The EU as security community-building institution: venues, networks and cooperative security practices

Paper prepared for the 10th biannual conference of the European Community Studies Association – Canada (ECSA-C), Montréal, Canada, 8-10 May 2014

Niklas Bremerberg, Ph.D.

Swedish Institute of International Affairs

Drottning Kristinas väg 37

Box 27035, 102 51 Stockholm

Sweden

niklas.bremerberg@ui.se

Abstract

How does the EU promote security beyond its borders? This paper answers this seemingly straight-forward question by way of exploring how the EU works as security community-building institution vis-à-vis non-members. Drawing upon practice theory in IR, the paper unpacks the security community concept focusing especially on the relation between cooperative security practices and the expansion of security communities. The paper discusses how recent practice-inspired insights in IR can be applied in empirical research to generate novel and interesting results of relevance for EU studies. It does so by recapitulating the main findings from a study on Spanish-Moroccan cooperation on civilian and military crisis management. The findings support the claim that common practice precedes collective identity in processes of security community-building in that the EU has helped bring together and perpetuate a community of security practitioners in the Western Mediterranean that builds upon, as well as transcends, already existing bilateral relations.

Keywords: security community, practice, institution, crisis management, EU, Spain, Morocco
Introduction

How does the European Union (EU) promote security beyond its borders? This seemingly straight-forward question digs right into a central problem that both mainstream and critical scholars in the field of European integration and International Relations (IR) have sought to address since the end of the Cold War (Webber, et al., 2004; Huysmans, et al., 2006; Kirchner and Sperling, 2007). Of course, the question is only seemingly straight-forward since it immediately spurs a host of follow-up questions. What constitutes the borders of the EU? For whom does the EU promote security and from what? What does it mean in practice for regional organizations such as the EU to promote security? To be sure, security is an essentially contested concept which meaning cannot primarily be established deictically but rather by becoming aware of the pragmatic context and social practices in which actors are embedded (Kratochwil, 2011).

Departing from this understanding of security and drawing upon recent advancement on practice theory in IR (Neumann, 2002; Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Bueger, 2013), this paper suggests that a particularly fruitful way to answer the question of how the EU promotes security beyond its borders is by way of exploring how the EU works as a security community-building institution vis-à-vis non-member states.

Even though the EU is still far from being a coherent international actor (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013), it is one of the world’s most advanced security community-building institutions (Bellamy, 2004). The EU (together with other regional organizations such as the OSCE, NATO and the Council of Europe) reinforces security community-building in Europe in terms of an on-going re-imagination of the ‘European space’ through practices of economic and
political integration (Zürn and Checkel, 2007), but also by seeking to transcend a closed meaning of security by means of redefining national security from an emphasis on territorial defence towards non-military threats and trans-boundary risks (Boin, et al., 2013). The argument here is that there is no reason to assume that this process is only confined to ‘Europe’ since the EU’s enlargement process entails a dynamic relationship between community-building and boundary-drawing (Smith, 1996; Rumelili, 2007).

The circle of EU member states will probably not expand beyond the Western Balkans in the foreseeable future, but the Union has sought to respond to the challenge of formally restricting enlargement without confining the scope of its legislation and policy frameworks exclusively to EU member states. This has been done by way of developing a comprehensive framework towards neighbouring states to the south and east, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Several scholars suggest that the ENP is best understood as a means for the EU to exercise power and influence over states in its near abroad that are highly dependent on trade and aid from the Union (Smith, 2005; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009; Bechev and Nicolaïdis, 2010; Börzel and Risse, 2012). Others suggest that it rather serves as a vehicle for an ‘open-ended process of socialization’ involving both EU members and neighbouring non-members (Manners, 2010:44).

Any attempt to analyse how the EU promotes security beyond its borders needs to take the inherent duality of the Union’s enlargement process and its evolving relations with neighbouring non-members as an analytical starting-point, and the security community concept provides useful conceptual tools to do so as it explicitly seeks to capture the dynamics between power and socialization in international politics.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, it unpacks the security community concept focusing especially on the transformative potential of practices of cooperative security. Second, it spells out an analytical framework building on three mechanisms of security community-building: institutionalization of multilateral venues, expansion of transgovernmental networks and development of cooperative security as crisis management.\(^1\) Third, it recapitulates the main findings from a study on Spain and Morocco in which the framework has been used. Thus, the paper can be said to discuss what a ‘praxiography’ of security communities might look like. It empirically focuses on the EU and its neighbourhood in order to show how recent practice-inspired insights in IR can be applied in empirical research generating novel and interesting results of relevance for the field of EU studies.\(^2\) The main conclusion presented in this paper is that the EU has helped foster a community of security practitioners in the Western Mediterranean that builds upon, as well as transcends, already existing bilateral relations.

**The EU as security community-building institution**

The central problematique for research on security communities has for a long time been explaining and understanding why, how and under what conditions dependable expectations of peaceful change emerge and spread (Deutsch, et al., 1957; Adler and Barnett, 1998). Since the end of the Cold War several studies have contributed to our understanding of how security communities work, building mainly (but not exclusively) on constructivists insights on international socialization and collective identity-formation (e.g. Risse-Kappen, 1996; Williams

---

\(^1\) On mechanism-based reasoning in social science, and IR in particular, see Bennett (2013).

\(^2\) For another recent example of applying practice-based insights to study EU foreign and security policy, see Bicchi (2011).
and Neumann, 2000; Williams, 2001; Bjola and Kornprobst, 2007; Anderson, et al., 2008). Even though these studies constitute major advancements they tend not to focus adequately on one of the major shifts in international security in the post-Cold War era, namely the widening of the concept of security in both theory and practice to include non-military threats and trans-boundary risks (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). This is unfortunate because it obscures many useful insights from the corpus of scholarly work on security communities that can be used to make sense of how security is practiced in the post-Cold War era, under what conditions notions of what constitute security change and what role regional organizations, such as the EU, play as security community-building institutions.

For example, it is well-known that in Deutsch’s early works great emphasis was placed on the role of social communication and transnational transactions in developing a broader ‘sense of community’ among states and societies, and much of the recent work on security communities have tended to focus on processes of collective identity-formation since the emergence of ‘we-feeling’ is often assumed to precede social practices of self-restraint among states (Wendt, 1999). However, it should be noted that Deutsch suggested that close attention be paid to the: ‘institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change’ (Deutsch, et al., 1957:5, emphasis added).³ Möller points out that security communities do not necessarily rest upon commonality of values (i.e. collective identity), but rather compatibility of values and mutual responsiveness (Möller, 2007:46). Adler and Barnett also suggest that regional organizations function as security

³ Rosamond notes that: ‘Deutsch focused less on Europe than other integration theorists and to this day the idea of “security communities” might have better purchase as a general theory of integration, because its focal point is the transformation of international relations and intersocietal exchange, rather than the development of supranational institutions and the demise of state sovereignty’ (Rosamond, 2000:41).
community-building institutions in that they provide: ‘sites of socialization and learning [which] foster the creation of a regional “culture” around commonly held attributes’ (Adler and Barnett, 1998:43).\textsuperscript{4} Such regional cultures of common attributes might contain elements of a strong collective identity but they do not have to.\textsuperscript{5} To paraphrase Neumann, regional organizations matter in this regard to the extent that they turn generic venues for social interaction (e.g. multilateral crisis management exercises) into specific sites ‘where something happens’ (e.g. practicing cooperative security) (Neumann, 2013:4).

\textit{Regional organizations and the expansion of security communities}

If security communities are not necessarily dependent on strong collective identities in order to emerge and expand, then it is hard not to agree with Pouliot’s suggestion that if we want to understand the social construction of security communities, an important first step is to: ‘focus less on how people represent one another [and more] on what practitioners actually do when they interact’ (Pouliot, 2010:5, emphasis in original). The next step here is to ask how cooperative security practice relates to the EU as security community-building institution vis-à-vis non-members. To begin with, practices should be seen as: ‘knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines and organizations that

\footnote{Examples from the literature on security communities include OSCE (Adler, 1998), ASEAN (Acharya, 2001) and NATO (Pouliot, 2010).}

\footnote{In relation to the evolution of transatlantic relations since 1945, Ikenberry notes that: ‘Norms of consultations and reciprocity… can exist at least partially independently of substantive norms and values’ (Ikenberry, 2008:26). Even in a ‘thick’ institutional environment such as contemporary Europe, there is empirical evidence suggesting: ‘minimal socialization, in which its effects are clearly secondary to dynamics at the national level’ (Zürn and Checkel, 2007:260). Moreover, Checkel and Katzenstein note that the European security community is actually: ‘based on a relatively thin conception of collective identity that is lacking in emotional strength. Europeans have made peace in… a community of strangers’ (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009:12).}
structure experience’ (Adler, 2008:198; Schatzki, 2000). Practice is consequently about performance as much as (setting) the standards of competent performance.

Thus, there is a distinct communal quality inherent to practices and it does not make sense to analyse practices as if they would be a kind of discrete social activity/doing. Instead, the prime analytical locus should be communities of practice defined as: ‘like-minded groups of practitioners who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice’ (Adler, 2008:196). Importantly, practice theory does not emphasize norm internalization as the universal means to achieve commitment to communal standards. It rather assumes that shared practical understandings can evolve through social interaction even though actors’ understandings of self and other(s) might remain unaltered. From the perspective of practice, what is important in terms of processes of (security) community-building is whether actors learn to do something in a new way (not that they first create a common identity).

Furthermore, the social power of practices rest on the establishment of ways-of-doing-things that appear self-evident, or to put differently: ‘The order of things is established through the iterated practices performed by capital-endowed agents, because their doing something in a certain way makes the implicit but powerful claim that “this is how things are”’ (Pouliot, 2008:282). Importantly, understanding security communities as ultimately being constituted by communities of practice also provides substance to explanations as to how security communities expand through processes of socialization, but contrary to ‘standard’ accounts: ‘socialization, learning, and persuasion follow rather than precede practice: at best, they co-evolve’ (Adler and Pouliot, 2011:23).
In a similar vein, focusing on practice provides us with new ways to think about how the EU promotes security beyond its borders. Although it might seem intuitive that the expansion of the European security community would follow the expansion of the borders of the Union, a key insight here is that communities of practice are not necessarily: ‘congruent with the reified structures of institutional affiliations, divisions and boundaries’ (Adler, 2005:24) and the transformative potential of such communities relates to their capacity to carry social structures across functional and geographical boundaries (Adler, 2008). In this sense the EU’s role as a security community-building institution is not limited to the process of enlargement (and the disciplining effects of aspiring to EU membership). It is rather determined by the extent to which the EU supports the spread of cooperative security practices among member states, as well as among members and non-members.

*Cooperative security practices as military and civilian crisis management*

A conspicuous trend in international politics after the end of the Cold War has been the remarkable drop in the number of armed inter-state conflicts (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2011). Some scholars even suggest that inter-state war is no longer conceived as an existential threat by the leading great powers in the international system (Jervis, 2002). This does not mean that war is no longer a problem in international politics nor that societies around the world necessarily are enjoying more security today since non-military threats and trans-boundary risks (e.g. terrorism, pandemics, man-made and natural disasters) are still very much present. However, as Rasmussen points out: ‘the standards by which we measure our security have changed’ (Vedby Rasmussen,

---

6 However, the return of what seems to be quite traditional geopolitical competition in Eastern Europe after Russia’s annexation of Crimea might led to a re-assessment of such claims.
2006:1). Analogously, we need to re-think how we empirically study security communities since the absence of preparations for armed conflict (as a proxy for dependable expectations for peaceful change) might not be the only nor the best means to identify processes of security community-building today.

To be sure, security dynamics among states do not necessarily vanish once inter-state peace is ‘secured’ as they might start to revolve around other kinds of threat instead (Waever, 1998). For example, as security communities become increasingly institutionalized and entrenched national armed forces of member states might take on new roles that go beyond territorial defence (Adler and Barnett, 1998). It is therefore important to take into account what happens to states’ national security policies as ingrained connotations of territorial defence are complemented, or even challenged, by the acknowledgement of non-military threats. Research on securitization provides useful insights here since it emphasizes the social processes in which intersubjective understandings of existential threats within a political community is construed and changed (Buzan, et al., 1998; Williams, 2003). However, focusing exclusively on urgent and exceptional measures as being the prime indicator of on-going security dynamics runs the risk of losing sight of more low-key and routine-based security practices that are nonetheless important for the formation of intersubjective understandings of what constitute a security threat and, more importantly, how to deal with it.

In line with the above discussion on practice and security, there is need for detailed praxiographies of how security is practiced and not to restrict the analysis to discursive representations of threats in order to understand how security communities work (cf. Bueger, 2013; Kratochwil, 2011). For example, in a majority of European states traditional security and
defence policies (e.g. the ‘territorial defence model’) have been losing ground ever since the end of the Cold War (Gärtner, 2003). The logic of collective defence as a means of military deterrence is being complemented with notions of joint military operations in order to deal with non-military threats before they ‘hit home’ and changes in military planning in many EU member states can be said to indicate a disposition towards engaging in: ‘military cooperation, joint planning and exercises, intelligence exchanges, revision of army doctrines from traditional war-fighting to post-conflict reconstruction’ (Adler and Greve, 2009:72).

In the EU, this change is most obviously seen in the development of the Union’s military and civilian crisis management capacity, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Several scholars stress the importance of socialization of diplomats and military officials in transnational policy fields on security and defence (including both EU and NATO) as explaining the development of the CSDP, since: ‘senior officials from foreign and defence ministries, not politicians, were the key actors behind [CSDP]’ (Mérand, 2010:366; Meyer, 2005; Cross, 2010; Brickerton, et al., 2011; Mérand, et al., 2011). Focusing analytically on practice provides us with tools to think about how these processes relate to the EU as security community-building institution as it highlights the importance of how practical lessons from joint military operations and civilian missions on the ground have been brought back to Brussels and national capitals over

---

7 The EU has launched over 20 CSDP military operations and civilian missions in the Western Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Hitherto, most CSDP missions have been civilian, such as EULEX Kosovo, whereas eight CSDP military operations have been launched since 2003. The EU currently conducts a counter-piracy naval operation in the Gulf of Aden/Somalia since 2008 (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) although the largest military operation ever conducted by the EU is the still on-going EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The latest operation is the training mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) launched in early 2013. On CSDP, see Howorth (2007), Grevi, et al., (2009).
the recent decade. There are also indications of gradual convergence of ways-of-doing-things related to international crisis management among European diplomats and military officials.

Closely related to developments in CSDP is the fact that national policies in many EU member states to protect the civilian population in the case of large-scale military invasion are being replaced by policies aiming at providing societal protection in the face of natural and man-made disasters, including terrorist attacks (i.e. civil protection) (Alexander, 2002; Bremberg and Britz, 2009). Since the 1990s, the EU has been involved in developed ‘policies of protection’ within the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (e.g. counter-terrorism, police and judicial cooperation, border management, asylum and migration, and civil protection) to deal with these kinds of non-military threats (Monar, 2006). As such, cooperative security performed as civilian and military crisis management can now be said to constitute an essential feature of security community-building in Europe (Boin, et al., 2013).

Furthermore, in the literature on the ENP there are important findings that need to be taken into account in relation to the question on how the EU promotes security beyond its borders. Lavenex and others observe that the EU is promoting the extension of parts of the Union’s *acquis communautaire* beyond the circle of member states towards states in its immediate neighbourhood (Lavenex, 2004). Importantly, transgovernmental networks play a prominent role when it comes to rule expansion from the EU to neighbouring non-members in the field of ‘internal’ security (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2007; Balzacq 2009). For example, large parts of the *acquis* in JHA: ‘consist less in transferable legal instruments than in operational

---

8 Lavenex suggests that this is: ‘conditioned by the resurgence of [the EU’s] fundamental identity as a “security community” in an altered geopolitical context’ (Lavenex, 2004:681).

11
cooperation. A particular feature of cooperation in JHA is its network character and predominance of transgovernmentalism as a mode of governance’ (Lavenex and Wichmann, 2009:85).

These networks are constituted by security practitioners from both EU member states and non-members who deal predominantly with operational aspects of, for example, trafficking, border control or disaster management. As such, they serve as a: ‘tool for “socializing” third countries into common European standards’ (Lavenex and Wichmann, 2009:98; Freyburg, 2011; Van Hüllen, 2012). Seen as part of a security community-building process, these networks function so that practitioners from non-member states are exposed to the ways-of-doing-things that are already established within the circle of EU member states, while practically engaging in exchanges over how to deal with non-military threats and trans-boundary risks. Conversely, practitioners from both EU institutions and member states are, as a result, getting a first-hand account of the dispositions, experiences and threat perceptions of the non-members.

Exploring how the EU promotes security beyond its borders through the spread of cooperative security practices to counter non-military threats and trans-boundary risks thus allows for a fine-tuned understanding of the relationship between security community-building and processes of securitization since security communities do not necessarily expand based on some kind of altruism, but rather on a ‘logic of securitization’ by which sustaining the community is predicated on its continuous spread through formal or informal inclusion of its periphery (Waever, 2000; Adler, 2010).
Towards a framework for studying the EU as security community-building institution

Based on the above discussion, when studying regional organizations as security community-building institutions the focus should be set on i) the extent to which and with what means they provide venues for regional cooperation involving both member states and non-members, and ii) whether these venues make it possible for an increasing amount of practitioners from different states to meet, discuss and possibly also find common solutions to security threats through practical cooperation. Furthermore, insights provided by recent practice-inspired approaches to security communities call for a broader focus in terms of including practitioners from a range of policy fields and not only including diplomats and military officers. Therefore, it is here suggested that the empirical focus should primarily be set on the following three mechanisms:

i. **Institutionalization of multilateral venues** operationalized as the setting-up of common decision-making structures bringing together high-level representatives (e.g. heads of state and government, ministers, senior diplomats) from EU member states and non-member states on a regular basis, either bilateral or regional. Institutionalization here refers to both the creation of formal institutions for political cooperation as well as the cooperative practices developed over time. Frequency and regularity of meetings are taken as simple proxies for an on-going process of institutionalization, although the ‘quality’ of the social interaction in the venues, in the sense of what kind of decisions are being made and what policy matters are being discussed, also need to be taken into account.

ii. **Expansion of transgovernmental networks** operationalized here as the extent to which practitioners (e.g. civil servants at governmental departments and agencies but also military officers) from EU member states and non-members are brought together in cooperative endeavours in relation to EU policy fields. Again, frequency and regularity of for example exercises and workshops can be used here as proxies to determine how
embedded practitioners are in such networks, but qualitative accounts from the participants are also needed in order to determine the ‘substance’ of the cooperation, both in terms of how policies are shaped and what the outcomes are.

iii. **Development of cooperative security as crisis management** which is here operationalized as changes in security policy as well as military and defence planning in EU member states and non-members. It is particularly interesting if territorial defence is less emphasized in favour of international and/or regional cooperation, especially with an aim of jointly countering non-military threats and trans-boundary risks. Policy documents, speeches and official statements can be used to probe how far EU members and non-members have gone in revising the concept of national security and in embracing the notion of cooperative security as civilian and military crisis management. Naturally, there is only so much that can be retrieved from official documents and this kind of data needs to be complemented with other sources, not least elite interviews.

**Bridging the Strait? Exploring the dynamics of security community-building in the post-Cold War era: Spain, Morocco and the EU**

This section recapitulates the main finding from a study on how the evolution of three EU policy fields (external trade, CSDP and civil protection) has affected Spanish-Moroccan cooperation in the time period from 1995 to 2010. The empirical analysis is based on data collected from some 70 semi-structured elite interviews with practitioners mainly in Brussels, Madrid and Rabat (Appendix), as well as a detailed study of EU, Spanish and Moroccan primary sources. The three policy fields have been selected as they represent a wide set of EU policies at the same time as the institutional set-up within the Union varies across them, and they all have a distinct external dimension which affects the EU’s relations with neighbouring non-members.

---

9 For a description of the study’s research design, method and data collection, see Bremberg (2012).
The choice to focus on Spain (EU member state) and Morocco (non-member) relates to the fact that Spanish-Moroccan relations is not necessarily characterized by a strong collective identity, and bilateral cooperation is from time to time strained by several contentious issues such as Spain’s colonial legacy in Morocco, illegal migration and territorial disputes (Gillespie, 2000; Hernando de Larramendi and Mañé Estrada, 2009). In other words, Spain and Morocco can be said to be a ‘hard case’ for the EU as security community-building institution vis-à-vis non-members. Determining whether, how and to what degree the EU embed Spanish and Moroccan practitioners in frameworks for cooperation that transcend already existing bilateral arrangements, especially in relation to non-military and trans-boundary threats and risks, is therefore of crucial importance for understanding how the EU works as security community-building institution in the post-Cold War era.

*Security community-building in the absence of collective identity*

Morocco is of course highly dependent on trade and financial assistance from the EU but the study suggest that the role that the EU plays as a security community-building institution vis-à-vis Spain and Morocco is not exclusively related to the gravitational force of the Internal Market and European aid programs. It is rather seen in the way that this structural power is translated into a process in which habits of consultation has evolved first and foremost in a kind of ‘tri-lateral’ setting with the European Commission and Spain (and other EU member states) on the one side and Morocco on the other. The fact that Spanish-Moroccan economic relations are affected by an increasing number of EU policy areas through the EU-Morocco Association Agreement (which entered into force in 2000) and the ENP (since the adoption of the first Action Plan in 2005) has served to lessen bi-lateral tensions between Spain and Morocco on a range of contentious issues
(e.g. agricultural trade, fisheries and even migration). As a result, these issues tend to take on a more ‘technical character’ when negotiated in venues such as the EU-Morocco Association Council, hampering the tendency for polarization that might otherwise be present in bilateral settings.\footnote{Interview #36 (Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Interview #54 (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs)}

For example, the adoption of Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU in 2008 seems to have reinforced this dynamic. Several interviewees emphasize that Morocco had been calling for something similar to the Advanced Status for quite some time.\footnote{Interview #31 (Diplomatic Representation of Morocco to the European Communities), Interview #49 (European Commission’s Delegation in Morocco), Interview #5 (European Commission)} One interviewee in the European Commission explained that:

> For us, Advanced Status doesn’t mean anything concrete. We don’t see it as the end of a process either. We see it as a continuing process of deepening relations. We are taking big steps with the decisions taken this year [2008] but there clearly are other areas where we could go further, and that is what we envision to do.\footnote{Interview #5 (European Commission)}

The Advanced Status carries a significant symbolic value for Morocco and the EU as it reiterates the willingness on both sides to move closer together. It is also important for Spain, as one Spanish interviewee points out:

> We think that Europe can stimulate a domestic reform process in Morocco exactly through exercises such as the joint document on Advanced Status and the EU-Morocco summit, etc… the work of international and European persuasion shows that the strategy of using the closeness to the EU as a leverage of persuasion works for the Moroccan reform process. And this is our absolute priority and conviction in terms of foreign policy towards Morocco. For Spain, a modern and prosperous Morocco is the only guarantee for stability.\footnote{Interview #60 (Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs)}
However, the study also suggests that institutionalization of multilateral venues does not necessarily imply that mutual expectations of peaceful change are articulated. For example, asked to comment on whether Spanish-Moroccan relations would be improving due to the Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU, one Moroccan diplomat said that there is nothing that really prevents relations between Spain and Morocco from deteriorating again as they did in the summer of 2002 (the ‘Parsley Islet crisis’), although a reprise would be unlikely since the governments on both sides of the Strait now have ‘learned their lessons’. The counterparts in Madrid seem to agree as one Spanish diplomat willingly acknowledged that embedding Spain and Morocco in a broader EU framework serves to reduce the level of tension, but it will not automatically prevent conflicts in the future. Interestingly, the same interviewee depicted what happen in 2002 as something quite ‘out of character’:

Over a couple of years there had been a build-up of an environment with misunderstandings and distances creating a loaded atmosphere in which a spark eventually would come along. It shows the dangers associated with permitting such a situation of misunderstandings, silences, lack of contacts and reproaches to evolve. It led to things that are absurd in this day and age. Perhaps in the 18th or 19th centuries these matters could have been solved at the point of a canon, but not today. For two countries, or for two regions, this was simply too much… But it was useful because it underlined the risks.

Even though these diplomats do not seem to think that expectations of peaceful change define Spanish-Moroccan relations, military solutions are deemed inappropriate in order to solve bilateral disputes. Moreover, the study shows that in terms of security Spanish-Moroccan relations are characterized by increasing practical cooperation.

15 Interview #50 (Moroccan Ministry for Foreign Affairs)
16 Interview #36 (Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs)
Communities of practice and the power of the EU

The study shows that there is convergence on the highest political level between Spain and Morocco regarding the goal of protecting people, property and the environment in the Mediterranean from man-made and natural disasters. The means through which this is meant to be done is through improved regional cooperation on disaster management. This might of course mainly reflect political rhetoric, but there are numerous examples of practical cooperation taking place, for example through the subsequent Euro-Med civil protection programmes.\textsuperscript{17} Civil protection as policy field within the EU and the Euro-Med programmes have developed side-by-side since the 1990s, and the regional cooperation in the Mediterranean has benefitted from the creation of EU instruments such as the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection, which serves to assist EU members and non-members with coordination of international civil protection operations. For instance, one Moroccan interviewee describes, in relation to an earthquake that struck northern Morocco in 2004, how the local airport received on one and the same day some 50 airplanes carrying personnel and equipment (from EU members and other countries) to assist Moroccan authorities, adding that civil protection cooperation is ‘soldarité en marche’.\textsuperscript{18}

In addition, EU member states clearly have an interest in supporting the Euro-Med programmes since the trans-boundary nature of many natural and man-made disasters in the Mediterranean (e.g. earthquakes and maritime oil-spills) implies that the EU would need to get involved whenever large disasters strike in neighbouring countries. However, the study also shows how the

\textsuperscript{17} The EU’s support for civil protection cooperation on a regional level in the Mediterranean has mainly been realized through subsequent programmes running from 1996 up until today. On Euro-Mediterranean civil protection cooperation, see Bremberg (2010).

\textsuperscript{18} Interview #51 (Moroccan Directorate General for Civil Protection)
conceptual shift from territorial defence to de-territorialized notions of security in the post-Cold War era plays an important role for changing the rationale in favour of regional cooperation. The Community Mechanism has not only served as a means for EU member states to assist each other and share best practices, it is also increasingly important as a means to involve sub-national authorities from non-members.

Furthermore, regional cooperation on civil protection has been facilitated by already established transgovernmental links between national civil protection authorities. One Spanish interviewee, referring directly to the Spanish-Moroccan cooperation on civil protection, explains how it typically works in the case of the recurrent problem of forest fires:

When there is a need for it, we send our fire-fighter airplanes. They have also offered to send their forest fire units and we’ve accepted them. It’s the neighbour next door. It’s like that guy who owns the house at the other end of village. The Mediterranean is a village. Some people live closer, others live further away.

The study shows that the close-knit and practical nature of the civil protection cooperation, in which learning and knowledge exchange are favoured by the shared professional identities of the participants, has been an important factor behind the success of the programmes. It also indicates that the Euro-Med programmes have taken on the quality of being sites in which capital-endowed agents iteratively are doing things in a certain way. Through its support of the programmes, the EU has contributed to bringing together and perpetuate a community of like-minded practitioners bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice.

---

19 Interview #38 (Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection), Interview #44 (Spanish Military Crisis Management Unit), Interview #53 (Head of Civil Protection in Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer)
20 Interview #39 (Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection)
21 Interview #6 (European Commission), Interview #13 (European Commission), Interview #15 (European Commission)
Practicing cooperative security and building community?

After Spain’s transition to democracy, the absence of conventional military threats to the country has meant that the role of its armed forces has expanded from having a primary focus on territorial defence to also include crisis management in order to enhance the Spanish state’s capacity to handle the non-military threats (e.g. international terrorism and disasters). Spain actively seeks to promote military cooperation outside of the EU, especially in the Mediterranean and North Africa, and cooperative security practices relating to international crisis management developed within the EU and NATO are regularly applied in relation to Morocco and other countries in the region since it is seen as a means to also ‘secure’ Spain.

Morocco is the only Arab country ever to have participated in an EU-led military operation (EUFOR Althea in Bosnia) and the Moroccan regime has reiterated its interest in deepening its cooperation on CSDP as part of its Advanced Status with the EU (besides its already close cooperation with the U.S. and NATO). Persistent tensions with Algeria and the on-going occupation of Western Sahara imply that territorial defence is still the prime task for the Moroccan armed forces, but there are indications that the Moroccan elite is beginning to embrace...

---

22 It would in fact be more appropriate to describe the territorial organization of the Spanish Armed Forces during the Francoist regime as being set up to _occupy_ Spain rather than to defend it against the threat of foreign invasion (Serra, 2008:127). Until becoming a member of NATO and EU in the 1980s, Spain had practically been absent from international operations. Today, however, it would be nearly impossible to find a high-ranking Spanish military officer that has not served in Bosnia under NATO or EU command. In this sense, the contrast could not be greater between the ostracized Francoist regime of the Cold War and contemporary Spain having been a member of both EU and NATO for more than two decades (cf. Barbé, 1998).

23 Interview #41 (Spanish Ministry of Defence), Interview #42 (Spanish Ministry of Defence)
notions of cooperative security similar to the EU and NATO as part of the modernization of Morocco’s military capacities (and possibly also because this serves to promote Moroccan interests vis-à-vis its Western partners). For example, peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean is said to be a strategic objective for Morocco but it cannot be achieved only with ‘hard security’ (i.e. military means) (Hilale, 2007). In 2009 Morocco called for a ‘tri-continental approach’ to combat de-territorialized security threats since terrorist networks in the Sahel region cooperate with Latin American drug cartels in their efforts to ship drugs to Europe through routes in West Africa (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). The question of stability in North Africa and the Sahel is of course even more on the agenda for both Morocco and Spain in the wake of the ground-shaking events taking place there as of 2011 and onwards.

The focus on non-military threats and trans-boundary risks such as terrorism and trafficking might certainly serve diffuse political interests, but the study indicates that as a consequence Spanish and Moroccan practitioners interact with each other more intensively than before in terms of practical military cooperation, ranging from table-top seminars to joint exercises. As one Spanish interviewee describes in relation to the so-called 5+5 Defence Initiative24:

We are doing exercises within the 5+5 format, such as air and maritime exercises in which all countries participate. Well, small and simple things, like cooperation between patrol vessels in case of marine pollution or oil-spills… There are currently agreements between Spain, France and Italy where the Western parts of the Mediterranean is divided geographically in terms of responsibilities in case of accidents. We hope that in the future, although I’m not going to say in a near future but we have great expectations, that when it

24 The 5+5 Defence Initiative was launched in December 2004 following a declaration on behalf of the Ministers of Defence from Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Mauretania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia. The 5+5 format was originally proposed by France in the early 1990s as a means to promote cooperation among these countries and it has evolved to bring together ministers from various line ministries on an informal basis (e.g. foreign affairs, interior, tourism, transport, social affairs) (Algora Weber, 2008).
comes to SAR [search and rescue] there will also be areas of responsibility designated to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Would that come to pass, it would have an impressive practical importance. That is to say that day-to-day cooperation creates these kinds of mechanisms. That’s the transcendental character of practical cooperation.\(^{25}\)

The development of CSDP thus enhances the EU’s role as a security community-building institution because, as an EU policy area, it further embeds EU diplomats and military officers in cooperative security practices that do not rely on the logic of military deterrence and territorial defence, but rather on the logic of ‘defusing’ de-territorialized security threats and international crisis management. To a lesser extent, it also embeds Moroccan diplomats and military officer through high-level meetings with the EU’s Political and Security Committee, on-going information sharing on CSDP through the Council Secretariat as well as participation in the EU-led operation in Bosnia during 2004-2007.\(^{26}\)

**Conclusions**

The study presented in this paper indicates that the spread of practices of cooperative security are not first and foremost dependent on actors creating a common identity. It has shown how the EU supports, through the creation of multilateral institutions, the emergence of EU-promoted regional networks and the emulation of CSDP measures, a community of practitioners in the Western Mediterranean that builds upon, as well as transcends, already existing bilateral relations. While having an interest in sharing knowledge on how to deal with non-military threats based on templates developed in the EU, this community can be said to expand the boundaries of

\(^{25}\) Interview #42 (Spanish Ministry of Defence)

\(^{26}\) Interview #1 (Council of the EU), Interview #3 (Council of the EU), Interview #18 (Council of the EU), Interview #26 (Council of the EU), Interview #32 (Permanent Representation of Spain to the EU), Interview #54 (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
the European security community in the post-Cold War era. However, it does not necessarily do so on the basis of common practices of self-restraint, but rather by sharing a notion of what role national armed forces and civilian authorities should play in international and regional crisis management.

These findings are of broader relevance as they suggest that, in terms of security community-building, the role of a regional organization such as the EU first and foremost lies in its capacity to continually provide funding and institutional ‘hard-ware’ for multilateral frameworks for cooperation, which to a large extent draws upon rules, procedures and norms developed within the organization. To put it differently, the social power of the EU as a security community-building institution lies primarily in its capacity to provide the sites of practice in which interaction between members and non-members take place.

But there are nonetheless reasons to be cautious when discussing what these findings imply for our understanding of how the EU promotes security beyond its borders. The community of military and civilian practitioners that has been identified here is not exclusively dependent on the EU. It is obvious that is has also benefitted from the ways in which security threats are conceived of and international crisis management is practiced in NATO. This is of course perfectly compatible with an understanding of communities of practice as not necessarily being congruent with institutional affiliations and at the same time acting as ‘vanguards’ of social change. More than anything else, this calls for further praxiographic studies on the interaction between regional organizations in processes of security community-building.
Finally, the findings discussed in this paper suggest that it would be highly interesting to do comparative research including regional organizations in other parts of the world, such as for example South-East Asia and West Africa. The starting-point for such comparative studies would be to ask why, how and under what conditions different regional organizations engage in promoting cooperative security practices. Although we might have reasons to assume that there are differences in how such organizations work in different places, a focus not only on institutions but also on communities of practice, would help a great deal in our effort to meaningfully compare the nature and shape of the interactions in terms of how security is practiced among groups of states in various regional settings, as well as tracing cross-regional diffusion patterns.

References


## Appendix: List of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date/Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Council of the EU, General Secretariat, EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) (Head of Crisis Response Section)</td>
<td>1 December 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>NATO (Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, Head of Mediterranean Dialogue)</td>
<td>4 November 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Council of the EU, General Secretariat, DG E VIII Defence Issues (ESDP and the Mediterranean)</td>
<td>6 November 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>European Commission, DG ENV (Policy Officer, Civil Protection)</td>
<td>11 November 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>European Commission, DG Relex (Maghreb Unit)</td>
<td>6 November 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>European Commission, DG AidCo (Project Manager, Euro-Med civil protection)</td>
<td>23 September 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>European Commission, DG ENV (Deputy Head of the Civil Protection Unit)</td>
<td>2 December 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Council of Europe (Executive Secretary, EUR-OPA Major Hazard Agreement)</td>
<td>18 November 2008, Strasbourg (telephone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>European Commission, DG AGRI (Maghreb Unit)</td>
<td>2 December 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Council of the EU, General Secretariat, DG H IV (Civil Protection)</td>
<td>22 October 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU (Representative PROCIV)</td>
<td>13 October 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>European Commission, Secretariat General (Policy Officer, Crisis Management)</td>
<td>22 October 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>European Commission, DG AidCo (Head of Sector, Environment, Statistics, Civil Protection and Cooperation with Local Authorities)</td>
<td>23 September 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Portuguese Authority for Civil Protection (Representative PROCIV)</td>
<td>3 November 2008, Lisbon (telephone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>European Commission, DG Relex (Policy Officer, Middle East and Southern Mediterranean, Euro-Med Unit)</td>
<td>30 September 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>European Commission, DG Relex (European Neighbourhood Policy)</td>
<td>29 September 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>French Ministry of Interior (Direction de la Sécurité civile, Executive Director Euro-Med Bridge Programme)</td>
<td>14 November 2008, Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Council of the EU (Policy Unit, Administrator, Middle East /Mediterranean Task Force)</td>
<td>23 October 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Head of the Evaluation Mission of the Euro-Med Bridge Programme (Consultant)</td>
<td>1 December 2008, St Lucia (skype)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>NATO (Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, Responsible for Civil Emergency Planning in the Mediterranean Dialogue)</td>
<td>8 October 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU (Representative PROCIV)</td>
<td>3 October 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU (Representative PROCIV)</td>
<td>13 October 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Date/Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>European Commission, DG Relex (European Neighbourhood Policy)</td>
<td>18 November 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Permanent Representation of the UK to the EU (Representative PROCIV)</td>
<td>10 December 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Council of the EU, General Secretariat, DG E IX (Civilian Crisis Management)</td>
<td>24 October 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>European Commission, DG Trade (Maghreb Unit)</td>
<td>27 November 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU (Representative PROCIV)</td>
<td>7 October 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Co-director Euro-Med Bridge Programme (Consultant)</td>
<td>1 November 2008, Stockholm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>European Commission, DG Relex (Instrument for Stability)</td>
<td>7 October 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Moroccan mission to the EC (Ad-hoc working group on Morocco’s ‘Advanced Status’)</td>
<td>31 October 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Permanent Representation of Spain to the EU (Representative PROCIV)</td>
<td>12 November 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Council of the EU, DG H IV (Civil Protection) (Ret.)</td>
<td>13 November 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Council of the EU (Policy Unit, Principal Administrator, Middle East/Gulf/ Mediterranean Task Force)</td>
<td>27 October 2008, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Member of Spanish Parliament (Partido Popular)</td>
<td>17 March 2009, Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Subdirector General del Magreb)</td>
<td>16 March 2009, Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Área de Asuntos del Mediterráneo)</td>
<td>16 March 2009, Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergencies (Jefa del Área de Actuación Operativa)</td>
<td>16 March 2009, Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergencies (Consejero Técnico de Relaciones Internacionales)</td>
<td>18 March 2009, Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Spanish Prime Minister’s Office (Director de Departamento de Infraestructura y Seguimiento de Situaciones de Crisis)</td>
<td>22 April 2009, Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Spanish Ministry of Defence (Subdirector General Cooperación y Defensa Civil)</td>
<td>17 March 2009, Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Spanish Ministry of Defence (Subdirector General Planes y Relaciones Internacionales)</td>
<td>22 April 2009, Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergencies (Desk officer seconded from DIGENPOL)</td>
<td>16 March 2009, Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Unidad Militar de Emergencias (Teniente Coronel)</td>
<td>21 April 2009, Torrejón de Ardoz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Moroccan Directorate General for Civil Protection (Commandant)</td>
<td>3 June 2009, Rabat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program (Conseiller Environnement et Développement)</td>
<td>3 June 2009, Rabat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Date and Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Moroccan State Secretariat for Water and Environment (Chef de la Division Prévention et Stratégie d’Intervention)</td>
<td>5 June 2009, Rabat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Delegation of the European Commission (Conseiller Affaires Politique, Commerce, Information, Culture)</td>
<td>4 June 2009, Rabat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chef du Service Coopération Régionale Euro-Méditerranéenne)</td>
<td>5 June 2009, Rabat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Moroccan Directorate General for Civil Protection (Inspecteur National)</td>
<td>3 June 2009, Rabat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development (AECID) (Responsible for Environmental Cooperation)</td>
<td>4 June 2009, Rabat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Head of Civil Protection in Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer</td>
<td>3 June 2009, Rabat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chef de la Division de l’UE)</td>
<td>5 June 2009, Rabat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development (AECID) (Responsible for Environmental Projects)</td>
<td>4 June 2009, Rabat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>National Mobil Unit of Intervention (Civil Protection) at Salé</td>
<td>3 June 2009, Salé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>UN Resident Coordinator in Morocco</td>
<td>2 June 2009, Rabat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Moroccan Ministry of Interior (Director of Migration and Territorial Surveillance)</td>
<td>4 June 2009, Rabat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ambassador at Large for Mediterranean Affairs)</td>
<td>19 July 2010, Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Subdirector General del Magreb)</td>
<td>19 July 2010, Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>European Commission, DG Humanitarian Aid &amp; Civil Protection (Civil Protection Unit)</td>
<td>6 October 2010, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Council of the EU (Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), Partnerships and Military Capabilities Unit)</td>
<td>4 October 2010, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>European Commission, DG AidCo (Environment, Statistics, Civil Protection and Cooperation with Local Authorities)</td>
<td>8 October 2010, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>European Commission, DG AidCo (Head of Sector, Environment, Statistics, Civil Protection and Cooperation with Local Authorities)</td>
<td>8 October 2010, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>European Commission, DG Relex (Desk Officer Morocco)</td>
<td>5 October 2010, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>European Commission, DG Relex (Policy Officer, Middle East and Southern Mediterranean, Euro-Med Unit)</td>
<td>6 October 2010, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Council of the EU (Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), Partnerships and Military Capabilities Unit)</td>
<td>6 October 2010, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Council of the EU (Policy Unit, Administrator, Middle East /Mediterranean)</td>
<td>5 October 2010, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force)</td>
<td>7 October 2010, (Ambassador) the Hague</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69 - Spanish Embassy to the Netherlands (Ambassador)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 - Council of the EU (Policy Unit, Principal Administrator, Middle East/Gulf/ Mediterranean Task Force)</td>
<td>4 October 2010, Brussels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71 - Council of the EU (Policy Unit, Principal Administrator, Middle East/Gulf/ Mediterranean Task Force)</td>
<td>4 October 2010, Brussels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>