

EU Strategic Culture and the 2011 Libyan War

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Abstract

Since the Maastricht Treaty came into force in 1992, the EU has sought to enhance its capacity as an actor within security policy. An important step in this process was the 2003 European Security Strategy, which introduced the EU goal of developing a common European strategic culture. The conflict in Libya in many ways seemed an ideal opportunity for the EU to manifest itself as an important security actor, and to fulfill its strategic ambitions as they are described in the 2003 European Security Strategy. Instead, due to internal disagreements on the use of force, the EU was unable to forge a common position of any importance and therefore once again remained peripheral.

This article examines the strategic culture of the European Union and what the conflict in Libya, 2011, tells us about the emergence of such a strategic culture and the EU's capacity as an actor in security policy. It argues that the divergence in national strategic cultures within the EU remains a major obstacle for the EU's ambitions to take more responsibility in the realm of security policy, and that the scope for future EU action in the hard security field is even narrower than previously imagined. The conflict in Libya showed just how far the EU is from having developed a proper strategic culture with which to sustain itself as a security actor.

Introduction

"... EU Council officials have taken down a picture of Libya's Gaddafi greeting the former EU foreign relations chief, Javier Solana, which used to hang in its Justus Lipsius building in the EU capital."

EUObserver, February 25th, 2011¹

This little note was among the news that EUObserver saw fit to report from Brussels as the Arab Spring was gathering steam. It proved to be telling of the EU's level of initiative regarding the civil war that was then breaking out in Libya, and which less than one month later had brought on an international intervention. When push came to shove, the EU was embarrassingly paralysed and relegated to the sidelines while a coalition of willing states carried out the military intervention that eventually brought down the Gaddafi regime. But how could it be that the EU proved so incapable of handling a conflict that in

¹ Andrew Rettman, 'EU officials remove Gaddafi picture', *euobserver.com*, February 25th, 2011.

just about every conceivable way seemed so perfectly suited to the EU's professed identity as a security provider and to its supposed strengths and capabilities, as stated in the 2003 security strategy?

This paper argues that the EU's response to the conflict in Libya in 2011 tells much about the extent to which an EU strategic culture is emerging and about the EU's future capacity as a security policy actor. The article is divided into three sections. First, we look at the concept of strategic culture, the divergences in national strategic cultures, and the basis for crafting a common European strategic culture. Second, we examine the actions taken during the Libya conflict, both at national and EU level, and how strategic cultures influenced these, resulting in the marginalisation of the EU. Third, we conclude by discussing where this leaves EU strategic culture and what it implies for the EU's future prospect as a security actor.

Strategic culture

Issues of strategy and the use of force have traditionally sat more easily with the rationalist approaches to the study of IR. Yet for the understanding of the strategic choices of actors on the modern international scene, which frequently defy strict 'rationality', social constructivism has contributed by bringing attention to the importance of identity-based factors, such as history, culture, ideas, norms and values for explaining actions. Such factors have in the past 30 years been credited by scholars from across the IR spectrum.²

Strategic culture has been defined as 'a constitutive factor that facilitates and/or constrains strategic actorness'.³ Although theorists may disagree on the *extent* to which actorness is influenced by strategic culture, we may see it as part of the background milieu for debates on strategy and behaviour.⁴ Gray has emphasised the influence of a country's history, values and norms on its opinion on the use of force and its behaviour in the international system, defining strategic culture as:

"... modes of thought and action with respect to force, which derives from perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behaviour in national terms [and from] the civic culture and way of life."⁵

² Colin Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986); David G. Haglund, 'What Good Is Strategic Culture - A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept', *International Journal*, Vol 59, no. 3 (2003-2004): 479-502; Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, vol. 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1996); Adrian Hyde-Price, 'European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force', *European Security*, 13:4 (2004) 324.

³ Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, 'EU Strategic Culture: When the Means Becomes the End', *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol.32, no.3 (December 2011) 524.

⁴ Colin Gray, 'National Style in Strategy: The American Example', *International Security* 6, no.2 (Fall 1981) 35-37.

⁵ Gray, 'National Style in Strategy', 22.

To the influence of time and historical processes, Longhurst has also added beliefs and attitudes:

*"... a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, held by a collective and arise gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective's experiences."*⁶

That strategic cultures are not static means they also represent a learning curve, as new practices and experiences are internalised. Strategic cultures will thus always be unique, because they are the result of individual historical and identity-related processes and national "memories" and represent individual national "realities". A country's strategic culture thus forms the background for its opinions, actions and alliances in foreign policy. It doesn't so much rank strategic options in order of preference, but rather shapes which are considered available at all, ruling some in and some options out.⁷ Thus, drawing on the above, we will, in the following define the concept as:

A strategic culture is formed by a country's historical experiences, values and norms and constitutes the environment in which decisions on foreign and security policy behavior are made, shapes the options available, and ultimately influences the strategic decisions made.

With this definition we want to underline the *function* of strategic culture as the underlying national identity and decision-making milieu, which is always present. As noted above, *the extent* to which strategic culture is decisive may vary, and other factors, such as trade interests or domestic politics, may also influence a given decision. But strategic culture can not be deselected or ignored altogether, but will always play *some* role in a decision making process.

Strategic culture and the EU

Adrian Hyde-Price, a scholar of the realist persuasion, has argued that,

*"... European strategic culture reflects the experience and security environment of the second half of the 20th century. For this reason, it is increasingly an impediment to the development of European security strategies relevant to the post-Cold War and post-9/11 international security agenda."*⁸

But to say that the EU's strategic culture has a heterogeneous basis is an understatement of the first order. The Union includes stalwart NATO members and countries with long histories of neutrality, and attitudes towards the use of force range from the relatively gung-ho Brits and French to the almost pacifist Germans, with other members straddling the very wide spectrums between these various extremes.

⁶ Kerry Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) 17.

⁷ Colin. S. Gray (1999). "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back". *International Affairs*, 7 (1), pp. 49-69. 55.

⁸ Hyde-Price, 'European Security', 324.

History has certainly played its role in leaving the three leading members, the UK, France and Germany with vastly different strategic cultures and strategic outlooks.

Both the UK and France are influenced by their former status of great powers, the sense of great power responsibility still being part of their self-perception, together with the willingness to take on leading roles in crisis management, the upholding of international order, and the safeguarding of democracy and human rights. For both countries military force remains an acceptable means to advancing national interests, and still feeds British 'nostalgia for past glory'⁹ and French 'grandeur'.¹⁰ Germany on the other hand has, since 1945, largely rejected militarism, instead developing a strategic culture characterized by military restraint and an aversion to the use of force as a decisive instrument in foreign policy.¹¹ Germany does at the same time wish to be perceived as a responsible and reliable partner, and it slowly began participating in multilateral operations in the 1990's. But while both France and Britain have several times undertaken military interventions since 1991, both in coalition with others and unilaterally, for Germany multilateralism and a solid basis in international law has been a precondition for engagement, and Germany has no wish for leadership on the international scene.¹²

When weighing NATO and EU security cooperation, major differences also exist between the three, which did to a large extent hamper the development of the EU's military dimension for many years. To the UK, the most Atlanticist of the three, the special relationship with the US is foreign policy priority number one, and British security policy is anchored in NATO while it has traditionally been sceptical of CSDP developments and of the EU playing a larger role in security matters.¹³ To France, the CSDP represents an avenue for the projection of French strategic culture to the European level and a vehicle for its foreign policy ambitions, thus providing an occasional alternative to the US-dominated NATO when autonomy is

⁹ Laurence Martin and John Garnett, *British Foreign Policy – Challenges and Choices for the Twenty-first Century* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997) 83-85.

¹⁰ John Gaffney, 'Highly emotional states: French-US relations and the Iraq war', in *Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda*, editors Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 77-79; Alister Miskimmon, 'Continuity in the face of upheaval – British strategic culture and the impact of the Blair government' in *Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda*, editors Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 92-95.

¹¹ In 2010 comments by Federal president Horst Köhler to the effect that German naval vessels participating in the anti-piracy operations off Somalia were acting to protect German commercial interests caused such a storm that the president chose to resign from office.

¹² Longhurst, *Germany and The Use Of Force*, 46-47; Piotr Buras and Kerry Longhurst, 'The Berlin Republic, Iraq, and the use of force' in *Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda*, editors Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 30; John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken – Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Reunification* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 62-66.

¹³ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 147.

desirable.¹⁴ Germany has to the greatest extent of the three balanced its security interests between the two forums. Both have served to safeguard against the Soviet threat and to anchor Germany in Western Europe, confirming its commitment to liberal values and to hindering the revival of nationalism.¹⁵ Germany has, however, also a far deeper attachment to international law and the United Nations than either France or Britain. Whereas these two have in extreme cases been willing to dispense with UN Security Council authorization for the use of force, to Germany this has proven virtually unthinkable.¹⁶

In seeking to straddle such divides, the general focus has been on discussing the kinds of tasks the EU should be able to undertake and the ability to do so. Cornish and Edwards have argued that EU the emerging strategic culture should encompass, “the political and institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force, coupled with external recognition of the EU as a legitimate actor in the military sphere”,¹⁷ thus underlining the importance of the functions to performed. The earliest talks of a European defence identity separate from NATO resulted in the formulation of the so-called Petersberg tasks in 1992, which were the kinds of missions Europeans should be able to undertake without US assistance. These include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. The Petersberg tasks thus covered both military operations (the ‘high end’ of the list) and civilian missions (the ‘low end’ of the list). These were later incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty. The work towards the development of a common European strategic culture was augmented at the Saint Malo meeting in 1998, when the UK and France agreed that although NATO would be the primary security organisation in Europe, “... *the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so ...*”.¹⁸ The following year, the EU members launched the CSDP, and agreed on the Helsinki Headline Goals, establishing the ambitions of an EU military structure capable of deploying up to 60.000 troops out of area for the purpose of handling Petersberg style operations. In 2002, the relationship with NATO was clarified with the Berlin Plus agreement, allowing the EU to ‘borrow’ the military structures of NATO under certain circumstances. The severe disagreements over the 2003 Iraq War, however, showed how much ground was still to be covered in crafting a common strategic culture.

¹⁴ Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 188.

¹⁵ Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 118, 124; Thomas Banchoff, *The German Problem Transformed – Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945-95* (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), 54.

¹⁶ The much talked about exception to the rule, the Kosovo War in 1999, generated much talk for a long time of Germany becoming a more ‘normal’ security policy actor. That exception has, however, proven to be just that, an exception confirming the rule.

¹⁷ Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, ‘The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A progress report’, *International Affairs* 81:4 (2005) 802.

¹⁸ ‘Joint Declaration on European Defence. Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit’ (Saint-Malo: 1998).

It was therefore all the more remarkable that by the end of that year, the EU adopted its first Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS was built on the several already existing strategy documents, so the document was not a completely new invention. The main purpose of the ESS was to show that the member states could agree on some fundamental principles of the CSDP, disproving the impression of a divided Europe and a wrecked CSDP after Iraq. It is also the clearest statement of the role the EU sees itself playing in the world. The ESS describes the EU's most important challenges, threats and goals, with a focus on security. A safe and secure Europe would be best secured by fighting the global and interrelated threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. The threats identified in the ESS were of a kind that required the 'comprehensive approach' that the EU has always prided itself on; active usage of political, diplomatic, military and civilian means and the linking of the full range of policies available. The task of the EU, the ESS declared, "...is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East ... and [south] with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations".¹⁹ Preventive engagement was the guiding idea; utilising the EU's varied civilian capabilities to address the root causes of threats, and handle crises before they became urgent security matters. "...the first line of defence will often be abroad", as the ESS notes.²⁰ In those cases where preventive engagement had failed, military means could be considered in line with the Petersberg tasks. As the ESS states, "in failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis [...] The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations."²¹

Thus the Petersberg tasks retained their relevance in the ESS, but consensus on how these should be undertaken has not always been evident. Member states have often focused on different Petersberg tasks, some having emphasised the military aspects, others having wished for a focus on crisis management and peacekeeping. EU missions have covered a broad range of assignments, from military operations and training missions to supporting/assistance missions, rule of law, monitoring, police and border missions. But most have been non-military, 'low end' Petersberg tasks, crisis management operations with a focus primarily on post-conflict reconstruction, election monitoring, peace keeping/peace enforcement, providing assistance to development priorities and so forth. This is a niche which the EU has carved for itself, rather than developing actual war fighting capabilities. The goal of being capable of intervening in conflict areas, however, was clearly stated: "We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention."²² The document also links security and development objectives,

¹⁹ 'A Secure Europe In A Better World: European Security Strategy', (Brussels, 2003), 8.

²⁰ Ibid., 7.

²¹ Ibid., 7.

²² Ibid., 11.

and military instruments are thus only one aspect of the comprehensive approach to the 'multifaceted' situations the EU faces in its quest for security and a better world.

On the face of it, it would seem that the fundamental components for a grand strategy – means and goals - are established. However, the quotes above are the only ones in the ESS regarding when and where the use of force is an option. This vagueness on the high end Petersberg tasks has led to critique of the ESS for being too unclear and being not a 'real strategy', or indeed for being "a recipe for "masterly inactivity".²³ Others have been more optimistic, noting that the ESS can be seen as a sensible overall strategy which can promote coherence and consistency in EU foreign and security policy and the development of a strong strategic culture, which is, after all, a learning curve.²⁴ Still, the absence of an agreement on the use of force is problematic for the *actor*-ambitions of the EU. For as Howorth argues:

*"... a European strategic approach requires the appropriate integration of the military component. ... the EU will continue to pursue norms-based effective multilateralism; of course it will continue to promote a world in which human rights, human security, international institutions and international law will replace the jungle. But if those objectives are actually to be achieved, the EU must have the entire range of policy instruments, including a significant measure of hard power."*²⁵

Another defining feature of EU strategic culture is in the way legitimacy for military action is sought. The EU sees the UN as the most important guarantee for upholding international law, and strengthening cooperation with the UN is a major priority for the EU. Especially when compared to the 2002 US National Security Strategy, it becomes clear just how strongly the ESS emphasizes multilateralism, international organisations and the importance of a United Nations (UN) mandate for military action. International law thereby becomes a major element of the EU's strategic culture. Another, related source of legitimacy is in the linking of military force to humanitarian aims. The ESS clearly considers the plight of civilians in war zones an international obligation and argues that the EU must take its share of responsibility.²⁶ This chimes with the subsequent development of the 'Responsibility to Protect' doctrine (R2P) in 2005, and with the EU's own self-perception as being a force for good in the world. Thus ambitions of liberal interventionism are balanced by a desire to uphold and act in accordance with international law.²⁷

²³ Asle Toje, 'The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (2005) 132.

²⁴ For example: Michael E. Smith, 'A Liberal Grand Strategy In A Realist World? Power, Purpose and the EU's Changing Global Role,' *Journal of European Public Policy* 18:2 (2011): 144; Janne Haaland Matlary, 'When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?', *Security Dialogue* 37:1 (2006): 109, 118; Laura Chappell and Petar Petrov, 'The EU's crisis management operations: strategic culture in action?' (Conference paper presented on the annual UACES conference, Cambridge, November 1st-2nd, 2011), 2.

²⁵ Jolyon Howorth, 'The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48:3 (2010), 465.

²⁶ European Security Strategy, 1-2.

²⁷ Sten Rynning, 'The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?', *Security Dialogue*, 34:4 (2003), 486.

Yet foreign and security policy remains firmly subject to intergovernmentalist rules, to interstate bargaining with 28 veto players. The lack of real consensus on strategic matters means that EU policies easily become a question of the lowest common denominator. Pessimists, like Rynning, argue that the EU will not anytime soon develop the capacity to become a liberal power, and that it would be better served by letting coalitions of the willing undertake interventions.²⁸ More tongue-in-cheek, Toje comments that:

*"The trend is that the lower the level of commitment, the higher the likelihood of achieving consensus. EU foreign policies are generally less defined by what tools are most likely to meet a specific objective, and more by what tools can be agreed upon."*²⁹

But does the EU all the same have a strategic culture in practice? The military interventions it undertook prior to 2008 were mostly conducted in its extended neighbourhood – that is, including the Sahel and Central Africa in addition to the ENP region – although arguably they were also instances of France successfully uploading its own interests to the EU level. The missions were mostly of smaller scale and of short duration, in support of UN missions, and with a clear humanitarian aspect.³⁰ They were also mostly, although concerned with situations of state failure and regional conflict, at the lower-end of the Petersberg list, with the military's role being less that of combat troops but rather of peacekeepers or providing security to the civilian/humanitarian side of the operation. The Atalanta anti-piracy mission off Somalia, on the other hand, depending on the interpretation, showed the EU either pursuing own commercial interests by military means, or providing a common good by keeping sea lanes safe.

This record suggests a strategic culture with a balanced attitude towards the use of force and its alternatives in conflict solution, and a strategic culture which allows for engagement in many different parts of the world, but clearly within certain limitations. For the EU's strategic culture, the 'ideal military conflict' would therefore seem to be one that takes place in the neighbourhood; that directly or potentially involves the five threats of the ESS; which has a humanitarian aspect, as in helping/protecting civilians; which is legitimised by the UN and a multilateral approach; where the adversary is not respecting fundamental EU values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law; in short, involves high principles rather than traditional national interests, but in a small-scale way. On this basis the EU has, in the words of Cornish and Edwards, achieved a certain degree of consensus at the lower end of the Petersberg task list, proving an upward trend on the learning curve of strategic culture. The Libya War, as it unfolded in

²⁸ Ibid., 494.

²⁹ Asle Toje, 'The Consensus-Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe's Ineffective Foreign Policy', *Security Dialogue*, 39:1 (2008) 132.

³⁰ Chappell & Petrov, 'The EU's Crisis Management Operations', 26.

2011, would have seemed the logical mission to provide the next step up to the higher end of the list, and thus show the continuing evolution of the EU's strategic culture.

Libya I: The EU comes unstuck

On the 28th of February 2011, Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Stefan Füle spoke to the European Parliament about the Arab Spring, and underlined that Europe had to respond in ways that was in keeping with its values of democracy and human rights:

*"... Europe, at this particular moment more than ever before, must be faithful to its values and stand on the side of democracy and social justice."*³¹

The Commissioner also addressed the need for the EU to engage in Libya. And the conflict did in many ways seem precisely the kind that the CSDP was set up to handle, and the logical next step up in the progressive crafting of an EU strategic culture. Libya had long and close historical connections with Europe, was a major supplier of natural gas, and had enjoyed a close partnership especially in handling migration issues. The unfolding civil war had however disrupted both kinds of cooperation. By early March Libya was displaying traits of several of the major threats outlined in the ESS. State failure and regional conflict were both imminent threats, and as the ESS put it:

*"It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe."*³²

The Qaddafi regime's brutality against the civilian population was such that intervention was justified on moral grounds – was indeed something that many called for from inside Libya - and had moreover induced the kind of mass migration, which the ESS also securitised. The conflict was in many ways an obvious opportunity for the EU to show itself as a security policy actor willing to and capable of assuming its responsibility its own neighbourhood. This was all the more so, since the US had made it clear that it did not wish to lead any intervention. Not surprisingly since its interests in the Libyan conflict were much less in terms of oil, trade routes and migration than the EU's. But this opened up for EU initiative and leadership in its own neighbourhood. The scene was thus set for the EU to defend its fundamental values and extend them to the Libyan people.

At first it seemed Europe might take the lead. In February, David Cameron argued for a no-fly zone and wanted to arm the protesters. The UK and France then pushed for sanctions in the UNSC, and this led to the passing of the Resolution 1970 on the 26th of February 2011, shortly before Stefan Füle's speech to the

³¹ Stefan Füle, 'Speech on the recent events in North Africa' (Speech, Brussels, February 28th, 2011), EU Parliament.

³² 'European Security Strategy', 7.

EP. Nicholas Sarkozy then became the first Western leader who demanded the resignation of Qaddafi, and on the 10th of March he became to first EU-leader to recognise the TNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. On the same day, Cameron and Sarkozy in a joint letter to Herman van Rompuy requested

*“... continued planning to be ready to provide support for all possible contingencies as the situation evolves [...] This could include a no-fly zone or other options against air attacks, working with Allies and partners, especially those in the region.”*³³

Following further pressure from the UK and France, the UNSC passed Resolution 1973 on the 17th of March, giving UN members permission to establish a no-fly zone and to protect the civilians with “all necessary means”.³⁴ This opened up for the military intervention initiated two days later. Together with the US, the UK and France were the main contributors to the military operation, providing two thirds of the 150 combat aircrafts used in Libya. The intervention was thus one which was to be conducted on the EU’s own doorstep, and was necessary due to European interests, both security and commercial, in the region; had clear humanitarian aspects, being in response to the massive human rights violations perpetrated by the Qaddafi regime, and thus in keeping with the R2P doctrine; it was legitimised under international law by UNSCR 1973, and in fact had been further legitimised by support from the Arab League - three members of which would take active part in the subsequent military intervention. Altogether, the conflict in Libya seemed well suited for the EU and its emergent strategic culture, and an ideal test for its military capabilities. Or, in the words of Sven Biscop, “...a textbook example of a situation in which Europe, through the European Union, should have taken the lead and proved that it is a security actor worth noting.”³⁵

However, already before the intervention had begun the wheels were coming off for the EU. Internal disagreements were already exposed in February, when the question of sanctions against Gaddafi was on the agenda. France, Germany, Finland and other Northern member states wished for a strong dissociation from Gaddafi’s harsh treatment of the Libyan protestors and requested sanctions, while the Southern member states feared the consequences of Gaddafi’s defeat in terms of migration and oil import, and others felt that sanctions would make no difference in stopping the violence anyway. Given such divisions, all the EU could do in February was to express concern, condemn the violence and stress the importance of

³³ ‘Letter from David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy to Herman Van Rompuy’, *The Guardian*, March 10th, 2011.

³⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf, (last accessed April 20th 2014).

³⁵ Sven Biscop, ‘Mediterranean Mayhem: Lessons for European Crisis Management’, in *An Arab Springboard for European Foreign Policy?*, editors Sven Biscop, Rosa Balfour and Michael Emerson, 75-82. *Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations* (Gent: Academia Press, 2012) 75.

respect for human rights in two declarations on the 20th and 23rd of February.³⁶ The declaration on the 23rd also announced that partnership negotiations with Libya would be stopped. On the 26th of February, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1970 which included an arms embargo, asset freezes and travel bans.³⁷ The EU adopted UNSCR 1970 on the 28th of February, thus imposing asset freeze and travel bans on Muammar Gaddafi, his family and closest associates.³⁸ However, the call for Gaddafi to step down was not expressed until the meeting of the European Council on the 11th of March³⁹, a day after Sarkozy had made the same statement. With regards to the actual intervention, the EU would find itself even more divided, for reasons that can largely be explained by the national strategic cultures.

The UK largely acted as the great power status of the past and the sense of responsibility and willingness to lead in international operations clearly shone through, although Britain was initially somewhat cautious about intervention. David Cameron had entered office sceptical of the use of military power, stating as late as February 2011 that you can not “drop democracy out of an aeroplane at 40,000 feet”.⁴⁰ The intervention in Libya thus showed his attitude changing, possibly in response to Qaddafi’s rhetorics and harsh treatment of the Libyan people, which brought into focus humanitarian aspect, which has been important for British missions since the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia. The UK’s relationship with the US and preference for conducting missions through NATO also showed. When the Obama administration initially distanced itself from Cameron’s request for a no-fly zone, Cameron downplayed his rhetorics and said instead that the UK for the moment would do no more than to make contact with the protesters. When the British position changed back in favour of the no-fly zone, it was with a preference for NATO to take the lead.

France was the most pro-active of the member states. Cynically, one might argue that France’s actions were influenced by Nicholas Sarkozy facing re-election within a year, and with his polls needing the good press of a successful war in Libya. But that would ignore that traditional French strategic culture was displayed in Libya. France acted in defence of western civilizational values such as democracy, respect for human life and the rule of law. The intervention also provided an opportunity for France to show *grandeur*

³⁶ ‘Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union on events in Libya’, Brussels, February 20th 2011; ‘Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on Libya’, Brussels, February 23rd 2011.

³⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011), February 26th 2011, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970\(2011\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970(2011)), (accessed April 21st 2014).

³⁸ ‘Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with the Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya, as amended by Council Decision 2011/156/CFSP’, Brussels, March 18th 2011.

³⁹ ‘Extraordinary European Council 11 March 2011 Declaration’. European Council Declaration, March 11th 2011. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-11-2_en.htm, (accessed April 22, 2014).

⁴⁰ ‘Leader: Cameron and Obama should take heed of people power’, *newstatesman.com*, May 26th, 2011.

by taking initiative and leadership. By pressing for action at the UN, France showed itself as a European great power, especially by distancing itself from the passive Germans.

French eagerness did create some problems too. Some EU countries were provoked by how early Sarkozy recognised the TNC and the fact that he started talking about aerial attacks against Gaddafi, without prior discussions in either the EU or NATO.⁴¹ Later, France also showed its willfulness by breaking the UN arms embargo, which was part of the Resolution 1970, by arming the Libyan rebels. Increasing French influence in the region was also a motive for engagement. By creating good connections with the new Libyan government and advocating the reform process, France was able to secure trade interests and at the same time gain influence on the EU's foreign policy for the Mediterranean area. Its half-hearted attitude to NATO was also typical French. Whereas the UK had wanted NATO to be the vehicle for the intervention, France wanted a European operation, arguing that the Alliance had a bad reputation in the Arab world.⁴² More likely, France wanted a European mission, because this would give France the best chance of influence and profiling.

Germany also brought attention to itself, but not for its positive contribution. Foreign minister Guido Westerwelle argued early on that a military operation was too dangerous and that Germany under no circumstances would be part of such an operation. Therefore, together with Russia, China, India and Brazil, Germany abstained from voting in the UNSC on Resolution 1973. This caused a major stir and much criticism, as Germany had never before taken a stand that went against that of *both* its major allies, the US and France, at the same time. Had Germany chosen to support the mission politically without contributing militarily it would probably have been accepted by its partners. Instead, Germany was perceived as failing its obligations as an ally. Not only did Germany abstain from the vote, they also tried to find a majority against Resolution 1973.

The fiercest criticism probably came from within Germany itself, former CDU defence minister Volker Rühle and former CDU chancellor Helmut Kohl accusing the government of having made "a mistake of historical dimensions" and of leading a foreign policy "which has made Germany an unreliable partner".⁴³ The week after the UNSC vote, Germany tried to save face by changing to support of 1973. Angela Merkel stated that the resolution was now "Germany's too"⁴⁴ and promised to contribute with German troops, should the UN ask for humanitarian support to evacuate refugees and protect aid workers.

⁴¹ Nicholas Watt, 'Nicholas Sarkozy calls for air strikes on Libya if Gaddafi attacks civilians', *the Guardian*, March 11th, 2011.

⁴² 'Amidst confusing coalition war aims will Libya become a NATO mission?', *natowatch.org*, March 21st, 2011.

⁴³ 'Kritik an deutscher Libyen-Politik: "Schwerer Fehler von historischer Dimension"', *Spiegel Online*, March 23rd, 2011. Daniel Brössler and Nico Fried, "'Merkels Außenpolitik ist ohne Kompass'", *Süddeutsche.de*, August 25th, 2011.

⁴⁴ Honor Mahony, 'Merkel moves on UN resolution on Libya', *euobserver.com*, March 22nd, 2011.

German behaviour in several ways expressed its strategic culture. Whereas commercial interests might partly explain British and French support for intervention, thus relegating strategic culture as a factor, the same can not be said of Germany. It had as much economic incentive to act as the others once favouring stability in relations with the Libyan regime was no longer a viable option. But it instead *chose* not to act even when it was clear that action would be taken by others. German history and values played an important part in its decision *not* to act and use its considerable power to protect its own interests. The polls reflected the antimilitary aspect of German identity: two thirds of the Germans opposed German military engagement in Libya, and the government therefore chose to stay completely out of the conflict, no doubt influenced by impending state elections during the spring of 2011. Reconciling the questions of power, interests and identity, German politicians lacked sure-footedness and were prone to ill-considered short-termism.⁴⁵

The contradictions in German strategic culture were expressed when Germany changed its mind on Resolution 1973. By abstaining from the vote Germany had followed its antimilitary principle but compromised its image as a trustworthy and responsible partner. Moreover, German attitudes were not free of hypocrisy: A survey in May 2011 showed that 37 % of Germans supported an international intervention in Libya; a minority of the population, but still twice as many as the 18 % supporting using German troops in such an intervention, suggesting that while it is important that somebody does something to promote democracy and help repressed people, it is more important that it not be Germany doing it. By comparison, 58 % of the French supported an intervention, and 56 % supported the engagement of the country's troops.⁴⁶

Faced with these kinds of internal disagreements, it was out of the question that the EU would spearhead the intervention. Many of these tensions then spilled over into NATO, and peaked on the 21st of March when a NATO meeting ended in open quarrels. French reluctance against NATO provoked the other allies, Germany criticising France for having started the aerial attacks without clear ground rules and without informing the other countries first. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen criticised France for keeping NATO on the sidelines and Germany for not participating. The meeting ended with the NATO ambassadors of both France and Germany leaving in anger. Most NATO countries are also EU members, and the disagreement in NATO reflected the problems in the EU. Eventually France gave way, albeit reluctantly, and NATO took charge as the US wound down its direct involvement.

As it appears from this short overview, the UK, France and Germany reacted very differently to the conflict in Libya, and their strategic cultures were very much a factor in the shaping of their opinions on

⁴⁵ Miskimmon, 'German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis', 394, 405.

⁴⁶ 'Transatlantic Trends Survey – Key Findings 2011', *The German Marshall Fund of the United States* m.fl. (2011): 29, 31.

who should lead the mission, which means of conflict solution were appropriate and which role they each had in the conflict. But while this overview has focused on the 'big three', all other member states also showed great disagreements on the question of intervention. Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Greece and Romania supported and contributed to the intervention. Poland, Estonia and the Czech Republic initially supported the German reluctance. Poland's Prime Minister Donald Tusk attacked European involvement in Libya for giving the impression that the West only intervenes when oil interests are at stake. Tusk called the European behaviour towards Gaddafi hypocritical and the attitude towards human rights inconsistent, and stated that "if we want to defend people against dictators, reprisals, torture and prison, that principle must be universal and not invoked only when it is convenient, profitable or safe."⁴⁷ Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves added, with a not-too-subtle barb at some of his fellow EU leaders:

*"Poland and Estonia know well that bringing down a despotic regime is easy, but what's much harder is to build up a new democratic society. Poland knows much better what to do in Libya than those who have supported dictators for the sake of stability."*⁴⁸

Both Poland and Estonia ended up supporting NATO's involvement in the conflict politically if not militarily. But these quotes show just how divided Europeans felt over what to do. And the mission that eventually got under way was led by a coalition of the willing, and not by either a united EU or NATO.

Libya II: What we learned about the EU strategic culture

But even as the EU was clearly failing to step into its crisis management role, several EU leaders were busy claiming the credit all the same. "Had it not been for the EU summit on the 11th of March", argued Jose Manuel Barroso in an interview, "and had the Europeans not pushed for this, a massacre would have taken place in Benghazi. Thanks to the Europeans, this was averted."⁴⁹ Herman van Rompuy was even more explicit when addressing the European Parliament on the 5th of April, declaring that the EU bore part of the responsibility and honor for the international society having taken action to prevent a bloodbath in Libya, arguing that the British and French attacks on Gaddafi on the 19th of March would not have been possible without the 'clear position', established during the EU meeting a week earlier.

"From the beginning of the crisis, the European Union was at the forefront... on the subject of Libya, many criticisms can be levelled at us. However, without Europe, without European leadership, there would have been a bloodbath in Libya. Without Europe, there would have been massacres. Some of you have been very critical of

⁴⁷ Gareth Jones, 'Polish PM chides Europe over Libya "hypocrisy"', *reuters.com*, April 9th, 2011.

⁴⁸ Claudia Louati, 'Military intervention in Libya: where is ESDP?', *Nouvelle Europe*, April 20th, 2011.

⁴⁹ Thomas Lauritzen, 'Barroso: Europa har afværget en massakre i Libyen', *Politiken*, (our translation), March 23rd, 2011.

*the European Union. Yet we acted in time! And without Europe, nothing would have been done at global level, at United Nations level..*⁵⁰

It is probably true that without France and Britain there would not have been a Western intervention in Libya. But European leadership is not the same as EU leadership, and van Rompuy's talk of European leadership and use of the word 'we' was more than a little misleading.

What the EU did agree on the 11th of March 2011 was to call for Gaddafi to step down, and to subsequently recognise the TNC as its legitimate political partner. But although there was a consensus on regime change, the means did not extend beyond halting partnership negotiations, strengthen the arms embargo, impose asset freezes, and introduce visa restrictions. During the spring of 2011, EU members also evacuated 5.800 Europeans from Libya, and the EU helped provide additional funds for Italy and Malta, so that they could manage the large number of refugees coming to their countries from Libya. As the conflict transitioned, the EU, together with the member states, contributed over €158 million in aid, making the EU the biggest humanitarian donor; and subsequently provided help with health and educational issues and the transition to democracy. Such initiatives were by no means irrelevant, but they were the extent to which the EU could take action, and they contributed little to bringing down Gaddafi. To achieve this, a military intervention was needed, and this could not be agreed on in the EU.

Libya had been an ideal opportunity for the EU to take the lead in a multilateral operation, which would have promoted its self-declared values of democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights. And that in a situation where there was a severe risk of state failure in the EU's neighborhood and direct security threats for Europe. The conflict was also almost tailored to the Petersberg tasks, the core of the EU security policy agenda, as there was a need for both the low end tasks and the high end ones. Although, the EU can not be compared with the US militarily, the EU members had the physical capacity to conduct the military intervention⁵¹ and the EU's supposedly broad spectrum of humanitarian and military resources could have extended beyond merely evacuation and aid, as was the case. It was the political capacity that was sorely missing. The CSDP does not require all members to take active part in EU missions, and constructive abstention has been an option since the Amsterdam treaty. But even that approach proved impossible, as Germany did not just stay out of the intervention, but actually tried to prevent it. Thus eight

⁵⁰ Herman van Rompuy, speech to the European Parliament, Brussels, April 5th 2011, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20110405+ITEM-003+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN> (last accessed, April 20th 2014).

⁵¹ At least theoretically the EU members have the capabilities needed. It is more doubtful in reality, as evidenced by the myriad logistical problems the Europeans faced once the Americans had retreated to a supporting role. In fact, the British and French-led coalition would have been hard pressed to maintain the pressure on Gaddafi's regime had the US not made emergency supplies of munitions and spare parts for the combat aircraft, and stepped up its role in air-to-air refuelling, surveillance, C2 and target acquisition. In that sense, the war turned out to be difficult to manage, in spite of the conflict area's close geographical proximity to Europe.

years after its formulation the ESS's call for a "strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention", was still found wanting.

The only military action the EU took during the conflict turned out to be a non-event. On the 21st of March, the EU announced that it would prepare a humanitarian CSDP mission, capable of managing refugees and aid on the ground in Libya, and ready for deployment at the request of the UN. EUFOR Libya was launched on the 1st of April, headquartered in Rome, and with an Italian admiral appointed as commander. Unfortunately, the call from the UN never came, and the mission never moved beyond the planning stages. Some saw it as mainly an attempt by the EU to save face, and that all knew full well the UN would never request the mission.⁵² Its limited budget (€8mil.) and limited mandate added to the impression of a gesture that was not seriously meant, but mainly an attempt to demonstrate some kind of 'actorness'. Instead, it only served to underline the limited capacity of the EU, and some, noting the unfortunate coincidence of the launch date, simply labelled it an April's fool.⁵³

The conflict in Libya suggests that the EU's strategic culture in 2011 was limited to economic sanctions, aid, evacuation and humanitarian relief, but did not include being a military security provider or even acting militarily in its own security interest as defined by the ESS. For Germany the whole affair had become an embarrassing debacle. For the French it was a disappointment that its efforts to strengthen the EU's strategic capability had not been more successful - and that it was the Germans who had undercut French policy at a crucial moment.⁵⁴ The UK for its part, however, having always wanted the intervention to be led by NATO, declared its stance vindicated. In a May 2011 speech, UK foreign minister William Hague underlined the priority the UK attached to the 'special relationship' with the US and roundly rejected the idea of a common foreign policy in the EU.⁵⁵ Any positive assessment of NATO's role that this might imply was, however, somewhat contradicted by US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates's harsh farewell speech in July 2011, in which he expressed severe foreboding at the development of the alliance, and criticised the European allies for their poor military prowess.⁵⁶

Rather than grapple with such fundamental questions, some decided to place the responsibility for the EU's marginalized role with Catherine Ashton, the High Representative for the CFSP. Her statements on Libya were indeed not very powerful, but she showed the flag as much as could be expected, being the first senior Western official to meet with the newly appointed Libyan Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib and

⁵² Biscop, 'Mediterranean Mayhem', 78.

⁵³ Gomes, Ana. 'Was Eufor Libya an April fool's joke?', *euobserver.com*, July 13th, 2011.

⁵⁴ 'Showing the strain', *The Economist*, July 14th 2011.

⁵⁵ William Hague, speech in London, May 4th, 2011. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/we-will-continue-to-fight-against-terrorism-wherever-it-rears-its-head> (accessed April 21, 2014).

⁵⁶ Robert Gates, speech in Brussels, June 10th 2011. <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581>, (accessed April 21, 2014).

being the highest ranking foreign official to visit Benghazi when, on the 22nd of May, she inaugurated the EU office there. Still, Nicolas Sarkozy accused her early on during the conflict, in highly personalised terms, of passivity towards the tyranny of Gadaffi, and was indirectly supported by David Cameron, Ashton's fellow Brit, while few government leaders came to her defence.⁵⁷ The not-too-subtle implication was that another, more experienced person would have done the job better. But were Catherine Ashton's actions or lack thereof a cause or a symptom of the EU's problems in foreign policy?

The HR does not decide the EU foreign policy agenda, and can only give voice to a policy if the member states can agree on one. Catherine Ashton may have been a convenient scapegoat for the member states' failure, but all the criticism of the HR – whom the member states had themselves chosen for the job – mainly served to undermine her position, and by extension the credibility of the EU. As the EEAS chief operating officer, David O'Sullivan succinctly put it:

"At the end of the day, it's the member states that decide whether they want to speak with one voice, and there are moments when there are divergences [...] The high representative has difficulty expressing a common European view if one doesn't exist."⁵⁸

And since 2011?

The war itself led to little in terms of re-appraising the EU's military and political capabilities. There is thus no real consensus on what would be done should a similar case arise again. Libya itself has since the end of the war been rocked by instability and a poor security situation, as several militias continues to hold sway. The EU has been running several programmes targeting areas such as human rights, women's rights, health, education, migration, freedom of the media and enforcement of civil society and public administration. However, already in early spring 2012, former TNC leader Mahmoud Jibril was blaming the European approach for lack of focus and said that Europe is now "looking at what it wants to do and [...] ignoring needful priorities [such as getting weapons off the street]. Engaging women is a good thing, but doesn't touch the real problems".⁵⁹ In 2013 the EU launched EUBAM Libya, a civilian mission aimed at strengthening border security in Libya. The mission will eventually employ app. 100 international staff and have a budget of €30 mil.⁶⁰ The EU's civilian engagement in Libya since the end of the conflict, however, can not change the impression left during the conflict: a powerless EU incapable of contributing to security in its own neighborhood. Moreover, the EU has largely failed in the very kind of tasks that it is supposedly

⁵⁷ Toby Vogel, 'Running out of friends', *europeanvoice.com*, March 24th, 2011.

⁵⁸ Meabh McMahon and Andrew Willis, 'Member states responsible for EU 'single voice'', *euobserver.com*, May 16th, 2011.

⁵⁹ Robert Marquand, 'Libya to Europe: Remember us?', *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 29th, 2012.

⁶⁰ European External Action Service, 'EUBAM Libya Mission Description', eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eubam-libya/index_en.htm, (accessed April 20th 2014).

good at, which is post-conflict stabilisation. In time, the instability caused by the 2011 war's messy end spread to neighbouring Mali, necessitating another intervention there.

The conflict most comparable to Libya is the ongoing civil war in Syria, as it presents many of the same problems and threats for the EU. Given the EU's failure to act in Libya, and the difficulties faced by those countries that did, it is hardly surprising that the Union, especially without US support, has not taken any military steps against Syria, which would be all indications be a much bigger mouthful militarily than Libya was.⁶¹ The EU's policy mirrors the early steps against Gaddafi, consisting of an arms embargo and other economic and diplomatic sanctions. Few EU countries showed willingness to join even a symbolic attack on Syria in the summer of 2013 following the Assad regimes use of chemical weapons on its civilian population, and only France expressed any regret when the whole thing was called off.⁶² If one should point to there having been any lesson at all learned from Libya, it is not that the EU should step up and overcome the problems it faced in 2011, but rather that the EU should, in spite of the humanitarian disaster unfolding in Syria, stay right of it and just wait that conflict out.⁶³ Thus the EU's strategic culture seems to have plateaued at its pre-2011 level, and the experiences of that year not having resulted in new learning.

The wars in Mali in the winter of 2012-2013 and in the Central African Republic in December 2013 suggest a certain reverting to past form for the EU's strategic culture. In both cases France had intervened unilaterally to shore up failing regimes, conducting the heavy military phase through its own command structures. In Mali the EU eventually agreed to send some 200 defence instructors to help rebuild the country's armed forces. In CAR a mission of some 1000 troops, tasked with creating a secure area around Bangui, was approved in February 2014, and will be launched during the spring. In both cases, the EU envisages its role to be short-term, until other forces, whether UN or those of regional organisations, can take over the tasks. Both were also small-scale, time-limited, focused on the EU's prime area of operation, Sub-Saharan Africa, and both had France as the lead nation. They also showed the EU returning to the lower end of the Petersberg list, in what seems to be an acknowledgement of the limits to any EU strategic culture.

In another reverting to past form, there have been several debates on the means available to the CSDP, but less on the strategic objectives to be served. France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland have proposed a permanent military EU headquarters, from which EU's military and peacekeeping operations could be managed, only to have the proposal vetoed by the UK, demonstrating once again how national foreign

⁶¹ David W. Lesch, 'Prudence suggests staying out of Syria', *Current History*, November 2012, 299-304.

⁶² Many took refuge behind the fact that UN authorization had not been given - which of course it wouldn't be given Russian opposition. Thus legalism provided a means to avoid taking hard decisions.

⁶³ The UK and France have both declared their willingness to arm secular, pro-western elements among the anti-Assad rebel forces. This has, however, been deeply controversial at the EU level, facing German opposition in particular, and at the time of writing little has been done about it.

policies block the development of the CSDP. Permanent structured cooperation in the defence realm has also been proposed and then abandoned. The December 2013 European Council Summit on defence, the first such in almost five years, achieved little, the UK, France and Germany being unable to agree on the way forward. Germany rejected a French proposal for a new EU fund to help pay for member states' participation in EU operations, insisting that costs continue to lie where they, while Britain declared its intention to block the EU institutions from owning and operating military assets. In the final communiqué, the member states agreed to cooperate on some projects including a common drone, a bigger fleet of air-to-air refuelling tankers, satellite technology, joint training on cyber defence and a new maritime security strategy.⁶⁴ Some of these points were new, others dated back to the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goals, and all would have to be met at a time when austerity has cut deep into already inadequate European defence budgets. But even more important than what means to acquire is agreement on the ends they'll be put to. And in this the summit provided precious few answers.

Conclusion

This article examined the strategic culture of the EU and its capacity as a security policy actor as these expressed themselves during the Libya War in 2011. In both cases the EU was found wanting. The national strategic cultures within the EU remain characterized by a vast heterogeneity. These enduring differences became evident during the war in Libya, when the member states could not agree on how to react and to the question of the use of force. The Libya conflict was by all parameters of the emerging EU strategic culture an ideal opportunity for the EU to prove itself. Yet it proved unable to play any decisive role. The conflict showed an EU strategic culture limited to civilian instruments such as economic sanctions, aid and diplomacy. There is little consensus between the member states on the use of force beyond the lighter military missions undertaken by the EU in Sub-Saharan Africa prior to 2008 and since 2013. With so civilian a strategic culture, if that is not oxymoronic, the EU can not be a security provider of the first order in its own neighbourhood, and in fact not even provide security for itself.

In terms of strategic culture being a process of learning, the EU seems to have developed little since 2011, and seems little more united in its strategic vision than before. So should the ESS be rewritten and its goals adapted to the realities of the EU's current political capabilities (or lack thereof)? Or is it still possible to imagine the development of an EU strategic culture that allows the Union to be a significant actor on the world stage? Either way, the fundamental question that this article has grappled with remains: If Libya was not the ideal conflict for the EU to engage in, in order to upgrade its strategic culture, then what would be?

⁶⁴ European Council Conclusions, Brussels December 20th 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf, (accessed April 21, 2014).