffuse them globally.

Changes affecting homeland security have been significant. However, whether this policy field has become a truly “global enterprise” (Napolitano 2011), as some policy-makers have claimed, especially in the West, is questionable. Although international organizations have acquired a greater profile, powerful national players with a direct stake in these matters (i.e. the United States and European governments) have continued to steer the policy process and to cajole other partners to follow their lead. Indeed, the recent strengthening of existing institutional and policy partnership in security matters between European and North American policy-makers has led to the creation of a ‘transatlanticized’ version of the emerging global homeland security field. While this outcome is contributing to this policy field’s consolidation, it also raises questions about the actual depth of existing cooperation and its future viability.

The paper is organized as follows. The first two sections examine the ‘globalizing’ role of international organizations in the homeland security field, using as case studies two of the most active actors in this domain, the International Civil Aviation organization (ICAO) and the World Customs Organization (WCO), and focusing on their efforts in two issue areas, namely aviation and supply chain security. The third section looks at the attempts by the United States, the European Union and its member states to promote the globalization of homeland security through ICAO and WCO. The concluding section considers the implications of these trends for homeland security as policy field and its future.

### **Globalizing homeland security: ICAO and Aviation security**

Modern aviation security developed in the 1970s as a result of the growth in commercial air transportation and the first high profile cases of aircraft hijacking (Szyliowicz, 2004). It is in this period, for instance, that the first screenings of passengers and luggage were introduced. Since then, more regulatory regimes and oversight were implemented at national level, especially

in countries affected by terrorist threats (i.e. United States, Europe, Israel). These policy developments tended to be reactive, occurring in response to an incident that had just occurred (e.g. the creation of the Aviation Security Panel in the aftermath of the 1985 Air India bombing). At the international level, provisions for aviation security were first introduced in the context of the International Civil Aviation Organization with the creation in 1974 of a security-related addendum to the Chicago Convention ('Annex 17')<sup>2</sup>. ICAO also started to assist member states in the implementation of international security measures, through the *Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference*<sup>3</sup>.

It is only after 9/11, however, that aviation security became a top priority in international security circles (Szyliowicz 2004). Since then, governments have introduced stricter rules and controls to prevent terrorist attacks or other types of security threats at airports and on aeroplanes. International organizations, and ICAO in particular, have become more involved in this policy field as well. ICAO's traditional security-related remit, which focused on the development of *Standards and Recommended Practices* (SARPs)<sup>4</sup>, has been broadened to include policy initiatives, capability audits, and assistance to States with limited capabilities. ICAO's other activities in the field of aviation security include efforts to enhance the security of travel documents and improve the training of security personnel. In addition, the organization provides support for regional security initiatives with the aim of strengthening aviation security globally.

ICAO's institutional framework has been strengthened as well. In addressing the evolving threat to civil aviation, the organization relies on the advice of experts who sit on the Aviation Security (AVSEC) Panel. Established in the late 1980s, the Panel is currently comprised of 27 members nominated by States, as well as five observers from industry. Together with the ICAO Secretariat, the Panel develops ICAO security policy and strategies to address

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<sup>2</sup> The Chicago Convention (also known as the Convention on International Civil Aviation) is the key legal document of the international aviation regime. It establishes rules of airspace, aircraft registration and safety, and details the rights of the signatories in relation to air travel. It entered into effect in 1947.

<sup>3</sup> For an overview of the role of IOs in aviation security before 9/11, see Wallis 1998

<sup>4</sup> SARPs are technical specifications adopted by the ICAO Council, which are published as Annex to the Chicago Convention.

current and future threats<sup>5</sup>. The management of these policies (aviation security, facilitation and machine-readable travel documents) are the responsibility of the Aviation Security and Facilitation Policy (SFP) Section of the Aviation Security Branch. SFP also develops new and amended Standards and Recommended Practices for the security and facilitation of international air transport. Recently ICAO also introduced an Aviation Security Point of Contact (PoC) Network. Through this network the organization share information and recommendations and facilitate communication among member States regarding potential threats to civil aviation.<sup>6</sup>

The increasing role of ICAO in matters of aviation security has put pressure on the organization to devise a new and more comprehensive strategy. Changes have in fact been mostly incremental and without a clear common vision. It is in this context that in February 2010 the ICAO Council approved the Comprehensive Aviation Security Strategy (ICASS). This document highlights seven focus areas, with the goal of rendering more efficient the use of resources. At the bi-annual ICAO general conference held later that year, the Assembly endorsed the new security strategy. It also issued a *Declaration on Aviation Security* in which ICAO member states committed to enhance aviation security globally and foster international cooperation in this policy area.

In terms of standardization of programs with a security component, ICAO has pushed member states to adopt internationally recognized requirements for the transmission of advance passenger information (API) data and agreed on a new set of guidelines for the national implementation of passenger name record (PNR) data exchange programs. By 2013, most member states had also issued machine readable passports (MRPs) that follow ICAO guidelines.

### **Globalizing homeland security: the WCO and Supply Chain Security**

One of the side effects of the growing interconnectedness characterizing today's global economy is the increased attractiveness of economic systems as targets of terrorist attacks.

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<sup>5</sup> Aside from the AVSEC Panel, other bodies of experts that play a pivotal role in ICAO's security work are the Ad Hoc Group of Specialists on the Detection of Explosives and the International Explosives Technical Commission.

<sup>6</sup> The network was used, for instance, in the aftermath of the attempted sabotage on a US-bound Air Cargo on 25 December 2009.

Since 9/11 countries whose economies heavily rely on international trade have recognized this vulnerability and introduced new strategies to address it. An issue that has received special attention is the protection of the transnational networks of economic agents producing, handling and distributing goods to be traded, or what in business jargon is known as ‘international supply chain security’ (Grainger 2007; Wielan 2009). Advance cargo information is the key feature of this security arrangement. The principle that relevant information about goods to be transported overseas can be provided to customs before arrival is not new (Ireland 2011: 5). Since 9/11, however, there has been a remarkable expansion and refinement of supply chain security measures around the world. The most notorious are the ones adopted by the United States, such as the *Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism* (C-TPAT) and *Container Security Initiative* (CSI) programs (Laden 2007; Browning 2003). Other countries and regional organizations such as the European Union have followed the US led in this regard<sup>7</sup>.

The idea of creating more coherent global standards in this policy area was raised at the first post 9/11 annual summit of the leading industrialized countries (‘G8’). The relevant document produced at that meeting (‘Cooperative G8 Action on Transport Security’<sup>8</sup>) committed G8 members to work towards the establishment at common rules within the WCO framework and highlighted the need to encourage non G8 members to come on board. The text also mentions the idea of a global container security program.

Following on the G8 call, the WCO established a task force to secure global trade, whose mandate was to outline a series of guidelines regarding the supply chain management which could balance facilitation and security (*Customs Guidelines on Integrated Supply Chain Management*; Ireland 2009: 7). To raise the task force’s profile, in 2004 a high level strategic group with 12 WCO members was created. It is this group which came up with the key initiative of the emerging globalized paradigm in this period, namely the *Framework of Standards to*

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<sup>7</sup> See, for instance, the European Union’s Security Amendment to the Customs Code (648/2005/EC); Sweden’s *StairSec*® program; Canada’s Partnership in Protection program; New Zealand’s Secure Export program; Australia’s Frontline program; Japan’s Advance Filing Rules on Cargo, Crew and Passenger Information, China’s 24-hour Advance Manifest Rule.

<sup>8</sup> The text of the declaration is available at <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2002kananaskis/transport.html>

*Secure and Facilitate Global Trade* (SAFE), agreed upon in 2005<sup>9</sup>. SAFE is a non binding policy document that includes a series of technical standards related to the protection of international trade. These standards are divided into two pillars (customs to customs network arrangements and customs-business partnerships; Ireland 2009: 9). An important component of the security chain approach is the emphasis on information and intelligence sharing between Customs administrations. It is for this purpose that the WCO supported the creation of a Global Network of Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices (RILOs) and Customs Enforcement Network (CEN). One of the effects of these developments is that the WCO, as it had been the case for ICAO, has acquired a new and expanded role in security related matters.<sup>10</sup> In the last decade the WCO has taken a leadership role in establishing international standards which were then taken up in national customs security policies. The emergence of such policies has in turn contributed to the emergence of a customs supply chain security ‘paradigm’ (Ireland 2011; see also Altemöller 2013)<sup>11</sup>.

### **Globalizing homeland security: the transatlantic connection**

North American and European governments – both individually and through the European Union - have been among the most enthusiastic supporters of the quest to globalize the homeland security policy field. In the case of the United States, the premise for its enhanced engagement is

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<sup>9</sup> The WCO was not the only intergovernmental agency developing new supply chain security programs. For instance, in 2003 the International Maritime Organization developed the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS). The International Air Transportation Association (IATA) also introduced the ‘known shipper’ concept (2006).

<sup>10</sup> This is especially the case for the Customs Enforcement and Compliance, the unit responsible for implementation of security programs. Activities under its competence include information and intelligence exchange, combating commercial fraud, counterfeiting, smuggling, drug trafficking, stolen motor vehicles, money laundering, electronic crime.

<sup>11</sup> This paradigm consists of pre-shipping data submission requirements; the adoption of advanced risk management methods; the reliance on non-intrusive container cargo scanning; and the introduction of preclearance certifications to selected economic operators (Ireland 2011).

that in the provision of security there is a “shared responsibility”<sup>12</sup>, involving not just governments, but also the private sector, individuals and communities. As a result, homeland security should become a truly “global enterprise”, based on strong international engagement and cooperative efforts at the international level (Bowman 2007)<sup>13</sup>. The European Union and its member states have also upgraded their commitment to engage with international partners. References to the need to ‘globalize’ its approach are indeed present in key EU strategic documents such as the European Commission’s “Strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice” (2005: 2, 7) and in the 2009 Stockholm program on the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (p.73).

For the United States and its European partners, working through international organizations has become a central feature of this global strategy. For both sides, IOs represent the ideal forums where to diffuse favoured homeland security policies. This stance stems not just from these organizations’ global reach and the relative flexibility in setting standards that they assure (thanks to the reliance on ‘soft’ legal instruments such as resolutions, principles, and guidelines), but also because of the legitimacy that they carry. This issue was particularly important for the US in the aftermath of 9/11, when, under these international institutions’ cover, unpopular policies could be ‘sold’ more persuasively to recalcitrant countries sceptical of the US-led ‘War on Terror’<sup>14</sup>. For critics, by setting the agenda in these forums the US and the EU and its member states have been practising a sort of “policy laundering” (Hayes 2012) at the international level. Examples of controversial policies that have been ‘laundered’ include measures relating to the surveillance of telecommunications and the introduction of biometric passports.

The approach deployed by the US government and its European counterparts to influence these organizations’ workings is based on individual and joint efforts. The next section examines this two pronged approach, focusing on the cases of ICAO and WCO.

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<sup>12</sup> On the role that “shared responsibility” plays in US homeland security strategy, see Napolitano 2011.

<sup>13</sup> “Global enterprise” is a recurring theme in US official documents related to homeland security since 2009.

<sup>14</sup> It should be noted that this emphasis on IOs during the Bush administration co-existed with public criticisms of international forums as mere ‘talking shops’.

## *The United States, ICAO and WCO*

The United States has traditionally been an influential player in setting international standards in the international aviation sector. Because of the size of US civil aviation operations, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules and regulations have frequently affected other jurisdictions. Although this influence was apparent before 9/11 (Willis 1997), since then it has become more direct and organized, with political involvement at high level. Department of Homeland Security secretaries and the Transport Security Administration officials, for instance, have been active in forums such as ICAO's High-Level Conference on Aviation Security to encourage the adoption of policies consistent with their security philosophy (e.g. the Passenger Name Record program). US pressure on the World Customs Organization over issues of trade security has been apparent as well. The WCO's *Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade* mentioned earlier has a notable US 'footprint' on it. The two pillars that constitute the Framework (customs-customs network arrangements and customs-business partnerships) are clearly based on the 2002 US Container Security Initiative and the 2001 C-TPAT. Indeed, these two pillars can be considered "globalized versions" of the US programs (Ireland 2009: 9). The US government has continued to advocate for greater standardization within the WCO. In 2011, for instance, DHS Secretary Napolitano spearhead a partnership with the WCO "to enlist" other states and IOs in a quest to increase the security of global supply chain and render it "stronger, smarter and more resilient"<sup>15</sup>. The US has also actively encouraged other countries, especially developing nations, to adopt international standards. In 2005, for instance, the US Customs and Border Protection created a Capacity Building Division within its Office of International Affairs to help developing nations implement the Framework of security standards and to do in collaboration with the Directorate for Capacity Building at the WCO<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> *Policy Briefing on securing the global supply chain*, Report, organized by the European Policy Centre in Brussels Brussels, 6 January 2011, Report, organized by the European Policy Centre in Brussels

<sup>16</sup> *Making Secure Worldwide Trade a Reality - United States Joins New WCO Framework of Standards*, DHS Press Release, 06/24/2005.

### *The European Union, ICAO and WCO*

Since it started to be active on the international sphere, the EU has supported the formulation of common standards in various policy areas and hailed international organizations as ideal forums where to elaborate new global initiatives. This has been the case for internal security matters as well. This ostensibly ‘communitarian’ approach, however, hides a more aggressive streak. As hinted in the ‘Strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice’, when dealing with security issues, the Union will “use its significant relationship with third countries as an incentive for them to adopt and implement relevant international standards and obligations on JHA issues” (p.5), and, in a more ominous way, warns that these countries “should be aware that the nature of their relationship with the EU will be positively affected by their level of co-operation, given the central importance of these issues for the EU and its Member States” (ibid.)

This ambivalent approach is apparent in recent experiences of the EU within ICAO on matters of security. Historically, Europe’s collective power in this institution has been expressed through the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC; Wallis 1998). ECAC is a subordinate body to ICAO and regional in its responsibility; however, four of its member states - the UK, France, Germany and Italy - are permanent members of the ICAO Council. As a former ICAO director attests, ECAC proposes and implement policies procedures “well in advance of those established by the UN body and indeed can usually draw on its member states’ collective experience with new procedures when proposing or supporting the introduction of standards and recommended practices in the world forum” (Wallis 1998: 93)<sup>17</sup>.

More recently, the EU has attempted to project its power as a collective entity within ICAO, in parallel to the activities of its member states. In September 2005, the European Commission, the EU executive branch, established an office at ICAO’s headquarters in Montreal. It has now observer status within the organization. Among the EU delegation’s main tasks is to “foster the influence and effectiveness of the Community in the policies of ICAO”<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup> See, for instance, ECAC Policy Statement in the Field Of Civil Aviation Facilitation (DOC30, 2003) [http://www.policylaunders.org/archives/ICAO/ECAC\\_Document\\_30.pdf](http://www.policylaunders.org/archives/ICAO/ECAC_Document_30.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> The European Union at ICAO, Official website, [http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international\\_aviation/european\\_community\\_icao/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international_aviation/european_community_icao/index_en.htm)

The greater EU involvement within ICAO is reflected in the area of security. It is in this context that in May 2011 the EU signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with ICAO to create a framework for closer cooperation in the fields of safety, security, air traffic management and environment, and established a Joint Committee to manage the activities mentioned in the agreement<sup>19</sup>. One of the results of the EU's growing institutional presence and clout within ICAO is that EU member states have started to outline and implement a more coherent and focused common strategy within the organization when dealing with security matters in order to advance European interests<sup>20</sup>.

Customs is one of the policy area in which the EU has the more long standing and influential roles in the context of the European integration project, for EU institutions have exclusive competence in this policy domain. The EU has taken advantage of this power to introduce security-related customs policies in Europe. This is the case, for instance, of the cargo information regulation called Pre-arrival/Predeparture Declarations (2011) and the Authorized Economic Operator program (2008), two of the key pillars of the EU Customs Security Programme introduced in 2005<sup>21</sup>.

The EU presence within WCO is more recent than at ICAO and thus its impact is less marked. The EU has nonetheless enhanced visibility within this organization. In 2007, the Council of the WCO accepted the request of the EU to join the organization. This decision granted the regional organization rights and obligations akin to those enjoyed by WCO

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<sup>19</sup>The security aspects of the MOC were elaborated in a Safety Annex/Annex on aviation security, which the EU/ICAO Joint Committee adopted in 2011. Available at <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/sep/eu-com-icao-implementing-agreement-12872-12.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> This new approach is reflected by the actions of EU member states, which have been very active in promoting EU-led policies within the organization. In 2010, for instance, Belgium, acting on behalf of the EU, submitted a policy paper to ICAO to review the organization's security standards (Art 17) Aviation Security Policy ("Assessment of Annex 17 - Security from a threat and risk perspective", paper Presented by Belgium on behalf of the European Union and its Member States and by the other States Members of the European Civil Aviation Conference, ICAO Working paper A37-WP/101, EX/2526/8/10). In this document the Belgian delegation (on behalf of the EU) calls for the introduction of the concepts of unpredictability and behaviour detection in the provision of aviation security.

<sup>21</sup> The EU Customs Security Programme covers activities supporting the development and implementation of measures enhancing security through improved customs controls.

Members. The EU has become a contracting party to several WCO Conventions, and contributes to the work of this organisation. Membership of the WCO highlights and confirms the central role and competence of the Community in international discussions on customs issues, including supply chain security standards.

### **ICAO, WCO and the transatlantic axis**

Since 9/11 transatlantic cooperation in the homeland security field has intensified. Public officials from both sides (from ministers, to senior officials and experts) have regularly met in a variety of newly established institutional forums (e.g. the 'Transatlantic Dialogue' on counter-terrorism) to discuss issues of common concern. The subjects of these discussions include the fight against terrorism and transnational crime, law enforcement and information exchange for law enforcement, protection of personal data, border management, visa and migration policies. Thanks to this deeper engagement, the United States and its European partners have concluded various agreements on issues ranging from the transfer of passenger name records to the processing and transfer of financial messaging data, and formalized the collaboration between security agencies on both sides of the Atlantic (e.g. between the US and Europol). As noted, during the Bush administration the transatlantic partnership has been fraught with mistrust and recurrent bouts of tension. With the advent of the Obama administration and the shadow of the Iraq crisis receding, this relationship has been revamped, with the addition of a clearer strategic vision. This new approach was encapsulated by the *EU-US Joint Statement* of October 2009<sup>22</sup>, which set out a common commitment to cooperation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs area for the following five years. The emphasis is enhancing policy and operational cooperation in areas such as mobility and law enforcement, and to ensure that early consultations would be held for new policy developments affecting the other partner. The types of cooperation mentioned are exchange of information on policy and operational initiatives, sharing

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<sup>22</sup> EU-US Joint Statement on "Enhancing transatlantic cooperation in the area of Justice, Freedom and Security" (October 2009) [http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy\\_eu\\_us\\_joint\\_statement\\_oct\\_2009.pdf](http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_eu_us_joint_statement_oct_2009.pdf)  
See also United States and European Commission Implementing Arrangement (PDF, 5 pages – 379 KB) – November 18, 2010

experiences and best practices, reinforcing cross-border law enforcement and judicial cooperation, and the organization of joint training and expert meetings.

As the Joint Statement clearly spells out, this transatlantic partnership is based on “the common commitment to work together in international forums towards full implementation of multilateral obligations and work cooperatively where issues of common interest arise.” This attention to IOs is not new. Since 9/11, the US and EU have worked together to push some of their favourite homeland security initiatives on global or regional forums’ agendas<sup>23</sup>. Recently this joint activity has become more intense and coordinated. Such pattern of enhanced cooperation is evident in the aviation security field. Spurred by the attempted attack on a Detroit-bound aircraft on 25th December 2009, high level officials from the US and EU (Ministers of the Member States, the Vice President of the European Commission and the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security) discussed ways to address common security threats but also foster a “global dialogue” on securing international travel<sup>24</sup>. This ongoing discussion has led in 2011 to the signing of the Cooperation Agreement on Civil Aviation Safety<sup>25</sup>. This agreement aims at improving safety standards in transport by air and achieving greater harmonization across the Atlantic on these issues. To foster practical cooperation, the two sides have discussed the idea of presenting joint papers at ICAO.

Examples of this common purpose are also present in the area of supply chain security. In 2011, for instance, the EU and DHS released joint statements on Global Supply Chain Security committing to a common effort to protect the supply chain system<sup>26</sup>. Since then the

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<sup>23</sup> The G8, the annual meeting of the leaders of the world’s most industrialized countries, for example, since 2004 has started to develop a set of guidelines and best practices to improve the security of travel documents, including the use of biometrics, which, in turn, the International Civil Aviation Organization has agreed to adopt as international standards.

<sup>24</sup> U.S.-EU Joint Declaration on Aviation Security, January 21, 2010, Available at <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2010/01/21/us-eu-joint-declaration-aviation-security>.

<sup>25</sup> The text of the EU-US Cooperation Agreement on Civil Aviation Safety is available at , [http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=7730\\_](http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=7730_)

<sup>26</sup> Joint Statement on supply-chain security June 23, 2011. Available at [http://ec.europa.eu/taxation\\_customs/resources/documents/common/whats\\_new/eu\\_us\\_joint\\_statement\\_protocol\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/whats_new/eu_us_joint_statement_protocol_en.pdf). As part of

two sides have been close to a mutual recognition agreement between trade partnership programs (trusted traders). Both the US and its European counterparts agree that the WCO is the forum where this cooperation can have the most substantial impact. This is one of the reasons why they supported this organization in its effort to establish *Global Shield*, an international program whose aim is to prevent the smuggling of dangerous materials. As the ICAO and WCO cases attest, a transatlantic partnership to ‘globalize’ homeland security has therefore taken shape, leaving an important mark on this policy field’s current policies and practices.

## **Conclusion**

The policy field of homeland security has experienced important changes in recent times. Although not completely eliminated, the reactive, unilateral features that characterized the post 9/11 early phases have subsided and given way to a more collaborative and comprehensive approach. Governments around the world have pushed for greater international cooperation and international organizations have become major focal point for the expansion of this new policy agenda. This ‘globalizing’ trend is now consolidating. This is evidenced, for instance, in the growth in collaborative practices between international organizations on matters of homeland security. IOs began working together in the aftermath of 9/11. In 2003, for example, the World Customs Organization and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) initiated the Container Control Program enhancing port surveillance in developing countries. These inter IOs activities have proliferated in recent years. In order to protect the global supply chain, the WCO has partnered with UNODC and INTERPOL to implement the Program Global Shield. In 2013, the Secretaries General of ICAO and WCO and their counterparts at the International Maritime Organization started a strategic dialogue on supply chain risk management issues with the aim of enhancing collaboration and coordination between their Organizations on aviation, border and maritime security. The three organizations are also been actively working on the

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these efforts, the US has also concluded a series of research and technology agreements with the European Union and some of its member states (France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK).

harmonization of their respective international frameworks for aviation, border and maritime supply chain security and facilitation.

Despite their activism and efforts to carve out a more independent role for themselves, IOs in the homeland security realm are still heavily dependent on their member states' political will and agenda setting powers when it comes to establishing new practices and international standards. In this context, these organizations' most powerful members are still running the show. This is especially the case for the United States and its European counterparts. The transatlantic push to include cybersecurity as a priority issue in IOs' policy agenda is the latest example of this state of affairs. In 2011 the US government released a new *International Strategy for Cyberspace*<sup>27</sup> whose explicit objective is that of providing the foundations for an international framework to render cyberspace more secure (pp.22-3). The US and EU have been working together to enhance the protection of cyberspace, focusing on the protection of electronic systems and networks that facilitate global trade, travel, and communication. The two partners have also established a *U.S.-EU Working Group on Cybersecurity and Cybercrime* to discuss ways to fight cybercrime, and to formulate common positions to be brought to the attention of international forums.

The ongoing globalization of homeland security is therefore likely to maintain a strong transatlantic imprint. One of the most troublesome implications of the continuous popularity of 'policy laundering' methods at international level is that an ever larger number of controversial security practices affecting citizens' lives are formulated and implemented through technocratic and opaque processes. What transpires from the recent 'Datagate' scandal, where the US government has been accused of spying on a massive scale on citizens and policy-makers around the world, is that the lack of accountability defining the current 'globalizing' trend in the homeland security field can lead to unchecked hubris, and, as a result, the potential for a backlash. The globalization of homeland security, at least in its current form, is thus not inevitable.

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<sup>27</sup> Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss\\_viewer/international\\_strategy\\_for\\_cyberspace.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf).



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