The European Crisis of Liberal Internationalism

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“So small is the prudence of men that they sometimes undertake to defend others when they neither know how, nor are able, to defend themselves”.1

The liberal international agenda promoted by the European Union is in crisis. At a time when America through a sparkling and spirited election campaign is rediscovering the merits of multilateralism, engagement and diplomacy,2 Europe, for its part, is slowly and painfully acknowledging that its ethical and moral foreign policies have reached their limits. Clearly, a liberal international agenda is filled with strategic dilemma, political frustrations and less than ideal results. None the less, the current European crisis runs deeper than the ordinary and familiar vices of international liberalism. As developed below, Europe has a problem of mindset, commitment and capabilities. This paper will review these problems with a special emphasis on military developments, i.e. the ESDP side of current EU external actions.

Some caveats are in order however. Firstly, the European Security and Defence Policy framework, -the adjective “Common” has now replaced “European” in the official documents, a dubious hyperbole to say the least-, is still in its infancy and remains a work in progress. Considerable achievements have been accomplished in the last 7 years, yet important gaps and inadequacies remain. Institutional developments have been numerous, some more formal than others but once again they have been put on hold since the Irish “no” to the Lisbon Treaty last June. Secondly, the room for improvement remains large. Learning by doing is the favoured incremental method in defence matters; learning from failure is the main internal dynamic behind foreign policies initiatives.3 From each crisis, a higher ambition is set, new tools and institutions are created, fresh practices emerge. It took the German reunification to launch a monetary and a stronger political Union, the Balkan fiasco to initiate a Defence and Security Policy, the divide about Iraq to craft a European Security Strategy. The current crisis however is latent, and

the lessons are not so clear as to trigger a new impetus. Thirdly, any assessment of military and security developments is by nature a subjective undertaking. Specifically, to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of a military tool is by definition an educated guess at best. The relevant evaluation belongs either to Europe’s eventual adversaries or potential allies. A conservative assessment of European security tools will look at ambitions and responsibilities they are designed to fulfil, but the European Union is a special case. The Union has adopted a Security Strategy but there is no organic link between this strategic framework and the shape of European forces. There is no European White Paper comparable to those that Defence Ministries at the national level publish on regular basis. None the less, the Solana document offers a clear benchmark to assess ESDP capabilities and missions to the overall strategic framework.

With these caveats, this paper will first review the European strategy broadly defined by the Solana paper, then analyse its limitations in theory and practice, and finally offer some tentative conclusions.

The origins of Europe’s Liberal Strategic Framework

As noted above, foreign and security policies are relatively new features developed by the European Union, most of them imposed by external factors and shocks. The Saint-Malo Agreement, which launched the ESDP process, was first and foremost a consequence of Europe’s failures in the Balkans. If the main lessons were drawn in military areas, the Balkan fiasco was also, if not primarily, a Foreign Policy failure. Disagreements among European members States, notably between the Big Three, on what to do in Bosnia led to an initially minimal and eventually catastrophic management of the conflict. But in the realm of foreign policies, it took another crisis, the divide within and ultimately the irrelevance of the Union about Iraq, to recognize the strategic costs of division. Obviously, defence efforts could not be effective without a Common Foreign and Security Policy at the Union level. The Lisbon Treaty offered some innovations for strengthening CFSP, -most of them were suggested during the Convention in 2003-, but institutional ingenuity cannot replace political willingness at the

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4 There was an attempt to draft one by the European Institute for Security Studies in 2002. But the mandate proposed by the Belgian Presidency in 2001 was subsequently modified, a sign that this issue is still a matter of controversy. See Jean-Yves Haine, (Rapporteur), Proposal for a White Paper, EU-ISS, 2004. It should be noted however that Defence and Strategy White papers published recently by France, the United Kingdom and Germany are largely congruent on the strategic goals and the means to achieve them.

national level to act in concert on the world stage. In an age of emerging giants, Europe has too many phone numbers, -the Lisbon Treaty may have deleted some but has added others-, and Europeans are still speaking with too diverging voices in world affairs. The disunity of interests is especially patent when major powers are involved, be Washington or Moscow, and when relationships with Europe’s neighbourhood are at stake, from Mediterranean shores to Central Europe’s frozen conflicts without even mentioning the biggest bone of contention, i.e. Turkey. To this day, the discrepancy between the two areas remains considerable.

There are several reasons why Europe’s slow and limited strategic awakening was and remains reluctantly endorsed. First, the European Union has been mostly if not exclusively built as a civilian affair. After the Franco-German strategic grand bargain and reconciliation of the 1950s\(^6\), the European integration process focused essentially on agriculture and trade and tariffs regulations. As slowly deepened and widened, the European Union integration process is a tentative exercise in post-modern politics whose aims is to transcend “the perpetual quadrille of the Balance of Power”.\(^7\) As European officials use to repeat, -often ad nauseam-, the Union is the most successful model of an increasingly integrated “security community” which has brought peace and stability on the continent. As the Berlin Declaration for the 50\(^{th}\) anniversary of the Union proclaimed, the “European unification has made peace and prosperity possible. It has brought about a sense of community and overcome differences”.\(^8\) Europe’s own narrative is thus based on the logic identified by K. Deutsch more than half a century ago, largely ignoring the external elements that made this European story a success. As any student of the history of the Cold War knows, to attribute peaceful outputs to an institution whose main role was limited to economic integration is an anachronism at best, a denial of historical realities at worst.\(^9\) It remains to be seen whether the nature of

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\(^6\) Euratom came before the treaty of Rome, i.e. the French A bomb was a prerequisite to its partnership with Germany, which could never have one. Regional balancing came first. This was thus an “equilibrium of disequilibrium” that allowed further integration at the European level. “The permanent worry about German power led to the highly original strategy of West European integration, which I have described as balancing through bandwagoning”, Hoffmann Stanley, “French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe”, in Keohane Robert O., Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann, After the Cold War, International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 133.


\(^8\) See the Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome, available at http://europa.eu/50/news/article/070326_b_en.htm. This notion of “security community” was initially developed by K. Deutsch, See infra.

\(^9\) NATO and the American nuclear umbrella made peace possible during the Cold War, while the Marshall Plan made prosperity a post-war reality. On the relationship between US policies, NATO and the EU, see, among others, F. Heller and J. Gillingham, (Eds.), The United States and the Integration of Europe: Legacies of the
the European Post-modern project makes Europe an exception to the “laws” of power politics? A civilian Europe may be ultimately compelled by regional or world geopolitics to become a “normal” power or at least a “normal” Alliance.\(^\text{10}\) Yet, as developed below, European decision-makers do not seem ready to change the way the EU defines itself in security and defence.

The second set of reasons are linked to the evolution of European security environment. The first and most important geopolitical change was of course the end of the Cold war: with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the crucial danger that threatened the survival of Europe was gone. Beyond this long-awaited peace, several trends naturally emerged. Firstly, most European States were keen to benefit from what was called the peace dividend, reducing drastically their defence expenditures and their capacity for autonomous actions. Secondly, the reunification of Germany meant a new balance inside Europe, one that anchored the German power through a monetary Union launched at Maastricht while NATO kept its monopoly for European security. Thirdly, the end of the Soviet threat opened up new possibilities and national choices for European countries. Foreign policy issues became increasingly domesticated and crises abroad were framed through national preferences. This rise of nationalism, -for the lack of better word-, remained largely benign in the West, far less so in the East.\(^\text{11}\) Yet even in the “old” Europe, the inter-governmental nature of the Foreign and Defence policies’ negotiations reduced Europe’s muted voice and influence to the lowest common denominator. Overall, the integration process became increasingly paralyzed by diverging national preferences, red flags and opt-outs. Lastly, but crucially, Europe lost its strategic preponderance for the United States. The security guarantee provided by Washington remained, yet the end of the Soviet threat meant ultimately the end of European dependency in security and defence. This transition from a sheltered dependency to an untested autonomy was difficult to make. This division of labour between a civilian European Union and a largely intact NATO was rapidly put to test in Bosnia.


\(^\text{10}\) In more general terms, the question becomes: “If the principle of the balance of power was useful in the 18\(^{\text{th}}\) century, it was likely to be valid in the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century as well, for its rationale never had anything to do with the character of particular regimes. Or are we to say that a new kind of regime must face the additional difficulty of inventing a new type of diplomacy? We ought not to infer that the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century presents us with a special case, to which long term experience of the past cannot apply”. Butterfield H., “The new and historical diplomacy”, in Butterfield H. and M. Wight, Diplomatic Investigations, Essays in Theory of International Politics, Unwin University Books, 1966, pp. 183-186.

The second geopolitical shock was indeed triggered by the conflicts in the Balkans. What was supposed to be the “hour of Europe”\(^{12}\) turned out to be European paralysis waiting for an American moment. European divisions were essentially political. Germany, for historical reasons, was keen to recognise the sovereignty of Slovenia and Croatia, but at the same time it lacked the capacity to guarantee these new international frontiers. France for its part refused to acknowledge border changes triggered by force, while Britain was reluctant to intervene in a conflict where no obvious strategic interests were at stake. Thus the lowest common denominator was management of the humanitarian aspect of the conflict. The presence of European forces under UN mandate had a considerable positive humanitarian impact but military intervention became even more difficult, with troops on the ground that were vulnerable to retaliation. Europeans were thus unable to put an end to the conflict; only NATO bombs were able to bring an end to the war. The Balkans tragedy compelled Europe to recognise that diplomacy without a credible threat of force has a limited impact, to acknowledge the ineffectiveness of national alternative, neither France nor the United Kingdom nor Germany could have successfully handled the crisis on its own, to foster a coordinated approach that was essential if Europe’s voice was to be effective. The Balkans fiasco in short forced Europe to rediscover ‘the need for geopolitics’.\(^{13}\) The Kosovo conflict confirmed Europe’s military shortcomings and the ambiguities of America as a European power. Its main lesson was military, not political: it was essential to improve Europe’s military capabilities to avoid a transatlantic decoupling; yet doing so would raise fears in Washington about a more autonomous Europe.\(^{14}\) European autonomy therefore meant not emancipation but improvement of European means of action inside the Alliance. This was the main basis of the St-Malo initiative between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac that launched the ESDP process. Humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping and collective security, not collective defence, became the organizing principles of European security. Efforts were thus geared towards a vague but narrow range of the security spectrum, one that can be labelled liberal internationalism.

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\(^{14}\) Kosovo put the Alliance under considerable strains. Whereas the European allies carried out only about 40 percent of the strikes, the crisis within the Alliance stemmed from the fact that while the Americans had great technological superiority in the air, political negotiations were necessary to obtain approval for most of the sorties carried out – 807 out of 976 – against targets in addition to those initially planned. Figures are quoted from John E. Peters et al., European Contributions to Operation Allied Force, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.: 2001. See also Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC., 2000.
The third geopolitical shift was even more dramatic for Europe. For the United States, the 9/11 attacks changed the world, for Europe, they transformed America. The answer of the Bush administration to this new “day of infamy” displayed some permanent trends as well as some specific new features of US foreign policy. Among the former, several old habits can easily be identified: a Manichean approach to the definition of the enemy, a global interpretation of the threat, an ideological perspective in framing the challenge, a missionary zeal in fulfilling its new-found mission – with the usual premium on power, technology and warfare as solutions to the new security dilemmas raised by international terrorism. Among the latter, several innovations stand out: a sovereign prerogative to proclaim right and wrong for the world, a clear emphasis on pre-emption that turned into prevention in the case of Iraq, and an evident choice for a unilateral approach to achieve US objectives. All these elements derived from the simultaneous combination of absolute confidence in US supremacy in the world and its sudden vulnerability. But for Europe, the US reaction to 9/11 had severe consequences. Europe ceased to be of significant strategic interests for the US. The fundamental issue behind the transatlantic partnership was not anymore the degree and extent of American involvement in European security: the question shifted to a debate about the place and role of Europe in an American strategy for global security. With the war in Iraq, EU Member States answered this question very differently: some opted for the counter-balanced some preferred the bandwagon, others remained hidden. In search for influence, all ultimately were unsuccessful. Moreover, when strategic interests differ, institutions collapsed: For the status quo powers, divergent security interests raised the entrapment dilemma whereby they could be asked to participate in a war that they did not want. For the revisionist actor, it was the opposite, the chain-gang dilemma, whereby allies were seen as slowing factors and obstacles to its autonomy and objectives. In these circumstances, NATO went through a near-death experience; the EU was deeply divided and rapidly irrelevant. At the same time, European officials were conscious of the destructive impact of Europe’s divisions and bureaucrats started to draft a document that will become a security strategy paper endorsed by Europeans in December 2003.

15 On these dilemma, see T. J. Christensen and J. Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity”, International Organization, vol. 44, no. 2, 1990, pp. 137-68. As P. Schroeder noted at the time, “The US administration’s stand on Iraq flatly contravenes that basic requirement for a durable alliance. If this persists, it will not necessarily mean the formal end of NATO, but it will mean its hollowing out, as America’s partners search for other combinations to defend their interests and find refuge from the likely consequences of America’s actions and as America’s opponents are encouraged to seek partners and form coalitions against it”. Schroeder Paul W., “Iraq: The Case Against Preemptive War”, The American Conservative, October 21 2002.
The European Security Strategy was thus a clear reminder to member States that disunity has a strategic cost, that challenges around the world had to be addressed in a united manner, and that Europe’s influence ultimately rests on its capacity to get its act together. Drawing a security concept faced difficult dilemmas: to reach a broad consensus while acknowledging the significant different strategic traditions and culture among member States, to map strategic threats while recognizing that they affect member States differently, to outline an overall approach in addressing them while taking into account the Union’s particular aquis and identity. Inevitably, the document was thus more about a vision than about strategic interests, more about attitude than policies. If it was never intended to be a guidebook for specific foreign policy initiatives, it presented however a genuine European worldview and approach to world affairs. One may be entitled to describe this philosophy of International Affairs as a specific European liberal internationalism. The EU, by identity rather than practice, presents itself to the world as a unique and successful civilian and ethical actor, articulating a prudent liberal vision to promote democracy and the rule of law, to defend and protect human rights and to support peaceful resolution of conflicts. Based on diplomacy rather than force, on incremental change rather than big bangs, Europe’s liberalism presupposes a global reach posture and an interventionist mindset. Both elements are currently highly questionable in the Union which is still trying to solve its Constitutional crisis that inflicts many deep wounds and leaves few credible leaders. The inward-looking tendency remains a serious obstacle to a truly “global” and effectively “moral” Europe. Ethics are not only a subject of discourses, they are most importantly a matter of effective actions.

Despite all its deficiencies, and some will argue its urgent need for an update, - a clear objective of the forthcoming French presidency-, the Solana Paper remains an inspiration for the myriad of actors involved in Europe Foreign and Security policies. From the document, European liberal internationalism is based on two pillars: preventive engagement and effective multilateralism. Prevention refers to the Union’s approach to crisis-management and nation-building which includes non only traditional military peacekeepers but also police personnel, civil administration officials and justice officers.

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17 The “activist” dimension of Europe’s strategic culture is indeed a key element of its ‘positive’ or ‘responsible’ power. See Sven Bischop, The ABC of European Union Strategy: Ambition, Benchmark, Culture, Egmont Papers, IRRI, Brussels, October 2007, pp. 15-16.
to strengthen the rule of law. This preventive approach relies first and foremost on diplomacy and economic assistance, yet military and civilian interventions remain an important component of prevention. The link with ESDP developments is in this regard the strongest. As discussed below, since 2000 ESDP capabilities have been developed along these objectives. On the military side, Battle Groups, -force packages of about 1500 troops, two of them on stand by-, can now be deployed rapidly to restore order and prevent further aggravation in a civil conflict. A European gendarmerie force has been set up aimed at post-conflict stabilization. On the civilian side, the Union has a reserve of 5000 police force that could be sent abroad, as it will be the case for Kosovo where a 2000 strong police force is on stand-by. This wide range of tools embodies the comprehensive approach promoted by the Union. The second concept, -effective multilateralism-, captures the essence of the Union’s ruled-based security culture. The fundamental framework for international relations remains the UN Charter and Organization, - the EU contributes up to 38.9 % of the UN budget-. Unilateral action is deemed both illegitimate and counterproductive. Multilateralism is a condition for success, not a legalistic or formal obligation.18 No nation, however powerful, can pretend to address contemporary threats alone. In the same time, the Union recognized that multilateralism alone is no guarantee of an effective response: collective tools and collective will to use them must be built together”.19 Clearly, the implicit references were on the hand the US invasion in Iraq, an example of what no to do in world politics, and on the other hand, the precedent of Kosovo, an example of what should be done. By endorsing international legitimacy as a condition for action, the Union relies on the goodwill of necessary partners and on the collaboration of potential foes to pursue its own interests and achieve its specific goals. At the UN Security Council, but also in other forums, the collaboration of other great powers, namely Moscow and Beijing, became a necessary component of EU objectives. This diplomatic imperative represents a difficult challenge for the Union whose 27 members do not always share the same interests vis-à-vis these powers. Multilateralism as a condition of action can rapidly becomes an alibi for inaction. This classic dilemma of international politics is especially acute for the Union. Moreover, with two EU members at the Security Council, coordination between Paris and London, and, as the nuclear diplomacy with Iran indicates, the involvement of Berlin became a necessary and crucial condition for effective action. However, the link between

18 Intervention in Kosovo under NATO was an exception to this rule.
effective multilateralism and the ESDP process is the weakest. One may even argue that, as far as ESDP is concerned, the emphasis on “autonomy” so prominently underlined from the Saint-Malo agreement onwards, is a clear indication that the Union will prefer to act alone. Precisely because ESDP was a tentative emancipation from NATO monopoly in defence and security, the explicit willingness to act autonomously, i.e. without the United States, is an essential part of ESDP origins and expansion. The Berlin Plus agreement in Spring 2003 was a condition for European involvement and contribution to security first in the Balkans, then in Africa. This proclaimed autonomy is in parallel closely associated with international legitimacy, in particular with the approval of the UN Security Council. Even if the word “mandate” is carefully avoided in the ESS document, in practice all Europe’s missions, civilian or military, have been subjected to a UN mandate. This self-imposed constraint has led to serious difficulties, especially in Kosovo where the UN Security Council is divided on the issue of independence. This legalistic approach has allowed Russia to play a classic divide and rule game, all the more effectively since the EU itself has not achieved a consensus on the issue. As for the instruments, the Battle Group agreement in February 2004 between London, Paris and Berlin mentioned the “explicit, but not exclusive” UN mandate for their potential missions. In the current post-Iraq climate, it remains highly unlikely that an ESDP operation could take place without a UN mandate. And even where there is a UN resolution, the often vague and ambiguous mandate does not constitute an helpful guide for these missions. Since the Irish presidency in 2004, a special link between the UN’s reformed DPKO and ESDP capabilities has been organically strengthened. However, this natural partnership still suffers from the traumatic Bosnian experiences of multiple and conflicting chains of command that have left bitter memories in some member states. The African theatre, which is the area of choice for military ESDP operations, will continue to involve the Union, the UN and the AU.

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20 Spain, Portugal, Greece, Malta and Cyprus have so far refused to recognize the independence of Kosovo, which raise a legal nightmare for the status of EU forces there when they will take over NATO.
22 However, there seems to be a strong implicit support inside the Union for humanitarian interventions, with or without a UN explicit approval. See Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture. Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union. Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2006.
23 On the EU-UN partnership, see EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations, Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration. It was adopted by the European Council on 17-18 June 2004.
European Liberalism and its limits

Beyond the Solana document, most of EU foreign policies and external actions, from its Neighbourhood to its human rights policies, are also inspired by a liberal internationalism philosophy. International liberalism in world politics has always been more a “vision than a programme”, a selective and thus unfair aspiration rather than a permanent necessity. It remains ambivalent about the just use of force, ambiguous about the opportunity of humanitarian interventions, vague about the degree of involvement morally required, and relatively helpless and mute about the devastating effects of nationalism, tribalism, ethnicity and religious extremism. To add contemporary misery to these already fragile and uncertain liberal values, the fiasco in Iraq has spoiled the well of liberal internationalism. Because the Iraqi conflict was initiated under the pretence of, among others, humanitarian motives, it has cast a long shadow of suspicion on genuine and altruistic commitments to protect human rights, promote democracy and enhance collective security. But apart from this tragic conflict, there is a specifically European crisis of liberal internationalism, one that displays in many respects the opposite shortcomings and flaws of the American Wilsonism in boots. Some may argue that the crisis is inherent to the young and inexperienced ways of the ESDP process and there is much to this argument. Others will add that, compare to other centres of power, Europe has still a relatively decent and honourable liberal record to be proud of. But others’ perceptions tell a different story, one that regards Europe’s foreign and security policies as full of empty rhetoric and shallow promises, as refusing to commit necessary resources and capabilities to protect human rights, as protecting strategic interests as coldly and cynically as any other actors in world politics. The gap between Brussels belief of Europe’s role in the world and foreign perceptions is widening and is damaging EU credibility and authenticity. The following developments will argue that the current

27 For one Chinese commentator, “Europe appears defensive, introspective, decadent and tired, too prosperous to continue to take risks, too complacent to accept change; Europe is a continent that has lost its ambition and its place in the world.” Quoted by John Thornhill, “Europe in 2008: Asia can drive its global aims” Financial Times, January 2 2008. As for Americans, it is difficult for Washington to understand how the EU is able to impose a huge fine on Microsoft but is unable to contribute more than hundreds policemen for the NATO Afghan mission. The US view of Europe is mostly linked to Europe’s contribution to world security, i.e. the “how many divisions” question. As K. Schake notes, “Across the political spectrum, America’s major politicians believe Europe is contributing too little and the US doing too much to secure common objectives”. Kori Schake, The US elections and Europe: the coming crisis of high expectations, Centre for European Reform, November 2007, p. 23.
crisis of European liberal internationalism is not about a temporary infantile disease but a critical and enduring weakness of European liberalism. Three elements in particular stand out: the good governance mantra, the mistaken belief in security institutions, and the ineffective policy on human rights. In these three specifically European themes of liberal internationalism, the gap between rhetoric and actions, or to put in a better way, between responsibilities and commitments, is threatening Europe’s credibility as an ethical actor.28

First, Europe, more than any other actor, has put a fervent emphasis on good governance as a condition for more peaceful international relations and as an objective worth pursuing in itself. As stated in the Solana Paper, “The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order”.29 This emphasis is a direct expression of the Kantian idea and ideal of democratic peace.30 For classical liberals like Locke and Kant, international peace was a reasonable and possible prospect between liberal democracies because enlightened citizens will ultimately learn the futility and cost of wars and impose these lessons learned to their own governments. This prudential mechanism, -neither perfect nor definitive31-, is only possible among liberal regimes that allow the restraining of leaders by constitutional and electoral process. This could in time lead to the establishment of a commonwealth of peaceful nations, a “security community”32 where the use of force as a mean to settle disputes disappeared. The European Union is of

28 Responsibility implies restraints and strategic thinking while ethics may lead to moral crusade or imperial hubris. For a good discussion on why the notion of “responsible” is better than “ethical” Europe, see Hartmut Mayer, “Is it still called ‘Chinese Whispers’? The EU’s rhetoric and action as a responsible global institution”, International Affairs, January 2008, Vol. 84, n°1, pp. 61-79.

29 A Secure Europe in a Better World, December 2003, p. 9. The use of the word “order” is of course confusing. “Order” is in many ways the opposite of “justice” and “freedom”.


31 The Kantian democratic peace is as a tentative process, not a definitive result. The possibility of conflict remains inherent to international politics, even among democracies. On this, see Kenneth Waltz, “Kant, Liberalism, and War”, The American Political Science Review, June 1962, Vol. 56, n°2, pp. 331-340.

32 This notion was initially developed by Karl Deutsch, “Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement”, Foreign Policy Analysis Series, Princeton University, September 1953, n°2, pp. 1-25. It was above all based on the density of relations between open societies. It is thus more communitarian than the utilitarian approach of a Locke. See also Adler Emmanuel and Michael Barnett (Eds.), Security Communities, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
course the most successful embodiment of such a community, and it intends to project this model abroad, in particular in its neighbourhood. Even if security, stability and other related self-interests have always been important parts of its Neighbourhood policy, the democracy and liberal values promotion aspect remains the essential component, so much so that Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner has called the ENP “the Union’s newest democratization tool”. In practice however, European policies tend to focus on state building rather than democracy promotion. The Union does not pay sufficient attention and support to civil society, civic organizations, opposition parties and NGOs. Moreover, when there is democracy agenda, it relies on existing regimes, some robustly authoritarian, to implement liberal reforms, and for those, there are no real incentive to comply with democratic and human rights rules. Overall, the Union’s approach privileges order over reforms, stability over democracy, status quo over change. For the European neighbours without accession aspirations, the EU has not been in the forefront of the recent democratic revolutions. If anything, the EU has tended to be “a little behind the game, welcoming the results but being studiously cautious in not promoting them”.

There are several reasons for these biases. First, the EU bureaucratic machinery is better suited in focusing on state institutions than civil society. The functioning of the EU demands strong States to manage the *acquis communautaire*, and building domestic institutions is one of the most tangible and effective consequences of the EU enlargement policy. The foundation of a “post-modern” Europe is a competent and controlling State rather than a vigorous civil society. After all, the integration process was an elite-driven mechanism in which people had few if no say. This state-centrism applies to Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond. Second, the security dimension of ENP has taken precedence over its democratization aspect. There is of course a legitimate strategic

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36 As J. Kopstein noted, “The European preference for order over freedom was strongly embedded in the entire process of EU accession. Rather than focus on civic groups, political parties, and elections, the European monitoring regime has concentrated on building up state capacity to ensure that the entire *acquis* could be implemented”. See Jeffrey Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2006, Vol. 29, n°2 pp. 85–98. See also Kristi Raik, “Promoting Democracy through Civil Society: How to Step up the EU’s Policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood”, *CEPS Working Document*, n° 237, February 2006.
reason for this: since 9/11, the issue of state sovereignty (and its failure), i.e. the monopoly (and its loss) of the domestic and legitimate use of force, has become a global strategic problem. What is happening inside a State does matter as much as what is happening among States. There is a strategic imperative to promote the efficiency of a State apparatus as well at its liberal character. It is in the interests of Europe that, for instance, Morocco develops an efficient police system to monitor radical extremism as well as a pluralist democracy. If both dimensions strategically matter, the EU tends to favour the former against the latter. ESDP missions reflect this priority. The Police mission in Macedonia in 2005 was aimed at providing support to the development of professional police service, in particular the Border Police, and to fight against corruption and Organised Crime. In the same vein, the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova/Ukraine, launched the same year, has helped the Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities to tackle illegal trade, trafficking, smuggling, organised crime and corruption. In Georgia, the focus was on the criminal justice system, an area deemed critical to strengthen the “Rose revolution” on the short term and to build a secure public security environment on the long term, with mixed successes however. Overall, these missions were useful, but they serve interests before values. Beyond its neighbourhood, the liberal agenda is often minimal and short-termed. In one of its most important missions, the EUFOR in Congo in July 2006, the Union commitment was more symbolic than real, avoiding to deploy troops where troubles were likely to arise, i.e. in the East of the country, limiting the actual deployment to Kinshasa and starting the operation barely a day before the actual voting. As the Human Right Watch noted, “… often the European Union will accept an electoral facade so long as the ‘victor’ is a strategic or commercial ally. The fairness of the vote and the openness of campaign conditions seem to matter


Classical liberalism emphasized the efficiency of the State apparatus that should be capable of upholding domestically the rule of law and containing societal, economic and political competition within peaceful limits. For this often forgot other side of the liberal state, see Roland Paris, “Bringing the Leviathan Back In: Classical Versus Contemporary Studies of the Liberal Peace”, International Studies Review, September 2006Vol. 8, n°3, pp. 425–440. This State is an ideal type that reflects a “Western” culture. As such, it is not easily exported to other cultures. See for example, Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006 and Philip Carl Salzman, Culture and Conflict in the Middle East, Humanity Books, 2008

It is not the scope of this paper to reflect on the “security” costs that a status quo approach to authoritarian regimes entails. On this issue, see for example Katerina Dalacoura, “Islamist Terrorism and the Middle East: Democratic Deficit: Political Exclusion, Repression and the Causes of Extremism”, Democratization, Vol.13, n°3, June 2006, pp. 508–525.

less than the political orientation of the democracy pretender”. Despite the creation of an Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights with a €1 billion for the next 6 years, the European liberal internationalism is far more Westphalian than the post-modern terminology would admit.

A second feature of European liberal internationalism is the Union strong belief in international institutions. This is of course linked to its preference to multilateralism in world politics. Being a reasonably successful institution itself, -if we put aside recurrent crises of legitimacy that Brussels is facing, it wants to export its success abroad. Yet, it is largely doubtful whether other regions of the world could emulate the European experience. This strong belief in institutions faces however serious conceptual problems and could be self-defeating. Two issues must be differentiated, the strategic and the humanitarian one. At the strategic level, the nature of contemporary threats is not conducive for an enhanced role of security institutions. Terrorism is a global phenomena and it demands coordinate answers at the international level. But this coordination is largely relevant for protection and preparedness rather than prevention and pursuit.

The Union itself has a marginal role in the later two aspects of counter-terrorism, for these, States are mainly in charge. Against this radicalization, every country develops its own counter-terrorism policies, depending on its national modus vivendi between immigration, security structures and cultures, past experiences and constitutional rights. There are more differences than commonalities between the French and the British ways of tackling extremism. There are even more divergences in framing and responding to this global threat between Europe and the United States. Terrorism is a matter of national security rather than institutions. At the level of humanitarian intervention and collective security, the added value of security institutions is also in doubt. Of course,

42 The President of the Commission acknowledged that this is a serious problem: “I really believe we have a problem there… of substantive legitimacy”. Honor Mahony, “Barroso admits legitimacy problem for commission president post”, EU Observer, 28 February 2008.
43 For a useful comparison with Asia, see for example Webber Douglas (Ed.), Integration in Europe and Asia, Routledge, 2004.
44 These four “Ps” of counter-terrorism are based on the UK strategy, a framework largely adopted by the EU in 2006. On this, see Sir David Oman, “Countering International Terrorism: The Use of Strategy”, Survival, Winter 2005-2006, Vol. 47, n°4, pp. 107-116. Protection and preparedness cover vulnerabilities; prevention and pursuit address the threats.
there is nothing specifically new in this feature, world politics is in many ways a graveyard of security institutions that had failed to fulfil their objectives. The reasons for this institutional fragility are linked to the nature of world politics that privileged autonomy over trust, short-termed commitment over long-termed obligation, relative positions over objective power. It is even more so when cooperation is about collective goods, because the problem of free-riders if even more acute. The fundamental dynamics of collective security are indeed problematic: collective defence is the easiest of collective tasks, everyone in a club, be an alliance or an institutional grouping like NATO or ESDP faces an existential threat. It is a matter of necessity, where the survival of one is the survival of all. Collective security is by contrast the hardest of collective tasks since few have a crucial national interest to defend and most have only values and principles to promote. In some instances, strategic interests may be even irrelevant. Action is therefore a question of national choice and degrees of commitment vary.

In this framework, an institution runs the risk of being limited to the lowest common denominator and if it functions under a consensus based culture it may be forced into inaction or into coalition of the willing. If not in principle, at least in practice, ESDP has become an à la carte grouping. This shift was and remains extraordinarily difficult to sustain. Leaving the realm of necessita to enter the domain of virtu, as Machiavelli would have put it, lead to the domestication of foreign policy issues and the resurgence of national sensitivities and preferences. Every crisis thus demands an intense and difficult debate about the rationale and the stakes of a potential mission. All security institutions suffer from this unavoidable predicament and the EU is not different. Situations, not institutions, shape foreign policy choices. For ESDP missions, these complex situations demand a high level of cooperation: a common framing and understanding of the crisis at hand, a similar approach to solve it, an equal acceptance of the risks involved. At the tactical level, they imply a common strategy, a clear chain of command, flexible yet interoperable forces. In these conditions, unilateralism is far more common than its opposite. In the history of humanitarian intervention, it is not surprising that the most successful

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operations have been conducted single-handedly by one State, -Vietnam in Cambodia, India in East Pakistan, Tanzania in Uganda or the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone. Clearly, the dilemma is acute. Motives and intentions of one should be checked and endorsed by most. But collective decision-making can be a recipe for paralysis and inaction. Multilateralism must be effective, inside as well as outside the Union. Inside, given the intergovernmental nature of ESDP, what matters the most is a tacit agreement among the Big European powers. However, given the nature of humanitarian operation, a coalition of the few tends to act in the name of all. The Union is in fact reduced to put a blue gold starry flag on operations that are “European” only by fiction or convenience. The framework, somehow factice when one looks at real contributions-, gives legitimacy to its members’ public opinion and triggers a whole range of EU instruments that complement the operation. But Europe must be aware of its inherent trade-offs: multilateral nation-building is more complex and time consuming than unilateral efforts. As developed below, in some instances the Union is an obstacle to efficient operations; in others, it acts for reasons that have nothing to do with the crisis at hand.

Lastly, the EU, beside its natural but uneasy ties with the UN, has forged a special relation with the African Union, especially on peace-keeping issues. The strengthening of regional actors to share the burden of these missions is a key objective that deserves praise. However, it may in practice lead to passing the buck to an organization, which, given the nature of conflicts and failed states in Africa, does not have the capacity and the legitimacy to act in peace operations. This devolution to the AU may represent a convenient political consensus to enhance a dialogue between the Commission and the AU, but this kind multilateralism is neither effective nor strategic.

48 As M. Walzer noted, “In these cases, there were no prior arrangements and no authorized agents. Had the UN’s Security Council or General Assembly been called into session, it would almost certainly decided against intervention... Everything depended on the political decision of a single state”. Michael Walzer, “The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention”, *Disent*, Winter 2002, Vol. 49, n°1, p. 32.

49 Contrary to a widespread perception, it is not the number of members that “counts”, but an agreement among the most capable States. To my knowledge, not a single ESDP missions have been subject to a veto by a small or medium member. Big Powers tend to abstain from, not oppose, a mission.

50 The UN record is mixed at best. See among many others, Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 2002. The US for that matter seems to have acted even more poorly than the EU. As James Dobbins argues, “Nation building is a responsibility that the United States is utterly unable, for material, political and cultural reasons, to shoulder alone”. Quoted in Dana Allin, Gilles Andréani, Philippe Errera and Gary Samore, *Repairing the Damage, possibilities and limits of transatlantic consensus*, Adelphi Paper, n°389, IISS, 2007, p. 84.


52 For a EU document that symbolizes this lack of “strategy”, see “The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership” written by the Commission and endorsed by the Council in December 2005.
The third feature of Europe’s liberalism in world affairs is its emphasis on human rights protection and security. Two specific and closely related elements, among many others, stood out: the EU rhetoric about human security and its relation to the newly established Responsibility to Protect. As far as the first element is concerned, the “human security” agenda, originally developed by the UN to focus on the protection of civilians in conflicts, has found its way to the highest level of the Union, with the Barcelona Report in September 2004 commissioned by J. Solana and has been linked explicitly with the ESDP process. Simply put, “human security” regards safety and protection of individuals as a paradigm around which international actions should focus on. It is a post-modern way of taking into account the protection of civilians, beyond traditional concepts such as national boundaries, state sovereignty, and inter-state wars. The Barcelona Report argued that the principle of human security should guide ESDP missions. It suggests new ways to intervene, involving a civil-military force whose efforts would be aimed at protecting local population, a kind of Red Cross with boots and guns. To achieve this, it called for the creation of a Human Security Response Force of around 15,000 personnel, composed for a third of police and civilian elements. The civilian dimension, according to the authors of the Barcelona Report, echoed the specificity of the ESDP process where a police and civilian component was an integral part of the Helsinki headline Goal. There is of course a good deal of idealism in this “human security” concept. It presupposed a benign environment where this military-civilian force would operate in a neutral and benevolent way. If that’s the case, it is not clear why NGOs would not be better equipped and trained to do the job. If the situation is a complex conflict, as it is often the case, then the kinetic dimension of this force will rapidly take precedence. It will be a “war amongst the people”, but a war none the less, that implies a strategy, battles, some for heart and minds, some for destroying and killing enemies. Even, -I will argue specifically- in humanitarian intervention, the use of armed

53 The Human security network was launched by Canada and Norway at the end of the 90s to focus on physical protection of individuals in troubled areas. Starting with Land-mines, it was broadened to included small-weapons, child soldiers, ... At the same time, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty started its own reflection group on humanitarian interventions that will eventually become the Responsibility to Protect.


55 The civilian component will be made of “police, human rights monitors, development and humanitarian specialists, administrators, etc”. All these have different functions but it is not clear how they will interact among themselves and with the military part of the Human Security Force. See Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities: A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, September 15 2004. Available at www.lse.ac.uk/collections/pressAndInformationOffice/newsAndEvents/archives/2004/HumanSec_Doctrine.htm
forces is domestically an utterly political decision, and internationally a strategic endeavour. In theory, human security may be a fine concept, yet in practice it cannot erase the geopolitical context in which it takes place.\textsuperscript{56}

The second element, the Responsibility to Protect, is better known and as such demands fewer developments. In many ways, it focused on the same problem but it starts at the opposite end of the spectrum, i.e. the international law and norms among States. By shifting the debate from the right to intervene to the duty to protect, and by underlining that this responsibility is firstly an internal matter, a wide consensus between the North and the South was achieved at the UN World Summit in September 2005 to shape the principles of The Responsibility to Protect (R2P).\textsuperscript{57} Considering that sovereignty confers international rights but also domestic obligations, the report puts the burden of responsibility on governments whose essential and minimum duty is to protect population. In such a framework, foreign military intervention is only a last resort response to be used in extreme cases, “situations actually or potentially involving large-scale killings, ethnic cleansing or other similar mass atrocity crimes”.\textsuperscript{58} In such instances, the use of force may be the only way to end these atrocities. Yet, it has to fulfil several prudential criteria: the seriousness of the threat, the primary purpose of the intervention, the proportionality of the response and the balances of consequences. It was a noticeable success to get a UN approval in 2005 of the R2P concept, especially in the context of Iraq. Europe was an unambiguous supporter of the idea. Prevention of genocide and crimes against humanity is unquestionably one of the core consensus about Europe’s role in the world. Yet, the record in Darfur tells a different and rather discouraging story.\textsuperscript{59} The ESDP process itself exists because of the European failure to prevent Srebrenica. The worst massacre since the end of WWII was the main \textit{raison d’être} behind its birth, it should have been its main rationale and organizing principle to its development. As we shall see in the remainder of this contribution, this was not to be.


\textsuperscript{57} The report is available at http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp


\textsuperscript{59} As Chris Patten recorded, “EU foreign ministers have since early 2004 issued 19 Darfur statements using phrases such as ‘serious concern’ or ‘profound concern’ a total of 53 times in a period that has seen some 200,000 slaughtered and 2.5 million displaced by government forces or government-backed militia, the Janjaweed. When something more than words is needed, the EU does not have much to boast about…” Quoted by Andrew Rettman, “Ex-commissioner attacks EU verbalism on Darfur”, \textit{EU Observer}, 20 March 2007. And that was a year ago, by now the number of “serious concerns” must be approaching 3 digits…
**Soft Power Illusions**

A security policy focused on the promotion of democracy, on the strengthening of international institutions and on the protection of human rights, is filled with moral and strategic dilemmas, complex and unsatisfactory implementations, unintended consequences and collateral damages. It demands a difficult equilibrium between ends and means, strategic interests and altruistic motives, legitimacy and efficiency. In its selection of cases for intervention, it often reveals double standards, if not manifest hypocrisy. In its implementation, it may be limited to effects rather than causes, prolonging rather than ending human rights abuses. These dilemmas are inherent to liberal internationalism itself. Yet, there are some specifically European flaws in the conception and implementation of its liberal agenda. These flaws are not superficial and they will need to be corrected in the very near future if Europe wants to retain an already largely lost ethical capital in world affairs. Essentially, European weakness is related to a recurrent confusion about the stakes at hand, to an increasing gap in the necessary means to be used and to the discrepancy between these ill defined ends and these under resourced means. In short, there is a responsibility problem and there is a commitment crisis. The two are of course linked and mutually dependent but in a more complex way than the rather straightforward relation, exposed by R. Kagan, of a military weakness influencing, -if not predetermining-, foreign policy behaviours. Europe military relative powerlessness seems more a symptom than a cause. After all, nearly a decade after the founding act of Saint-Malo, efforts to correct capability deficiencies could have been undertaken and bore fruits. Even if some Europeans have indeed invested resources to upgrade their military capacity, Europe overall still “punches” below its economic weight. The problem runs deeper: Europe does not want to punch, hence a relatively modest military instrument. So the pertinent correlation between ends and means seems to start, not surprisingly, with the ends rather than the means, with grand strategy rather than military policy, or in Europe’s parlance with CFSP rather than ESDP. As R. Cooper argued, “Europe may have chosen to neglect power politics because it is military weak, but it is also true that it is military weak because it has chosen to abandon power politics”. Both are thus interconnected and weak capabilities, as developed below, also tend to shape in important ways the kind of military missions European leaders are willing to undertake.

Europe’s liberalism is based on an acute sensitivity to globalization whereby troubles in one remote part of the world can have direct impact on Europe. In this sense, Europe displays a true Wilsonian internationalism that demands a proactive and preventive diplomacy to keep away the dark side of globalization from reaching Europe. In the ESS, no geographic boundaries are defined to limit Europe’s role, the emphasis on the contrary is put on global challenges rather than regional issues. The focus, as noted above, is put on global governance, state and institutions building. Three different environments must be differentiated. As with all classifications, they are more ideal types than empirical cases. In the real and complex world, they tend to blend and be part of continuum rather than separate categories. First, there are the modern but illiberal regimes that are willing and able to become post-modern. In this configuration, Europe is a model and an inspiration and its activism is quite effective. Of course, progresses are not linear, set backs are numerous and the process is expansive and fragile as the case of Bosnia currently illustrates.62 In these cases, ESDP missions reflect a Commission’s agenda, and their functions are about policing, training and the rule of law. They are a “security and defence” matter only by name. Second, there are illiberal States that are unwilling to change, i.e. most of the authoritarian regimes that surround Europe in the East and in the South. In these instances, alas numerous, Europe’s liberalism is far less successful. As noted above, it tends to consider these regimes as part of a solution rather than part of the problem; it very rarely applies conditionality in the economic area and does not sufficiently invest in civil society. It makes perfect strategic sense not to impose democracy at the point of a gun, but stability has a humanitarian price that Europe seems all too often ready to pay. Thirdly, there are the pre-modern regimes that need to become modern. In such configuration, the environment is basically stateless where an artificial and often illegitimate government has no control over its territory and no authority over its population. Means of violence are fragmented among armed groups, be militia acting in the name of an ethnic group, private armies defending an oppressed or dominant minority, or criminal gangs acting just for themselves.63 Somalia is the ultimate illustration of such a Hobbesian world where central authority has all but disappeared.

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these circumstances, Europe tends to offer its service and its money to help negotiate a ceasefire, to launch a political process of reconciliation, to set up the conditions for an election. The premise, as Solana once put it, is that in every conflict negotiation is possible.\footnote{Interview of J. Solana in La Vanguardia, 19 January 2003, quoted in Xiana Barros-Garcia, Effective multilateralism and the EU as a military Power: The Worldview of J. Solana, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies paper, 2007.} In this endeavour as an honest and neutral broker, Europe perceives itself as ideally suited, offering a wide range of instruments to mitigate conflicts.

Not surprisingly, it is in the last two situations that mass murders, genocide and crimes against humanity tend to occur and unfortunately it is in these cases that Europe is the least effective. In these instances, an effective humanitarian policy implies qualities that Europe seems extremely reluctant to possess and develop. First, when confronted with mass violations of human rights by an illiberal but effective regime, as the Balkans conflicts have made abundantly clear, the first task is to identify the source of these violations and act accordingly. In the Bosnian war, it should have been rapidly clear that Milosevic was the cause of rather than the solution to the humanitarian crisis. A humanitarian operation that keeps the coat of neutrality amounted in fact to a collusion with the offender rather than a defence of the offended. Neutrality made the humanitarian intervention ineffective and counterproductive; it didn’t address the cause of the suffering of the population, it didn’t prevent Srebrenica and it had the perverse effect of sustaining the fighting rather than reducing it. Taking side, i.e. taking Milosevic for what he was, -a war criminal- and not for what he couldn’t be –a peace negotiator-, became the condition to solve the conflict. The war in Bosnia ended the moment the international community acted against Serbia. With Kosovo, the same pattern applied, and it was the then US Secretary of State, M. Albright who was adamant to name, shame and punish Milosevic, although the conditions under which the intervention occurred were more controversial.\footnote{See above on the tensions between NATO members. On M. Albright’s role, see Walter Issacson, “Madeleine’s war”, Time Magazine, 17 Mai 1999.} This fundamental lesson should have been learned in Europe, but its diplomacy and minimal actions in the case of Darfur indicate that this is not the case. The regime in Sudan is still considered part of the solution; it should have been named and punished for being an essential source of mass murders. In summer 2004, there was an opportunity to make a difference, to actually prevent a genocide by at least protecting and defending the camps of refugees but because of a peace agreement between the North and the South of Sudan, order took precedence over justice.
The situation today is far worse, disorder and injustice-, more intricate, human rights violations are committed by both sides-, more anarchic, endemic violence reach pre-modern level- and wider, aggression against refugees destabilizes neighbouring countries. In such situations, humanitarian interventions are difficult: they need to be forceful to create buffer and no fly zones where assistance can be provided; they need to involve a large number of troops to defend these safe areas and to punish the spoilers; they need to be long-lasting to allow for reconstruction and reconciliation. They could trigger an insurgency, escalate into high intensity warfare, prompt casualties to the outside force as well as among the local population. In short, they are risky and dangerous. To say the least, these characteristics are not the ones that dominate the current mindset of European leaders and public opinions. With few exceptions, Europe by and large has developed a risk-averse culture. According to polls, a significant majority consider that the use of force is counter-productive and refuse to envisage situations worth European casualties. This opinion is reflected at the highest level. When asked when and where European Battle Groups would be deployed, the common answer from European officials can be summed up in few words: “where they will be successful”. Missions are thus framed around preserving the force, not towards making a difference. The safety and security of the tool becomes the objective of the mission, while protecting and helping local population become subsidiary. At the European level, it seems that the zero-casualty doctrine, similar to the one that was prevalent under the Clinton Administration, is now part of the ESDP implicit rules. This is the opposite of what effective humanitarian operation should look like. Moreover, this reluctance to take risks is ensured through national caveats that render collective action precarious, if not impossible. As the debate about Afghanistan demonstrates, unequal and unfair burden-sharing runs the risk of destroying the solidarity and damaging the credibility of the Alliance itself. What is true for NATO is true for ESDP: free-riding was a dangerous tendency in a collective defence framework; it is even more challenging in a collective security one.

66 Among Europeans who support greater EU responsibility for dealing with international threats, only 20% supported committing more troops for combat actions in general. See Transatlantic Trends, 2007, available at http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/index.cfm?id=54
67 Discussions with European officials on several occasions since 2005 indicate that the very concept of Battle Group is a misnomer. There is not a single “battle” where these troops, -the bulk of the European headline Goal 2010-, could be sent. The quoted words were used by an EU official in May 2007.
68 The Canadian contingent has lost more than 80 soldiers while other NATO members didn’t suffer any casualties. Needless to say, the sense of unfairness is high in Ottawa. On the Canadian case, see The Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, (the Manley Report), Ottawa, January 2008.
At its core, Europe’s problem is thus one of defining the stakes at hand in these configurations where mass murders and crimes against humanity tend to occur. In these instances, Europe is still unable and unwilling to “frame” adequately the characteristics of an effective liberal internationalism and to contemplate its implications. It still has many doubts about the value of “hard power” and displays a corresponding overconfidence in soft power. To be clear, the use of force is not a panacea, far from it. In the last configuration depicted above, empirical cases are *sui generis* but they tend to share some common characteristics: complexity, ambiguity, uncertainty and volatility. Force in complex humanitarian operations is just one aspect of a larger strategy that must start with a political process. Military force can only fulfil limited functions, -ameliorate, contain, deter, coerce and destroy. The “utility” of force may have changed, yet in a situation of ethnic cleansing, like in Bosnia or Rwanda, or in a chaotic stateless environment like in Congo or Somalia, using force may often be a prerequisite to end suffering. The European problem is thus one of mindset, ethos and ultimately responsibility. As M. Ignatieff, one of the main architects of the Responsibility to Protect, has argued, “an intervention strategy that takes sides, that uses force and that sticks around to rebuild is very different from one premised on neutrality, casualty-avoidance and exit strategies”. The European Security Strategy explicitly refers to the need to develop a strategic culture that “fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention”. Yet, with few exceptions, the predominant strategic culture in Europe today is one that favours minimal, short and low risk operations, i.e. an obsolete type of humanitarian operations.

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69 Framing an issue is by itself part of an actor’s worldviews and beliefs. From a cognitive psychology point of view, framing triggers a rational decision-making process leading to foreign policies and military strategies. For military operations, framing at the high conceptual level leads to a “concept of operation” and to an operational plan. For example, the US “war on terror” framework has significantly different prescriptions than the European “fight against terrorism” has. For developments on “framing”, see Larson Deborah Welch, “The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making”, *Political Psychology*, March 1994, Vol. 15, n°1, pp. 17-33 and Alastair Iain Johnson, “Thinking about Strategic Culture: Does Strategic Culture Matter?” *International Security*, Spring 1995, Vol. 19, n°4, pp. 5-52.

70 As a practitioner of operations in such environments put it, these operations “tend to be ‘wicked problems’, problems that are intractable and circular with complex inter-dependencies and where solving one part of the problem can create further problems or make the whole problem greater”. See John Kiszely, “Post-Modern Challenges for Modern Warriors”, *The Shrivenham Papers*, December 2007, n°5, p. 8.

71 For example, regarding the genocide in Rwanda, General R. Smith acknowledged that “if there ever was an example of a situation that might have been resolved or at least greatly ameliorated by a short, sharp intervention at the start it was Rwanda in 1994. By which I mean, the employment of force with the object of making it abundantly clear to those leading the rebels that ethnic violence in the face of a UN resolution would be punished”. General Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, Penguin Books, 2006, p. 313. For an extensive study on the use of force in UN operations, see Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 2002.

72 Michael Ignatieff, “Intervention and State Failure”, *Dissent*, Winter 2002, Vol. 49, p. 121. He added: “It is also based on different premises, and these have been outlined in the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ report.”
The second European flaw is alas very well known, and so for more than a decade. It is related to insufficiencies and inadequacies in military capabilities. In this regard, the discrepancy between the requirements of an effective liberal internationalism and the capacities to fulfil them is alarming. The level of military capabilities, expenditures and investments remains overall insufficient. This is a natural consequence of Europe disaffection with and shyness to hard power. Of course, at the national level, the picture is contrasting. Some European members had a long tradition and a strong culture of military operations abroad, notably France and the United Kingdom, the two founding and most important actors in the ESDP process. But compared to 1999, conditions for London and Paris have deteriorated. The United Kingdom has been heavily involved in Iraq and has still the largest force in Afghanistan after the US contingent. These years of intense warfare, -in the case of the Helmand province, the most severe combats since the Korean War-, have left the British Army in a difficult situation. The current level of expenditure, -although the highest in relative terms in Europe- does not suffice to replace and enhance the level of equipments needed in complex operations. France has a different problem: a significant part of its military budget is dedicated to its deterrence posture and to the highest end of the military spectrum, notably Network Centric Warfare technologies. Paris has not invested enough in basic equipments and this constitutes a serious obstacle to expeditionary operations. None the less, these two nations represent the bulk of the reserve force that could be available to the Union if these countries wish so. But national commitments, under NATO for Afghanistan or the UN for Lebanon, have dramatically decreased this potential supply. Other medium countries have invested massively to enhance their military capabilities, among them the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden stand out. Alas, others are free-riding. The shortcomings are well known: excessive number of non-deployable conscripts personnel, but shortage of crucial enablers, -most notably strategic transport, C3I but also field hospitals--; expensive duplication but under-investment in R&D. Europe spent a sizeable amount of money on defence; but it got a very small bang for its euro spent. The overall picture is rather bleak: only a fraction, -between 5 and

73 The French Defence budget amounts to 1,70 % of its GDP if pensions for personnel and the gendarmerie are put aside. Per soldier, France spends less than the Netherlands. Figures are quoted from Étienne de Durand, “De trop petits moyens pour une grande nation”, Le Figaro, November 30 2007.

74 As former NATO Secretary general summed up: “Huge amounts of money are spent on soldiers who can’t be mobilized, on tanks that will never move, on anti-submarine warfare assets against an enemy that doesn’t have any submarines”. See “Ex-Nato boss makes spending call”, BBC 25 November 2007. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/7111979.stm
10%—of the nearly 2 millions men under arms in European member States are actually usable. As acknowledged by J. Solana, “...it is by no means certain that we are on track to meet all our military capability shortfalls set out in the Headline Goal 2010, or in the civilian Headline Goal 2008.” To put it briefly, “the sober fact remains that the European Union still has a long way to go to prove itself in the domain of hard power”.

At the European level, some progresses have been achieved, notably the much talked about but so far never used Battle Groups. The Battle Group concept is a direct consequence of the Artemis operation that took place in July and August 2003. This operation represented an important step in the ESDP process. After the divide about Iraq and the disagreement about Tervuren Summit, it was the first autonomous mission outside Europe and outside the Berlin Plus mechanism and it demonstrated that Europeans were able to act together, in short notice and in a forceful way. Following a request by UN Secretary General K. Annan to set up a coalition of the willing to restore order in the Ituri region of Congo so to allow the return of a UN force, Operation Artemis was a UN bridging mission, based on a quick-in, quick out expeditionary force, a short-term emergency at the service of a broader goal, i.e. strengthening the peace process in a country ravaged by nearly two decades of wars. It took place in a relatively risky environment and casualties were deemed likely by military officials. It was risky but short: this strategy was one of quick-fixing by European troops, mostly French, and devolution to African Union peacekeepers under the UN. Overall the mission was a

75 As noted above, in recent years there has been a fairly consistent level of about 70 000 European troops deployed outside the continent, whether under UN, EU, NATO, or national flags. As N. Witney argued, “This is not nothing. On the other hand, it is also less than 5% of the nearly two million men and women that we keep in uniform in Europe. The fact that some 80% of this total are simply not deployable outside their national territories tells you that the modernization of Europe’s defence capabilities still has a very long way to go. It also tells you that Europeans collectively are not getting proper value from what they spend on defence, about $ 250 billion a year...”. See Nick Witney, The EDA’s goals: strengthening Europe’s capabilities and defence industrial base, European Institute: Transatlantic Roundtable On Defence And Security, Washington, 14 February 2007, p. 3. For an overview of Europe’s defence expenditure, see Wan-Jung Chao, Gregory Sanders and Guy Ben-Ari, Trends in European defense spending, 2001–2006, CSIS, April 2008.

76 He added: “… And there is no mystery why. We need to spend more and to spend better. Only a handful of Member States’ defence spending is over two per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). Furthermore, the United States defence budget is more than twice the aggregate of European defence spending and over 30 per cent of it goes on research and equipment. In Europe, we invest less than 20 per cent of our spending in that way. Consider research and development, and the mismatch is even worse. Defence research and development spending by European governments is now only about one-sixth of what the Pentagon spends. No surprise, then, that North America holds five times as many aerospace and defence patents as Europe!” J. Solana, “From Cologne to Berlin and beyond - Operations, institutions and capabilities” Berlin, 29 January 2007.


78 Incidentally, Artemis is the Goddess of hunting and the protector of children, a nice summary of the means and ends of the mission, with the first part conducted mostly “off mandate”.
success, even though some shortages were already apparent, notably the absence of a strategic reserve. 79 From this success was built the concept of Battle Group, a smaller but more flexible force package of around 1500-2000 troops strong that would improve the capacity of the Union for rapid reaction abroad. This new approach was later incorporated into a new Headline Goal 2010 with an ambition of two Battle Groups on stand by with a six months rotation. This last characteristic, - a stand by force-, is a considerable progress compared to the Helsinki Headline Goal, which was only a catalogue of unidentified forces. In the same time however, the size of the force has significantly dropped, from 60000 to roughly 25000 if all the battle groups are accounted for, while the missions had been expanded. 80 What has been gained in quality has been lost in quantity. The Battle Group is the lowest force package that can operate autonomously. 81 On average, it is composed of a battalion, plus support and service support troops. Its size is thus around 1500-2000 troops strong which put the number of troops on stand by at less than 5000 that the EU can call upon, if contributing countries agree. Since most of these Battle Groups are multinational, a green light for its use is in reality difficult to obtain. 82 Without addressing the continuing shortfalls in the current EU catalogue, the Headline Goal 2010 has made a virtue out of necessity, but a smaller number of troops, even if better, has huge strategic implications.

First, the revolution in military affairs, which was the base of Rumsfeld’s transformation of the US Army into reduced but highly mobile and manoeuvrable forces, has shown its limits. The Iraq war has demonstrated the kinetic effectiveness of such a structure but also its ineptness at stabilization and reconstruction tasks. Even if it is always precarious to draw lessons from one case, it seems that a “counter-revolution”


80 The missions for the Headline Goal 2003 were the Petersberg tasks defined in 1992 by the WEU. For the Headline Goal 2010, it is now the art 28b of the Lisbon Treaty: “The Union may use civilian and military means [for] joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories”. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML.


82 During the preparation of the Congo mission in 2006, it was suggested by Brussels that a battle group could be sent. At the time, it was a Franco-German one (in reality composed at 90 % by German forces). The German Defence Ministry put its veto, and an ad hoc force was set up under the leadership of… Germany. The Headquarter was Potsdam.
in military affairs is emerging, pointing to the limits of technology and stressing soldiers' skills and numbers instead. The Battle Group concept, which came from the same RMA inspiration, may rapidly become an outdated innovation before its actual use. Second, given the wide range of the Petersberg tasks and the size of the theatre of choice, -Africa-, the strategy of “quick-in, quick-out then devolution to the UN or AU” behind the concept has many weaknesses: projection and entry will not be that quick, especially with current limited strategic lift; exit may be delayed by many months and the African Union would not likely be able to come up with sufficient peace-keepers afterwards. This leads to the third problem: Europe has one set of force that is supposed to fulfill a wide range of tasks. Implicitly, there are some specialized functions, the high end of military operations to the Battle Group, post-conflict stabilization for the Gendarmerie. In practice however, given the reduced amount of troops, deployed forces are often asked to change their helmets of peacemakers to berets of peacekeepers. The introduction of Permanent Structured Cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty could lead to deeper specialization, but this will require a significant increase in manpower. Fourth, the small size of available troops has significant consequences on planning: in an environment of scarcity, force generation becomes an extremely difficult and slow process. It took six months to set up the relatively modest force for the election monitoring in mission in Congo in 2006 and more than eight for the current mission in Chad. In these circumstances, the rapid response element, one of the key objectives of the European Security Strategy and of the Headline Goal 2010, appears increasingly irrelevant. Fifth, a small force has consequences on the ground. Once deployed, the first priority for the force Commander is force protection. In a relatively benign environment, this may not represent a demanding task but in a dangerous zone, it may absorb a significant portion of its contingent, leaving a reduced capacity to fulfil the objectives of the mission. Furthermore, some critical functions become difficult to perform and to sustain when only several hundreds of soldiers are involved. Deterrence is of course more problematic, especially in the eyes of a potentially resolute adversary. At the very least, it demands a concentration of force and the determination to use it. Compellence

83 The term “counter-revolution” was used by Pierre Hassner, “Le siècle de la puissance relative”, Le Monde, 10 February 2010. For a good summary of this argument, “After smart weapons, smart soldiers”, The Economist, October 25th 2007.

84 For the Congo operation in 2006, of the some 780 strong German contingent, only about 100 soldiers were actually deployed in Kinshasa, the rest was on standby in next door Gabon. National caveats and rules of engagement have further constrained their performance. On this, Jean-Yves Haine and Bastian Giegerich, “In Congo, a cosmetic EU operation”, International Herald Tribune, June 12, 2006. Reflecting on the mission, J. Solana stated, “next time we need to make sure that we are able to get the first bit of
is more achievable, but it success depends on the resolve of your enemy who may consider the issue at stake as non-negotiable. The use of limited force as a signalling strategy may lead to an escalation that demands further commitments and reserve forces. As for punishment and coercion, much depends of the nature and size of the terrain, the type of adversarial force and its tactics. If the theatre of choice is Africa, as seems to be the case for EU military operations, the least one may note is that small contingent can only fulfil a fraction of these functions for a short amount of time. The Artemis operation was successful, but today the situation in the Ituri region has again deteriorated significantly. The current risk-averse culture in Europe and the lack of deployable troops lead to a strategic and humanitarian contradiction: missions are framed according to available means and not around declared objectives.

**Conclusion: A “Force” for Good?**

In practice, ESDP operations reflect these flaws. The current operation in Chad is a typical example of Europe’s responsibility avoidance, power shyness and strategy myopia. Last spring, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner suggested that something had to be done to address the humanitarian situation in Darfur. The first plan was to create humanitarian corridors where European peacekeepers and humanitarian relief workers could operate to protect and assist refugees in Darfur. Not surprisingly, the Al-Bashir government in Sudan opposed the idea, fearing backdoor Western involvement. A Plan B was thus put in place: assistance and protection would take place in the Chad-Sudan border, where the conditions for and safety of 460 000 IDP and refugees from Darfur were deteriorating. The rationale was thus more about managing the conflict than solving it. Nonetheless, this initiative was laudable even if its objective was limited and even if, from a R2P point of view, it should have taken place four years ago. In a way, addressing the problem in Chad is a consequence of inaction in 2004. The situation has worsened and expanded, destabilizing neighbours, especially Chad.

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85 Compellence is the use of military force to influence not to destroy your enemy. This was of course the case with NATO in Kosovo. The bombing campaign was about bringing Milosevic to negotiate, not about destroying Serbia. On compellence, see Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, Yale University Press, 1996 and on Kosovo, see Venesson Pascal, “Bombarder pour Convaincre? Puissance aérienne, rationalité limitée et diplomatie coercitive au Kosovo”, *Cultures & Conflits*, Printemps 2000, n°37, pp. 23-59.

From a political point of view, the mission followed Europe post-modern textbook. Under a UN mandate, agreed on September 25th 2007, the EUFOR will act to protect refugees, internal displaced persons and civilians in danger, to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and to assist the UN efforts in the region, notably the UNAMID force whose has been already under attack. All EU instruments—diplomatic, political and financial—have been mobilized, including substantial European Commission’s programmes for the establishment of a UN police force, which will train and equip Chadian police officers. The EU has allocated nearly €300 million for Chad and €137 million to CAR over a five-year period. Furthermore, the EU has also been engaged in the peace process between Chad and Sudan, by facilitating the signature of an agreement between the two countries in March and by establishing a contact group with Libya, Senegal, the Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Gabon, Chad and Sudan. This regional diplomacy is aimed at facilitating an AU border protection mission between N’Djamena and Khartoum. Since March however, tensions between Sudan and Chad has significantly increased.

From an operational point of view, several problems plagued the mission from the start. First, the force generation process was extremely difficult, due to competing engagements for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. In particular, helicopters were in high demand with only a dozen available to that kind of sandy terrain. The original number of troops was estimated at 5000, although the UN had suggested that 12000 would be needed. After many delays, and further commitment by France, the EU settled painfully for a contingent of 3700 with a strategic reserve of 600. The Headquarter was located in Paris under General Nash, from Ireland, while the operational Headquarter was established in Abéché in Eastern Chad. The deployment furthermore was extremely slow. Due to distance, -more than 4250 km between Paris and N’Djamena-, and logistical difficulties, -Abéché can handle only one C-130s Hercules at any one time-, airlift alone took more than two months.

87 The mandates the EUFOR was “(i) To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons; (ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations; (iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel”. See UN Security Council Resolution 1778 of 25 September 2007, 5748th meeting, S/RES/1778 (2007)

88 In May 2008, relations between the two countries broke down, following an attack against Khartoum by rebels allied with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) from Sudan's Darfur region, the first time in the five-year conflict in Darfur that fighters have reached the heavily-defended capital. See “Sudan: Chad Denies Involvement in Khartoum Attack”, UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, 12 May 2008.
Second, in Brussels, there was little enthusiasm to launch a European mission in a former French colony where France retains a significant military force and an influential political presence. ESDP was not designed to take over the traditional colonial role of saving or deposing troubled regimes in Africa. To avoid any confusion with the French heritage in Chad, the operation’s mandate underlines the “neutral, impartial and independent manner” under which the EUFOR will operate. The Op Plan itself was framed to emphasize the “Europeanness” of the mission, taking great care to separate the French soldiers operating under French bilateral agreement (called Epervier) and Europeans acting under the EU flag. The Irish force has been even asked to change their fatigues, which were deemed too similar to the French ones. Though these efforts may make political sense in Brussels, they do not make smart strategy on the ground. First, the “Europeanness” is less real than it seems: 14 different countries may participate in the mission but France had the leading role and bears the bulk of the forces, 2100 out of 3700, on top of the already 1000 strong French military presence in the country. To distinguish between French and European flags is a subtlety that escapes nearly everyone on the ground. As a UN official put it, “It will be very complicated for the local people to manage and for humanitarians to know the difference”.

Third, neutrality was jeopardized from the start. Months ago, the rebels in Chad, a patchwork of disparate and rivals factions backed by Sudan, have made clear that the European force was just a mantle covering a French intervention and was thus not welcomed. To make their point crystal clear, they ganged up and mounted a flash attack, leaving the Sudanese border on the 28th of January, the very day of EUFor’s endorsement by Brussels, and reaching the capital in N’Djamena 4 days later after a 700 km dash in the desert. Paris spotted the manoeuvre with its satellite but did not stop the column as it did in similar circumstances in November 2006 by flying over French Mirages. But, in parallel, a French-initiated non-binding UN Security Council resolution condemned the attack and President Sarkozy warned the rebels that “France is ready to do its duty” in Chad. While some French sources claimed that France did defend the Déby regime, Kouchner insisted that “for the first time in France’s history, we have not taken sides in an African struggle”. The costs of this non-intervention were however

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90, See “Chad: Dual Peacekeeping Mission Seeks to Dispel Confusion”, United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks; January 14, 2008.
91 President Sarkozy was quoted in Philippe Bernard, “Le Ministre de la Défense français apporte un message de soutien au président Déby”, Le Monde, 06 February 2008.
high. In Brussels, there were frantic discussions about possible cancellation of the EU mission and the withdrawal of the advanced units already in place. Deployment was postponed, even for a short time, when it was the most needed. This decision sent the wrong signals to the plethora of potential spoilers determined to oppose the mission. The Al-Bashir government can only be encouraged by the mission’s delay to further support the rebels in Chad. More harassment against the EUFOR, which will not be fully operational until May 2008, is thus likely as is the worsening of Chad- Sudan relations. The EUFOR may well find itself engaged in combat operations rather than humanitarian assistance; French support will then be crucial. Focusing on neutrality in a seemingly internal Chadian dispute missed the strategic point: the real challenge is Sudan’s determination to prevent an international presence on its borders. The pretence of neutrality has made the mission far more difficult than it already was. Collective action is about aggregating power, not taming it. French leverage in the region was a crucial enabler to the mission, not an obstacle to it. Most importantly, if France had intervened sooner, hundreds of people may have not been killed in N’Djamena by the rebel attacks and thousands would not have been forced to flee to Cameroon. To cling to a neutral posture when your potential adversary has denied it amounts to strategic shortsightedness. Even if President Sarkozy has claimed that the classic French game in Africa is over, the longstanding relationships between Paris and N’Djamena and the French support to President Déby were real. That France eschewed crucial leverages of influence to please Brussels reveals the mission’s strategic ambiguity. Sending troops in Chad was doomed to rise tensions with Sudan. The “hope” in Brussels was that the Sudanese government and their rebel groups will not confront the EUFOR, yet this hope has been shattered and it may happen again sooner than later. European efforts in this part of Africa deserve praise, but between the political conditions that made this operation possible and the strategic conditions that will make it successful, the gap is dangerously wide. When a decision to intervene is made, it should aim at making a difference, not at preserving Europe’s ‘innocence’.

93 Regarding Darfur, Robert Cooper asked “Do you allow killing to continue or do you invade Sudan?”. Between these alternatives, the EU mission is trying to navigate, but addressing the first has consequences on the second. Cooper is quoted in Lisbeth Aggestam, “Ethical Power Europe?”, International Affairs, January 2008, Vol. 84, n°1, p. 10.

94 The UN estimated the number of Chadian refugees at 30,000 to 70,000. See Craig Timberg, “Aid Groups Work to Avert Disaster Among Chadians in Cameroon”, Washington Post, February 8, 2008.

95 As echoed by the French Press, the support of Paris to President Déby was real enough. See “La France a permis à Idriss Déby de sauver son régime”, La Croix, 07 February 2008.

96 Moreover, the Chadian armed force is only 3150 strong, barely more than the rebels. See “EUFOR in Chad and CAR, The EU’s most taxing mission yet”, IISS Strategic Comments, May 2008, Vol. 14, n°4, p. 2.
It is too soon to tell how the most difficult and the longest EU mission, the UN bridging operation is supposed to last 12 months, will develop. But its conceptual problems and practical difficulties reveal EU’s humanitarian and strategic dilemmas. The way Brussels framed the Chad mission was alas part of a European ‘hubris’ that confuses soldiers with Red Cross personnel. This confusion has been partly translated in the Concept of Operation (ConOPS), yet the reality on the ground may rapidly force the Union to address the source of the humanitarian problem rather than its symptom. Some member states’ unwillingness to choose sides coupled with a reluctance to punish spoilers have been tested before in the Balkans, it led to Srebrenica.

At a more general level, this operation demonstrates the gap between EU rhetoric and practice or, to put it in another way, illustrates the contrast between a Post-modern Europe and a very modern World. In essence, it again raises questions about the actual impact and influence of a “civilian” power that remains the pride of Europe since François Duchêne coined the term in 1973. Then as now, there was a strong belief that power politics was a feature of the past, détente seemed successful, that the use of force was ineffective, the US failed in Vietnam, and that economic power brought real influence, Japan was then the ultimate economic success story. Less than a decade later, Hedley Bull gave a straight answer to this question. In 1982, he pleaded for the big powers of the EU to “acquire a greater element of self-sufficiency in providing for their defence”, not only because of increasingly divergent interests with the United States and the persistent of the Soviet threat, but also because a more independent posture should be built “not on renunciation of force and a politics of withdrawal but rather on the attempt collectively to provide Europe the military capacity which alone could make such a posture possible”. More than a quarter of century later, Brussels seemed to keep the same reluctance in contemplating and exercising power. Yet, as noted above, what was true for the collective defence issue of the Cold War seems even more relevant today in a collective security and humanitarian framework.

97 This confusion leaves the contingent between two chairs. Jean-Christophe Rufin calls this “Canada Dry” intervention, unable to both stop massacres and provide assistance. See Jonathan Moore (Ed.) Des Choix Difficiles, Les dilemmes moraux de l’humanitaire, NRF, p. 313.
98 “Europe as a whole could well become the first example in history of a major centre of the balance of power becoming in the era of its decline not a colonized victim but an example of a new stage in political civilization. The European Community in particular would have a chance to demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political co-operative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power” François Duchêne, “The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence,” in Konstnamm, M. and Hager, W., (Eds), Nation Writ Large: Foreign Policy Problems Before the European Communities, Macmillan, 1973.
In essence, this was the main finding behind the Solana Document. But its implementation has been more rhetorical than real. Generating, without meeting, expectations have dented the reputation and credibility of the EU as a liberal actor. Ultimately, it is less about Europe’s identity than Europe’s responsibility. Effective liberal internationalism is about doing good rather than being good.

As noted by K. Smith, “declarations and statements create expectations that the EU will act…and that makes it difficult to roll back rhetorical commitments… Through this process, the EU’s international identity …gradually acquires more substance”. Karen Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, Policy Press, 2003, p. 197-198. Substance however must be judged in actions rather than words.