

Paper presentation, ECSA-C biennial conference 2014

Montreal, 8-10 May

The Performance of the EU in External Nuclear Non-Proliferation Assistance

Lina Grip

1. Introduction

The EU have financed and implemented assistance and cooperation projects in the field of non-proliferation of WMD in countries and organisations outside of the Union for decades. Since 2003, EU projects in this field are specifically designed to meet the agreed objects on non-proliferation set out in the EU strategy against proliferation of WMD. (Council of the EU 2003d) This chapter discusses the value of these measures in terms of EU performance: agreed objectives ('output'), level of implementation ('outcome') and result of actions ('impact').

Some might still question whether the EU has any capacity to act in non-proliferation independent of its member states. In the field of technical assistance, the EU has developed separate capacities over several decades. In 1981, the EURATOM and the IAEA established a cooperative support programme aimed at providing EU assistance to IAEA's activities in the field of nuclear safeguards. The European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) still operates the programme, especially by providing expertise and technology in areas related to the implementation of safeguards verification measures including the detection of undeclared materials, activities and facilities. (Commission 2010) The European Commission early played a role in programmes to prevent the diversion of proliferation-sensitive knowledge from the former Soviet Union through its contributions to the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow and the Science and Technology Centre of the Ukraine in Kyiv as one partner in the Group of Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons

and Materials of Mass Destruction (G8 Global Partnership).¹ Today, major strands of the EU's external assistance continue to fall under the Commission's jurisdiction. The Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) is the main implementer of external EU non-proliferation assistance projects and acts as the single contact point for stakeholders both inside and outside the EU. DG DEVCO exclusively manages budgets for nuclear non-proliferation assistance under the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) (Grip May 2011: 9-10). Within all these frameworks, the Commission has accumulated know-how and technical skills to both formulate and implement policy. It has also developed structures, budgets and working methods which are now being used in cooperation with third countries. There should no longer be any doubt of the EU's 'presence' as a provider of nuclear non-proliferation assistance. Questions remain however whether these contributions have any added value beyond the assistance EU member states are providing. The rest of this chapter discusses the output, outcomes and impact of EU assistance after 2003.

2. Output in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Assistance

The EU's intention to take a leading role in nuclear non-proliferation regimes has been clear since at least the mid-1990s, but culminated with the official launch of the term 'effective multilateralism' with the adoption of the ESS and the WMD Strategy in December 2003. Effective multilateralism is a policy of multilateral treaty-based governance of non-proliferation, an approach that has been described as the core principle of 'Western' security culture (Krause and Latham 1998: 24-25). This chapter takes stock on three 'output' in terms of EU performance in effective multilateralism: support to nuclear non-proliferation regimes, assistance to third countries to comply with their regime obligations and the EU WMD non-proliferation clause.

2.1. Support to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regimes

In the WMD Strategy, one objective of the EU was to enhance 'political, financial and technical support to verification regimes', including by 'Releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions (i.a. IAEA, CTBTO

¹ The Commission was an original partner in the ISTC in 1992 and took the place of Sweden in the STCU in 1998.

Preparatory Commission and OPCW) which could assist in fulfilling our objectives' (Council of the EU 2003d: 9-10).

This is a straightforward first output in terms of clarity of formulation. The EU set out to increase funding to multilateral regimes, especially those which have verification mechanisms in place. Yet, the output is flexible enough to be inclusive of new instruments in the future. The clarity of the statement can be compared to the EU's policy in countering biological weapons, which included reinforcing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention through 'continuing the reflection on verification instruments' (Council of the EU 2003d: 10). The EU's approach seems sensible and could play a significant role. The international regimes' abilities to initiate projects often depend on voluntary contributions and the organisations frequently ask for budget increases to carry out their mandates (Gerami 2011:6). Added support by the EU—beyond the obligatory national contributions by EU member states—ought to be welcomed by other members of the regimes and the organisations themselves, although reservation by some stakeholders on enlarged EU contributions cannot be ruled out. The output, however, contained some possible loopholes. The agreed objective did not include an estimate of the cost. There was no decision to dedicate a set amount of money or regarding the frequency of payments. Further, there was no indication of what budget would be used. These ambiguities suggest that implementation of the output might be problematic.

2.2. Assistance to Third Countries

At the other end of the policy continuum of effective multilateralism, technical cooperation and financial assistance to third countries are often aimed at increasing third states' abilities to implement their multilateral obligations. The WMD Strategy contained three agreed objectives in terms assistance. First, the strategy aimed at 'reinforcing EU co-operative threat reduction programmes with other countries, targeted at support for disarmament, control and security of sensitive materials, facilities and expertise' (Council of the EU 2003d: 12). The WMD Strategy further broadened the commitment to bilateral assistance:

In order to tackle and limit the proliferation risk resulting from weaknesses in the administrative or institutional organisation of some countries, the EU should encourage them to be partners in the fight against proliferation, by offering a programme aimed at

assisting these countries in improving their procedures, including the enactment and enforcement of implementing penal legislation (Council of the EU 2003d: 8).

The WMD Strategy also specified the EU objective to strengthen export control policies and practices both inside the multilateral control regimes as well as ‘advocating, where applicable, adherence to effective export control criteria by countries outside the existing regimes and arrangements’, specifically through ‘Setting up a programme of assistance to States in need of technical knowledge in the field of export control’ (Council of the EU 2003d: 11).

In terms of output performance, the clarity of the objectives and policy means were fairly explicit, including through the specification of technical and legal assistance to states with limited capacities to meet existing standards in areas such as export control. The first statement identified that the EU’s support to threat reduction programmes would move beyond the previous focus on Russia and its nuclear expertise. The second and third statements explained EU’s ambition to start new programmes for assistance. In spite of a high level of clarity, significant questions of ‘assistance to who’ and ‘how’ remained unresolved. On the other hand, the relevance of the output was strong. National capacity gaps to implement commitments are well known and several instruments ask ‘able’ states and regional organisations to assist other parties under for example UN resolutions. One potential drawback was the fact that the future beneficiaries of EU assistance were not clearly identified. At first sight, the output may seem perfectly inclusive, open to states both inside and outside of regimes. The objective was to offer positive incentives in order to create alliances in non-proliferation. A closer reading however, reveals that EU viewed technical capacity building as *the* way to ‘advocate adherence’ also among states outside of regimes, neglecting the political motivations some states have for choosing to remain outside of nuclear non-proliferation regimes. In order to ensure relevance to all stakeholders, the EU could have emphasized mutual cooperation rather than assistance.

2.3. The EU WMD Non-Proliferation Clause

To complement its assistance measures, the Council adopted a WMD non-proliferation clause as policy to mainstream non-proliferation into the EU’s wider relations with third countries in November 2003, one month prior to the adoption of the WMD Strategy. The aim was to include in all agreements between the EU and a third country that include a CFSP component a legally binding commitment by the third country to the multilateral non-proliferation

instruments (Council 2003b). The background to the clause was the negotiations with Iran in the early 2000s for a Trade and Co-operation Agreement, which included similar conditions (House of Lords 2003). The idea was to mainstream non-proliferation into EU CFSP, to draw on EU's economic power to push its non-proliferation objectives, and to complement its provisions of positive incentives (assistance and EU enlargement) with a negative incentive (the threat of reduced bilateral trade and cooperation with the EU). The clause runs in the tradition of 'conditionality' on the part of the EU as it is designed to induce better behaviour from partner countries vis-à-vis a given issue (in this case non-proliferation) (Rynning 2007: 279).

The clause consisted of three elements:

- full compliance with and national implementation of their existing obligations under international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements and other relevant international obligations (*mandatory*)
- taking steps to sign, ratify, or accede to, as appropriate, and fully implement all other relevant international instruments; (*considered on a case by case basis*)
- and establish an effective system of national export controls (*considered on a case by case basis*)

No directions were given on what the criteria would be to consider making the second half of the clause essential to the agreement. Criteria was also lacking for what would constitute sufficient implementation. Although political conditions on issues of national security is likely to be met with protests, the meaningfulness of the clause could be strong within the EU if it would be used to raise the profile of non-proliferation commitments vis-à-vis other interests.

Table 1. Overview of output performance

	Support to international regimes	Bilateral assistance	Non-proliferation clause
<i>Clarity</i>	Strong	Mixed	Ambiguous
<i>Meaningfulness</i>	Strong, the international regimes ability to initiate projects often depends on voluntary contributions. Regimes frequently ask for budget increases.	Strong, there is a capacity gap to implement commitments and several instruments asks ‘able states’ to assist other parties of the convention.	Potentially strong
<i>Relevance to the stakeholders</i>	Strong	Strong, although the focus was on assistance rather than mutual cooperation.	Likely to be contested
<i>Inclusiveness</i>	Only nuclear non-proliferation regimes with verification mechanisms, but is flexible enough to include future new instruments.	Increasingly inclusive, although focus lied with states with capacity limitations.	Inclusive

3. Outcomes

The previous section showed good performance by the EU in terms of ‘output’, i.e. the adoption of policy and the identification of means by which to implement the agreed objectives. This section moves forward to analyze the outcomes of the intensions. As outlined in the first chapter of this volume, ‘The emphasis of the outcome perspective is on the EU efforts and actions and whether they carry out the agreed outputs and *not* on their impact.’ (Blavoukos 2014, forthcoming)

3.1. Funding to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regimes

As noted in the previous section, the objective of the EU was to enhance the support to nuclear verification regimes by making financial contributions to specific projects conducted by IAEA and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBTO Preparatory Commission). At the time of adoption, the EU had contributed to the IAEA through the joint cooperation programme managed by the European Commission. Although so-called ‘Joint Actions’ had been introduced as a foreign policy instrument of the Council in 1993, at the time of adoption of the WMD Strategy, the instrument had not been used to fund nuclear non-proliferation regimes. By 2003, the EU had made no financial contribution to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), independent of the EU member states. On the contrary, Council instruments were only used to declare EU political support to the regimes—not to make financial donations. In 1999 the Council of the EU adopted a Common Position in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Two Council Decisions reinforced the Common Position in 2001 and 2003 respectively. These three political declarations, adopted before the WMD Strategy, included no funding to activities carried out by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission (Council of the EU 1999, 2001 and 2003a). To the contrary, EU funding to CTBTO and IAEA has been significant in the past ten years (Table 2), through the introduction of Joint Actions/Council Decisions to fund activities managed by both organizations. Since 2006, the Council of the EU has adopted five Council Decisions in support of the CTBTO, all including funding for verification activities. During 2006-13, EU funding to CTBTO totaled to € 15.5 million.

The first Joint Action in support of IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Programme was adopted in 2004. Ten years on, EU is now one of the largest contributors to the Programme (Council of the EU 2004). In total, the EU adopted six Joint Actions and Council Decisions in support of the IAEA during 2004-10, totaling € 33.7 million (Grip Dec. 2011). The Joint Actions are nevertheless not the only source of funding to the IAEA. The EU has continued to use a variety of instruments to fund the IAEA activities on nuclear safety and security, nuclear safeguards, technical cooperation and the IAEA nuclear fuel bank. One estimate of the EU institution’s collective contributions to the IAEA totaled the support to €111.5 million since 2003, of which € 46.2 million was allocated to nuclear security and safeguards. Most of the contributions were earmarked for the time period 2007-13 (IAEA 2013). Like many national contributions, the EU support has been earmarked to specific

projects and beneficiaries. This causes a degree of inflexibility for the organisations and risks unbalancing the issue areas and countries involved in cooperation.

Table 2. European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy funding to nuclear non-proliferation regimes, 2003–13

Instrument	Prior to 2004	2004-2013 (million €)	Annual budget (million €)
Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty Organization	0	15.5	92
International Atomic Energy Agency	0	33.7	315

Source: IAEA (2013);

http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/treasury/35a_28Aug2013_Member_States_Payments.pdf;

Since the WMD Strategy did not specify a quantitative target, an increase in the EU support to projects carried out by the IAEA and the CTBTO are enough to meet the agreed objective. Although actual increases in the EU financial support is difficult to determine exactly (due to the various budget streams used to the IAEA) the EU institutions' grant to the IAEA is today notable higher than before 2003 (IAEA 2003a and 2010b). In the case of the CTBTO, the EU support to verification activities went from zero to on average one and a half million euro annually. The continuous use of Joint Actions to fund activities of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and the IAEA shows an EU behavioral change, presumably as a result of the WMD Strategy. The EU has managed to sustain financial support from the CFSP budget to the two nuclear non-proliferation regimes, even though this budget instrument was not envisioned for long-term support to core activities of international organisations. This is a proper use of the Joint Action mechanism under the CFSP, even though this form of use was somewhat unintended. The EU institutions have showed international leadership in terms of voluntary contributions to the verification activities, although the United States is still leading the voluntary contributions to the IAEA. On the other hand, EU contributions to the overall budget of the instruments (counting obligatory contributions by member states) are still limited.

3.2. Bilateral Assistance

At the G8 Summit in Kananaskis in 2002, the participating states agreed to raise \$20 billion for non-proliferation assistance between 2002 and 2012. This was primarily to support practical projects in Russia, to help reduce any risks from the huge military potential still present as a legacy of the cold war. The European Commission pledged to commit €1 billion over the period.² The G8 Global Partnership identified four main functional areas to prioritize for project support: the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposal of fissile materials and the redirection of former weapon scientists in the former Soviet Union. In 2010 the EU had committed more than €955 million and spent over €635 million, mainly in Russia and Ukraine (Council of the EU, 2010a: 44). The lion's share of this money was paid from the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) nuclear safety programme (created in 1991), supplemented by relatively small donations from the CFSP budget.

The WMD Strategy set out to reinforce threat reduction programmes 'with other countries', suggesting an ambition on the part of the EU to expand cooperation beyond Russia. One key step in implementing this objective was the EU reform of the Commission budget instruments in 2007. The reform created the INSC, as a successor to the TACIS nuclear safety programme. In 2007 the INSC replaced the TACIS programme, which worked on nuclear safety in states of the former Soviet Union. Support measures in the INSC Financial Perspective 2007–13 include the promotion of nuclear safety, radiation protection and the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries. The total INSC support amounts to €217 million for 2007–2009, with about €20 million for nuclear safeguards (Janssens 2010:12 and 14). Taking into account the lessons learned through the TACIS programme, the EU began to move from an ad hoc approach (2007–10) to a more coherent and integrated regional networking strategy in the Middle East, South and South East Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus and parts of Africa. The INSC is supported by the Regulatory Assistance Management Group, which brings together EU regulatory bodies, including members of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group, to assist the Commission in defining regulatory components of the nuclear and radiation safety needs of potential beneficiary countries (Grip May 2011).

² The USA committed \$10 billion that was to be matched by other donors from the G8 countries—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom — as well as the EU. Other donors, including some EU member states, also subsequently agreed to provide contributions to the Global Partnership.

Novel to the INSC was that it was global in its scope of funding. This gave EU external assistance the option of moving away from an exclusive focus on the former Soviet Union to areas of emerging concern, such as countries with new nuclear power ambitions or regions with assessed proliferation risks due to, for example, terrorism (DG DEVCO 2013). In comparison with the TACIS nuclear safety programme, which had four beneficiary countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine), the INSC has, since its creation in 2007, involved 15 countries including in the Middle East and Central Asia. Nuclear safety cooperation has further expanded to countries in Latin America and South East Asia (EEAS 2013). Although the development was in line with the objective to reinforce threat reduction measures outside of the EU, most projects of the INSC budget has been allocated to nuclear safety, rather than nuclear security, activities. The non-proliferation value of the expanded programme is therefore questionable. In general it can be said that whereas nuclear safety is about securing humans from nuclear materials, nuclear security is about protecting the material from humans. However, some view nuclear safety as a non-proliferation instrument. Roland Kobia has argued that:

There are very tight links between safeguards and safety and between safety and security in general. The absence of expertise, of skilled workforce, of a relevant legal framework and of a sufficient safety culture in most of the countries that envisage embracing nuclear power will not only increase safety and security risks, but will also increase the burden on countries that will have to provide material equipment and technology. This will, in turn, lead to a rise in safety and radiological risks (Kobia 2008: 44).

In terms of the second output—to offer administrative, institutional and legislative assistance to third countries on non-proliferation—a key outcome for the EU was the creation of a dedicated budget line to fund EU assistance to CBRN risk mitigation outside of the Union. Following the reform of the EU's financial instrument in 2006, the Commission allocated hundreds of million euros to cooperation programmes on CBRN risk mitigation in 2007–13, largely through the new IfS (Bauer and Bromley 2013:465-468)

The EU's IfS was created in 2007 to address conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building and is the main budget instrument to fund WMD non-proliferation programmes. An Expert Support Facility (ESF) was established in 2007 to mobilize expertise to support the Commission in maximizing the impact of the IFS - including through the identification of key areas of intervention, risk assessment and consistency with

other programmes. The ESF is managed by the Commission, but it could be used and co-financed by other EU actors. The long-term component of the IfS under budget articles 4.1 (for support to the ESF) and 4.2. (for risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, nuclear and biological materials or agents) are the main sources of funding for WMD non-proliferation projects. The combined IfS budget for 2007–13 is €2062 million, of which €266 million has been dedicated to WMD non-proliferation efforts.

The wording of the new IfS was somewhat different from the WMD Strategy, as it aimed to ‘undertake development cooperation measures, as well as financial, economic and technical cooperation measures with third countries’ in a way that was complementary to the CFSP-financed activities due to their long-term components. Nonetheless, ‘softer’, security governance projects in less developed states, such as was suggested by the output, have been a central component of the IFS during its first financial phase. Projects have included countering nuclear trafficking and the establishing of ‘knowledge management systems’, as well as regional Centres of Excellence (CoE) to address CBRN risks. These projects have sought to develop methodologies both in the collection, management, assessment and dissemination of technical data and information (knowledge management systems) and to develop institutional capacity at regional and national levels for CBRN risk mitigation (the CoE). The projects under the IfS also aim to broaden the geographic scope of the EU cooperation programmes to regions which are perceived to lack capacities to implement non-proliferation commitments (by e.g. weak export controls), including in the Middle East and South-East Asia, as well as parts of Africa (Grip Dec. 2011: 8–15).

Concerning the third objective—to create an assistance programme on export controls—, the EU commissioned three pilot projects in 2005-06. The EU pilot projects were conducted in South East Europe and were concluded in October 2008. The pilot projects then transitioned into the Long Term Programme ‘EU Cooperation in Export Control’. The focus of the project work has been agreed jointly between the EU and the implementing agent Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA), and the geographical scope of the programme has expanded to include new recipient countries and regions. The project is divided into five pillars: legal, licensing, customs, awareness and penalties. Activities within each pillar have included study visits, outreach to industry, customs and legal seminars, training, awareness raising, prosecution and investigation workshops, production of handbooks, etc. In addition to the bilateral and regional assistance activities, BAFA organizes experts meetings and multilateral conferences within the framework of the EU programme. While the programme initially focused on states in South East Europe, the scope has

progressively expanded to cover 30 countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. During 2008-11, the Commission committed €10 million from the IfS budget to the long-term project (BAFA 2011).

3.3. Adoption of the WMD Non-proliferation Clause

The first contract to ever enter into force containing the EU WMD non-proliferation clause was the 2005 Cotonou Agreement, a comprehensive agreement between the EU and a large number of developing states in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Island states. Since 2005, the clause has further been successfully introduced into a many other agreements, including with significant partners in non-proliferation, such as South Africa and South Korea (Council 2009: 2). The pattern of adoption, however, has been different from the original blueprints in two important ways: first of all, the WMD non-proliferation clause tend to be inserted into a separate political agreement rather than the trade agreement; secondly, in almost all cases the second part of the clause (taking steps forward in non-proliferation) is not made an essential element of the agreement. The EU-South Korea agreement, for example, says that ‘The Parties agree that their political dialogue will accompany and consolidate these elements’ (EU 2010: Art. 4).

The biggest challenge to the policy of enforcing non-proliferation policy in wider external agreements has probably been the case of Iran. Between 2002 and 2005, the EU sought to moderate Iran’s behaviour in various political fields by including economic incentives as essential political clauses in a comprehensive trade and cooperation agreement (Harnisch 2007: 8). Following Iran’s rejection of the EU’s offer and the resumption of Iran’s uranium conversion and enrichment, negotiations on the agreement are currently on hold (Commission 2013).

The Commission concluded negotiations for an association agreement with Syria in 2004, which was signed in 2009 but never entered into force. The Commission initially found it difficult to produce a text that was acceptable to all EU member states, due in part to differing positions on how far to push Syria over the WMD clause. Syria—which was not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) or the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC)—had particular reservations over the second section of the clause. Eventually it was agreed that the full standard WMD clause should be included, with minor alterations, but with only the fulfilment of existing obligations (and, in a variation from the model WMD clause, compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions) having essential element status (Grip 2009). Negotiations on an Association Agreement were frozen

in May 2011, while bilateral cooperation programmes under the European Neighbourhood Policy have been suspended, as have the Cooperation Agreement signed in 1977 (EEAS 2013b).

A big setback for the EU non-proliferation clause came in 2007, during EU's negotiations with India. India consistently refused any inclusion of political conditionality linked to the EU-India free trade agreement throughout negotiations, a position that the EU accepted (Grip 2009: 10-11). The EU-India Free Trade Agreement is still being negotiated.

One of the most recent agreements that the EU concluded was the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. Negotiations for the agreement were concluded in October 2013 (Commission 2013). The EU is Canada's second largest trading partner after the United States and the agreement is the biggest trade agreement that Canada has ever adopted (BBC 2013). The trade agreement does not include political clauses, therefore a Strategic Partnership Agreement covering the non-proliferation clause and other political requirements was negotiated simultaneously. The negotiations over the political clauses allegeable ran into problem (CTV News 2013). Although it might be difficult to imagine why Canada would oppose general language on non-proliferation in the agreement, one possible issue could be the Canada-India trade agreement on uranium supply. Although this would be a breach against the EU non-proliferation clause in theory, in practice the Canada-India deal is unlikely to cause any tension in Canada's relations with the EU given the fact that France is supplying uranium to India since 2009 (Strat Post, 2013; AREVA 2013).³

Table 3. Overview of outcome performance

	Funding to verification activities of IAEA and CTBTO	Bilateral assistance	Adoption of the WMD clause
Cohesion and continuity	Yes	Setting up of new programmes	No
Use of instruments	Continuous but unintentional use of Joint Actions	Good, including the creation of new budget instruments	Routine but contested
International leadership	Strong in voluntary contributions, but small compared to EU member states contributions	Strong	Weak

³ The EEAS assures that Canadian uranium supply to India was not an issue in the negotiations, but said that Canada had raised some issues with regards to firearms. Firearms fall under the small arms and light weapons clause which was negotiated at the same time (EEAS 2013c).

4. The impact of EU assistance

This fourth section considers the impact of EU assistance to nuclear non-proliferation regimes and to states, as well as the impact of the non-proliferation clause. It is tremendously difficult, if not impossible, to ‘establish causality between the EU actions and the changed environment in order to credit the EU with developments and establish solidly any claims about the EU performance record’ (Blavoukos, 2014 *forthcoming*). The section will nevertheless describe some results from the different projects after 2003 and reflect on the role of the EU involvement. In terms of regimes, the section measures impact by participation in the two regimes and verification activities. On assistance, it lays out some preliminary results from the three different programmes.

4.1. Impact on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regimes

One way in which the EU WMD Strategy measures effective multilateralism is the universality of selected multilateral non-proliferation instruments. The EU sees increased participation in these selected instruments as an objective, and the higher the rate of participation in a certain regime, the stronger the degree of confidence in the normative effect is believed to be. Table 4 shows the changes in signature and ratification in CTBT and IAEA Additional Protocol from January 1 2004 (close to the adoption of the EU WMD Strategy) until mid-2011. The table shows a remarkable increase of the number of states that have an Additional Protocol to their bilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA in force, as well as a very high increase of the number of states that have signed an Additional Protocol. A similar pattern can be observed for the number of states ratifying the CTBT (including three Annex 2 states—that is, states whose ratification is needed before the Treaty can enter into force).⁴

Table 4. Changes in signatory/ratifying states 2003-2011

	1 Jan 2004	2011	% Increase
Additional protocol	83 (29)	135 (108)	62.5 (272.41)
Signed (in force)			
CTBT signed (ratified)	170 (89)	182 (153)	7.06 (71.91)

Sources: As of 4 May 2011 http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html ; United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, 2003, p. 47; As of 30 June 2011 <http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/foreign->

⁴ Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Vietnam.

[policy/disarmament/weapons-of-mass-destruction/hcoc.html](http://www.ctbto.org/policy/disarmament/weapons-of-mass-destruction/hcoc.html); CTBTO <<http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/>>

It would be unreasonable to point to the Council Decisions alone to explain the sharp increase of signatory and ratifying states to these key non-proliferation instruments during this seven years period of time as this would ignore other significant developments in the area of multilateral non-proliferation. Furthermore, alongside EU efforts, state actors—including EU member states—have also been working for universalization through outreach to non-parties to the instruments. Furthermore, the EU has other instruments at its disposal to realise the objective of enhancing participation in multilateral instruments, such as the non-proliferation clause.

The CTBT has not entered into force and does not seem likely to do so anytime soon. In July 2003 EU adopted a Council Decision to increase participation, but none of the four subsequent EU Council Decisions directed to CTBTO have included actions towards raising the number of signatory states to the regime (Council of the EU 2003a). Little progress has been made in securing the ratification of states whose support is critical if the Treaty is ever to enter into force. In spite of the EU's outspoken commitment to 'promote the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty' the only so-called Annex 2 states which have signed or ratified the CTBT since 2003 are Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Vietnam. (Council of the EU 2003c) Nevertheless, it is likely that increased state participation in listed multilateral instruments in recent years has been encouraged by EU support and targeted actions and this has several beneficial effects. Increased adherence to conventions and codes is important as a more global membership increases the legitimacy of the multilateral instruments and also opens the way for the EU to support the national implementation measures that are vital elements in achieving the purposes of the selected instruments.

The EU support to the IAEA and CTBTO has also been dedicated to technical assistance projects. The IAEA Safeguards verification activities have greatly increased in numbers in the past decade. Prior to 2004, 40 IAEA Safeguards verification activities were reported; in 2011 these had increased to 175. This significant rise may mainly reflect the increased number of countries with a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the agency and is difficult to ascribe to EU cooperation. On the other hand, earmarked funding for verification activities from the EU and others de facto facilitated the activities. (IAEA 2003b, 2010a and 2013) The EU financial support has most likely also played a part in the

strengthening the CTBTO in the area of training and capacity building for verification. According to a recent statement made by the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, Dr Lassina Zerbo, the CTBTO verification regime has undergone many improvements in the past decade, which ‘would not have been possible’ without the EU financial contributions (Zerbo 2013). The EU support to CTBTO verification and monitoring capabilities has included capacity building of the CTBTO monitoring network; strengthening CTBTO capabilities in the field of radio-nuclide monitoring, in particular noble gas detection; support the CTBTO seismic monitoring system; strengthening the CTBT On-Site-Inspection capabilities, including through the conduct of a field exercises and the procurement of equipment to enhance the OSI rapid deployment capabilities; as well as capacity building and technical assistance in African states signatories of the CTBT (Council of the EU 2006: 6; 2007: 7; 2008 and 2010b). Although it can be established that EU contributions to CTBTO and IAEA verification activities have increased as a result of the WMD Strategy, and that this financial support has enabled both organisations to increase their activities, what the impact on verifications is remain uncertain. To truly comprehend the impact of the EU support would require in-depth analysis of different verification techniques. What is possible to say without such method is that the EU has provided support which has strengthened the two organisations’ capacities (technical and financial) to carry out verification.

4.2. Impact of Bilateral Assistance

In terms of reinforcing EU support to threat reduction, the main contribution by the EU has been to fulfil its commitment under the 2002 G8 Global Partnership. The primary beneficiaries are the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine to which TACIS committed €124.7 million in the period 2002–2007. The two centres are intergovernmental organisations set up by a handful of Western countries and the former Soviet Union as emergency programmes after the fall of the Soviet Union (ISTC 2011). The EU’s share of the support to the ISTC has significantly increased as the budget support for the programme by other donors has decreased. The ISTC budget was reduced from \$49.2 million to \$14.6 million during 2007–10 (ISTC 2010: 9). According to the ISTC, ‘over 58,000 weapons scientists and their team members in 765 research institutes spread across Russia/CIS have been involved in ISTC projects and activities’ (ISTC 2011). The Commission ordered an assessment of the centres following the termination of TACIS. The Commission’s external consultants found that the centres constituted ‘an exceptional asset’ for the EU and, with some modifications to changing security challenges, ‘should be

preserved and used to deal with Russia and other CIS countries' (Richard et al 2009: 22). Other assessments, while underlining the valuable contribution that the centres made in the past, have been more critical and have questioned the programmes' value to non-proliferation going forward (Boureston and Nikitin 2005). Assessments by donors notwithstanding, Russia has decided to withdraw from the ISTC as it considers that the initial goal of the centre has been met. Russia no longer believes that external assistance is needed to manage the threat of knowledge proliferation. The European Commission plans to make use of the lessons learned from the STCU and ISTC support to extend EU activities on WMD expertise redirection to other regions, where the communities of concern are smaller and less highly qualified than in the former Soviet Union, such as Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Syria. So far, one project to assist Iraq with the redirection of scientists and engineers by engaging them in decommissioning, dismantling and decontamination of nuclear facilities has been approved (€2.5 million) (Commission 2009: 29–30).

In terms of the second output of the EU, to offer administrative, institutional and legislative assistance, the impact is equally difficult to measure. Foremost because of the nature of the output is quite broad and diffuse, but also because the EU has not made use of a single policy instrument through which offers of assistance were made. Via the support to IAEA, the EU has provided legislative and regulatory assistance to at least 44 states to improve their implementation of national obligations under IAEA Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocols (Council of the EU 2005:12). Administrative and institutional assistance has been provided through the IfS, including by the creation of Knowledge Management Systems and regional CoE. Although the practical impact of these programmes is yet to be determined, they offer methodologies for managing nuclear threats and risks at the national and regional levels. The CoE also seek to establish institutional structures to address CBRN risks, including by creating and staffing regional secretariats and establish national focal points in regions which have been identified of concern to EU security. Administrative, institutional and legislative assistance has also been offered in the framework of export controls.

Cooperation has been especially intensive with countries that have an EU membership perspective—Albania, BiH, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia—and since the start of the activity these South East European states have undergone major changes in the area of export controls facilitated among other by EU assistance. All six countries have filed national reports to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 committee describing the progress on export controls (UNSC 1540 Committee 2011). The six states have either adopted

new export controls legislation or revised existing laws since 2005. Albania adopted the ‘Law No. 9707 on the State Control over Import-Export Activity of Military Equipment and Dual-use Goods and Technologies’ in April 2007. This inter alia created an independent export controls state authority under the Minister of Defence. BiH has a revised dual-use export control law in force since December 2009. BiH also adopted during that period the ‘Law of Implementation of Convention on The Prohibition of The Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction’ in February 2006. Macedonia revised and amended its export control law in force since 2005, in December 2010. Serbia’s ‘Law on Foreign Trade of Weapons, Military Equipment and Dual-Use Goods’ has been in force since 2005 (which at that time also covered Montenegro). Montenegro revised and amended the law on ‘Foreign Trade of Armament, Military Equipment and Dual-Use Goods’ in 2008. Croatia revised its 2004 ‘Act on Export of Dual-Use Goods’ in 2008 (BAFA 2011). While legislative reform may not automatically be defined as a successful non-proliferation measure, it is often an obligation states take on under various regimes and could therefore be approached as such.

As noted above, several of the recipient countries have submitted applications for EU membership during the period of implementation of the export control programme (Albania April 2009, Montenegro December 2008, Serbia December 2009). Croatia had already applied for EU membership in 2003 and is now a full member of the EU. Three of the states have reached candidate or membership statuses (Macedonia, Montenegro and Croatia) which means that they have taken a series of steps to align their national export control legislation with that of the EU under the standard procedure of adopting the ‘Community *acquis*’ (the broader EU regulatory framework of common rights and obligations) as a precondition for entering the EU. Furthermore, all of the countries are heavily dependent on the EU for trade and the region is an important axis for EU exports to the Middle East and beyond. While difficult to quantify, there is no doubt that the external assistance programme has been instrumental in bringing about reforms. However, the specific conditions in the region do not apply in other countries and regions. These unique characteristics have certainly made the countries positive to cooperation with the EU on dual-use export controls, and revising national legislation to make it compatible with that of the EU, as well as underpinning EU interest in collaboration. At the same time, the general methodology developed and tested in South East Europe has been possible to apply in adapted form in other countries where the EU now has active programmes underway.

4.3. Impact of the WMD Non-Proliferation Clause

The impact of the WMD non-proliferation clause on states' behaviour is perhaps most difficult to measure. Although a study showed positive steps taken by the ACP group of states in the years following the insertion of the WMD non-proliferation clause, the same group of states also simultaneously benefitted directly from EU bilateral assistance (Grip 2009). The EU has not been able to adopt new political agreements with states of proliferation concern since the adoption of the clause, and therefore its impact in these cases cannot be measured. One positive impact, although not foreseen in the time of adoption of the WMD non-proliferation clause by the Council in 2003, is that the clauses provide a legal basis for cooperation on non-proliferation with likeminded states, such as South Korea and South Africa. The EEAS is however reluctant to say that the clause has ever translated into actually bilateral cooperation programmes (EEAS 2013c). Furthermore, this positive contribution reduces the clause to a paragraph on mutual cooperation, and would presumably have very limited effect in terms of conditionality in the unlikely case of breaches of non-proliferation obligations by either side of the agreement.

5. Conclusions

In terms of nuclear non-proliferation assistance, EU funding has produced some tangible results since 2003 that can be measured using various indicators. Nevertheless, an 'attribution gap' remains, making it very difficult to show that EU efforts have caused the improvements. The EU's financial support to CTBTO and IAEA seems to have been especially successful, from the point of view of performance analysis of agreed objectives, implementation and impact. However, 'the negative side effects' (Blavoukos, 2014, *forthcoming*) of the recurrent regularities of financial contributions in the gradual buildup of the EU's external assistance, is that it may reduce the role of the EU to an additional funding stream. Common EU funding is mainly complementary of funding from EU member states. Nevertheless, the voluntary contributions by the EU enable the member states to agree in the Council on priorities of verification activities. What would the result be if the EU had not intervened? Seen from this perspective, it is not likely that all EU member states would have increased their national voluntary contributions by earmarking money for specific verification activities by CTBTO and IAEA, such as the EU Council Decisions have done.

The EU's new expanded bilateral assistance programmes on nuclear non-proliferation was intentionally set up in 2006-2007 based on the agreed objectives in the WMD Strategy.

Could EU member states have delivered the same level of assistance had the institutions not committed resources and established legal frameworks to carry out assistance in nuclear non-proliferation? On the financial aspect, it seems unlikely that EU member states would have allocated one additional billion Euro to the G8 global partnership between them, had the Commission's budget not been made available for this purpose. It is further difficult to see that one or several EU member states would create multiple regional CoE to address CBRN threats. In the area of export control, much assistance has been offered to EU candidate countries. Even though the key implementing agent has been the German agency BAFA, rather than the European Commission, there might be an added value to offer assistance to EU candidate countries through the EU institutions rather than by individual member states.

By conclusion, it can be said that the performance of the EU institutions on nuclear non-proliferation assistance has been relatively strong and has complemented assistance offered by EU member states.

The EU non-proliferation clause has been successfully adopted into a number of agreements, however the policy has failed to deliver in all cases of proliferation concern. One key issue is that the clause need to be inserted into a mixed agreement agreed after 2003, and the EU is not going to continue negotiations for cooperative agreement with many states of proliferation concern, due to for example sanctions. The use of the clause as 'conditionality' has therefore failed, however the adoption of the clause into agreements with likeminded states may still hold some potential as it creates the legal basis for cooperation on these issues. Although policies will be tailored to specific countries also in the future, a methodology should be developed for cases when an EU partner refuses to include the clause, as well as follow-up procedures to check partners' observance of the clause after its insertion in EU agreements. For the EU to deliver the 'comprehensive approach' it has set out for itself, insertion of the WMD non-proliferation into agreements should be followed up with practical assistance or cooperation programmes with the contractual partner state.

References

- AREVA (2013) 'India Demand Continues to Grow', <http://www.areva.com/EN/group-1476/india-demand-continues-to-grow.html> (accessed 29 Oct. 2013).
- BAFA (2011) 'Cooperation in Export Control of Dual-Use Goods', <http://www.eu-outreach.info/> (accessed 1 Sep. 2013).
- Bauer, S. and Bromley, M. (2013) 'Export Control Developments in the European Union', *SIPRI Yearbook 2013* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 457-468.
- BBC (2013) 'Canada and European Union agree free-trade deal', 18 Oct. 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24583745> (accessed 31 Oct. 2013).
- Boureston, J. and Nikitin, M. B. (2005) 'Improving the ISTC/STCU Science Centres' Programmes to Support Worldwide Non-Proliferation Objectives', Background paper 8, Conference on Strengthening European Action on WMD Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: How Can Community Instruments Contribute?, Brussels, 7–8 December.
- European Commission (2013) (Trade) 'Iran', <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/iran/> (accessed 1 June 2013).
- Commission (2009) The Instrument for Stability—Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2009, C(2009)2641, 8 April 2009.
- Commission (2010) Joint Research Centre, 'The European Commission Cooperative Support Programme: Activities and Achievements', IAEA-CN-184/230, <http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/Symposium/2010/Documents/PapersRepository/230.pdf> (accessed 28 Aug. 2013).
- Commission (2013) Facts and Figures of the EU-Canada Free Trade Deal, MEMO/13/911 18, Oct. 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-911_en.htm (accessed Oct 31 2013).
- Council of the EU (1999) Council Common Position of 29 July 1999 Relating to the European Union's Contribution to the Promotion of the Early Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) 1999/533/CFSP, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 204, 4 August 1999.
- Council of the EU (2001) Council Decision of 9 April 2001 Implementing Common Position 1999/533/CFSP Relating to the European Union's Contribution to the Promotion of the Early Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L99, 10 April 2001.
- Council of the EU (2003a) Council Decision 2003/567/CFSP of 21 July 2003 Implementing Common Position 1999/533/CFSP Relating to the European Union's Contribution to the Promotion of the Early Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 192, 31 July 2003.

Council of the European Union (2003b) ‘Fight against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Mainstreaming Non-proliferation Policies into the EU’s Wider Relations with Third Countries’, Council Note, 14997/03, 19 Nov. 2003.

Council of the EU (2003c) ‘Council Common Position 2003/805/CFSP of 17 November 2003 on the Universalisation and Reinforcement of Multilateral Agreements in the Field of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Means of Delivery’, L 302/34, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 20 Nov. 2003.

Council of the EU (2003d) ‘Fight against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, 15708/03, 10 Dec. 2003.

Council of the EU (2004) Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on Support for IAEA Activities under its Nuclear Security Programme and in the Framework of the Implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 182, 19 May 2004.

Council of the EU (2005) Council Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP of 18 July 2005 on Support for IAEA Activities in the Areas of Nuclear Security and Verification and in the Framework of the Implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Journal of the European Union*, L193, 23 July 2005.

Council of the EU (2006) Six-monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 5183/07, 9 Jan. 2007.

Council of the EU (2007) Six-Monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 16411/0/, 11 Dec. 2007.

Council of the European Union (2008), Joint Action 2008/588/CFSP of 15 July 2008 on Support for Activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to Strengthen its Monitoring and Verification Capabilities and in the Framework of the Implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 17 July 2008.

Council of the European Union (2009) ‘Second South Africa–European Union Summit’, Joint Statement, 13231/09 (Presse 266), 11 Sep. 2009.

Council of the EU (2010a) Six-monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 11135/10, Brussels, 14 June 2010.

Council of the EU (2010b) Council Decision 2010/461/CFSP, 26 July 2010 on Support for Activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to Strengthen its Monitoring and Verification Capabilities and in the Framework of the Implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L219, 20 Aug. 2010.

Council of the EU (2011) Six-Monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2011/I), 13132/11, Brussels, 20 July 2011.

CTV News (2013) 'EU-Canada Trade Talks Hit Snag over Wording of Human Rights Clause', 8 Oct. 2013, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/> (accessed 31 Oct. 2013).

Read more: <http://www.ctvnews.ca/business/eu-canada-trade-talks-hit-snag-over-wording-of-human-rights-clause-1.1488967#ixzz2jK4QkhUP>

DEVCO (2013) 'Nuclear Safety Co-operation Instrument (NSCI)', http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/nsci_en.htm (accessed 1 Sep. 2013).

European External Action Service (2013a) 'Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation', http://www.eeas.europa.eu/nuclear_safety/index_en.htm (accessed 1 Sep. 2013).

European External Action Service (2013b) 'Syria', <http://eeas.europa.eu/syria/> (accessed 20 Oct. 2013).

European External Action Service (2013c) interview with the author, 23 Nov. 2013.

European Union (2010) 'Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member states, on the one Part, and the Republic of Korea, on the other Part', L20, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 23 Jan. 2013.

Gerami, N. (Feb. 2011) 'The International Atomic Energy Agency: An Organizational Perspective', GCST Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Series, no. 1.

Grip, L. (Nov. 2009) 'The EU Non-proliferation Clause: a Preliminary Assessment', SIPRI Background Paper.

Grip, L. (May 2011) 'Mapping the European Union Institutional Actors Related to WMD Non-Proliferation', Nonproliferation paper no. 1, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium.

Grip, L. (Dec. 2011) 'Assessing Selected European Union External Assistance and Cooperation Projects on WMD Non-Proliferation', Nonproliferation paper no. 6, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium .

Harnisch, S. (2007) 'Minilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/EU-3 Iran Initiative', *European Security*, 16(1): 1-27.

House of Lords (2003) Committee on European Union, Letter from Denis MacShane to the Chairman, 5 November, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldeucom/71/71we81.htm> (accessed 28 Oct 2013).

IAEA (2003a) 'The Agency's budget update for 2003', http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC46/GC46Documents/English/gc46-7_en.pdf (accessed 8 Sep. 2013).

IAEA (2003b) ‘Safeguards Implementation Report 2003’, <http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/es/es2003.html> (accessed 8 Sep. 2013).

IAEA (2010a) ‘Safeguards Report Implementation 2010’, <http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/es/es2010.html> (accessed 8 Sep. 2013).

IAEA (2010b) ‘Annual Budget 2010’, <http://www.iaea.org/About/budget.html> (accessed 1 Dec. 2011).

IAEA (2013) ‘Overview of EU Support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the Field of Nuclear Safety, Safeguards, Security and Technical Cooperation Financed during the Current Multiannual Financial Framework 2007-2013’, <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2013/eucontribution.pdf> (accessed 28 Aug. 2013).

ISTC (website) http://www.istc.ru/istc/istc.nsf/va_WebPages/WhoweareEng (accessed 1 Dec. 2011).

ISTC, ‘Annual Report 2010: Developing International Scientific Cooperation’, [http://www.istc.ru/istc/istc.nsf/va_webresources/Annual_Reports/\\$file/AR_Final_2010_Eng.pdf](http://www.istc.ru/istc/istc.nsf/va_webresources/Annual_Reports/$file/AR_Final_2010_Eng.pdf) (accessed 8 Sep. 2013).

Janssens, W. (2010) ‘The EU Nuclear Security Programme Focus on Export Control’, Presentation on behalf of EU at 11th International Export Control Conference, Kiev, 8 June.

Kobia, R. (2008) ‘The EU and Non-Proliferation: Need for a Quantum Leap?’, *Nuclear Law Bulletin*, no. 81.

Krause, K. and Latham, A. (1998) ‘Constructing Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: the Norms of Western Practice’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 19(1): 23-54.

Richard, M., Daoust Maléval, I. and Louvet, P. (June 2009), ‘Status and Prospect of Non-Proliferation Activities of ISTC and STCU’, *ESARDA Bulletin*, no. 41.

Rynning, S. (2007) ‘Peripheral or Powerful? The European Union’s Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, *European Security*, 16(3–4): 267-288.

Strat Post (2013) ‘Canada to Supply Uranium to India’, 19 Oct. 2013, <http://www.stratpost.com/canada-to-supply-uranium-to-india> (accessed 29 Oct. 2013).

UNSC 1540 Committee (2011) ‘Assistance Requested by Member States Excerpts from National Reports Submitted pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (2004)’, <http://www.un.org/sc/1540/requestsforassistance.shtml> (accessed 8 Sep. 2013).

Zerbo, L. (2013) Executive Secretary, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, speech at the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference, 30 September, <http://www.iiss.org/en/events/eu-s-conference> (accessed 29 Oct. 2013).