“Theorizing the EU as a global actor: a constructivist approach”

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Date of presentation: Saturday, September 27, 2008

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Introduction

To construct something is an act which brings into being a subject or object that otherwise would not exist.¹

In the present ‘deeper’ and ‘wider’ Europe of twenty seven member-states, the theoretical issue of the European Union (EU) as a global actor and its practical implications become increasingly important. Current academic debates regarding the EU global actorness predominantly touch upon the nature of this actorness, the potential of EU global leadership and prospects for the future development. Indeed, in the epoch of globalization geographically remote threats appear to become nearly as much important for the stability and prosperity of the EU as the threats that come from the nearby regions. Nuclear problems in the North Korea and South Asia, security in the Middle East, current situation in Afghanistan and Equatorial Africa, post-conflict reconstruction and democratic reforms in the Balkans and East European states – altogether these and many other international problems are being solved with direct participation of the EU acting as a ‘collective’ subject in the International Relations (IR) field.

It should be noted that EU’s activities in numerous spheres where the EU acts internationally as a monolithic agent are all significant for its external image and self-identification. However, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) presents a unique component in the EU architecture predominantly aimed at influencing the processes outside EU’s borders. The actual impact of this “second pillar” remains unclear, which brings more uncertainty about the nature of the EU and its potential as an influential global actor. Therefore, the author finds it useful to look at the EU global actorness in connection with CFSP, its emergence and development.

EU’s external relations and, in particular, the field of study in CFSP “have been dominated by empirical accounts of decision-making, policy-making or issue-based case studies.”² In this vein, the overall objective of this essay is not to present comparative empirical data or measure the global capacity of the EU: rather, it is to provide a constructivist view of the EU global actorness in general, and CFSP processes in particular.

In this connection, it will be argued that the EU as the object of the IR studies is “inevitably a global actor,”³ and its unique presence and actorness are increasingly important for the creation of new meanings and new global practices in the sphere of global politics.

In the first part of the essay, the author provides a brief description of constructivist accounts for the EU global actorness. In the second part, the attention is drawn to the process of CFSP’s construction and the role ideas, norms and institutions play in this process.

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Considering the scope of this research agenda, the author will focus more on the external dimension of the EU. Such conceptual separation is useful since it allows focusing on one level of analysis that is the international level. In regards to the EU global capacity, external activities of the EU go far beyond the CFSP framework (e.g. the EU trade, foreign economic or environmental policies.) Nonetheless, the author will apply sectoral approach and look at the political dimension of the EU for the reason of analytical coherence.

Since the focus of this research agenda is on “endogenous interests”\(^4\) and ideas in the process of EU foreign policy formation, the author will advocate an interpretive methodology\(^5\) with the focus on the political and academic discourse reflected in the official documents and academic literature. Thus, textual analysis of official documents and examination of academic sources will be employed as methodological tools. The author will try to look at the basic elements of discourse expressed in the sources and interpret their meaning. It should be emphasized that constructivists do not reject that ‘reality’ exists out there. Instead, they claim that reality is dependent on our knowledge.\(^6\) This claim is very important for constructivist interpretive methodology, which recognizes the limits of objectivism in judging about the reality out there. There is no independent knowledge about the social world out there, and it is an individual (actor, observer, researcher etc) who plays a role in defining the real world. Indeed, with the dominant role of an actor or observer involved, their perspective will influence the final outcomes of observation.\(^7\) Positive thing about it is that it gives researchers a chance to be more ‘truthful,’ to recognize the limits of “knowable reality,”\(^8\) and to pay more attention to the process and dynamics of transformations and not just to the outputs or observable outcomes.

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\(^6\) Ibid.,361,363.


‘Inevitably global’: theorizing the EU actorness

Does the EU construct something new by acting globally? Or it only makes people hesitant about the real “Nature of the Beast.” Does the EU really make any difference for the world of global politics?

In order to address these questions, it will be further examined what kind of actor the EU aspires to be in the sphere of foreign and security policy and what characteristics of international environment and perceptions of its own global importance it is trying to shape.

Those scholars who focus on the international actorness of the EU face the same fundamental question for the EU’s studies: is the EU something comparable with already existing institutions, or is it something completely new? The author will assume that the EU is a new kind of multi-faceted, “multi-perspectival” construct, which by acting globally changes meanings and perceptions of foreign policy and presents a new type of international actorness and a new type of power that speaks and makes others speak different language in the foreign policy sphere and by its unique impact has a potential to “make a very new contribution to understandings of international politics.”

Since the EU global actorness will be approached by using theoretical tools of constructivism, it is necessary to shortly describe the basic features of the theory. First and foremost, constructivists are interested in “how ideas [and norms] define the international structure that constructs the identities, interests, and foreign policy practices of states, how state and non-state actors reproduce that structure- and at times transform it” Therefore, by looking at the “cyclical process of construction” between structure and actors, constructivists establish a well-known ‘bridge’ between structure and agency. It is necessary to emphasize that despite their commitment to idealism, constructivists do not reject materialism or existence of material reality. However, in accordance with constructivist thinking, this reality is also dependent on the meaning actors prescribe to it. The author believes that this ‘recognition’ of material ontology gives constructivists a possibility to employ ‘conventional’ quantitative and qualitative methods in their research agenda and then interpret their results in constructivist’s manor, e.g. looking at the ideas, norms or language constructs etc. In addition, social constructivism interprets “global politics in terms of social interaction in which actors engage.” These processes of social interaction influence the actors and change their perception of themselves and

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the others. What is the reason to apply constructivism to the EU in foreign affairs? The constructivist’s task is to combine the analysis of material structures with investigation of perceptions and meanings the relevant actors give to them. Thus, it would be interesting to employ this analysis of agent-structure relations in order to examine the EU’s [world capacity to shape events inside and outside its borders, either by its own will in the process of integration, or in response to the external actor’s expectations and demands.]16

It is worth noting that the author will not seek to completely disqualify other approaches to theorizing the EU. Instead, constructivist theoretical perspectives will be considered as analytical tools and not empirical portraits of reality. These perspectives only provide the idea of how the EU and its foreign policy dimension can be analyzed and understood. They provide researchers with “maps of the international arena:”17 maps can be drawn in different ways with different focus and with different scale. Thus, constructivism presents only one such map, which offers an alternative to other possible perspectives.

Moreover, structure for constructivism is both an objective reality and a “world of our making.”18 Thus, structure, i.e. the outside world creates only a context for interpretation but it does not determine the outcomes.

Actoriness from constructivist point of view is “a function both of external opportunities… and internal capabilities, [i.e. its resources, political will and legitimacy.]”19 What does inevitability of global actoriness mean for the constructivist thinking? It implies that the EU is ‘inevitably’ engaged in different types of communication in the sphere of global politics and it exists not only as a material object but also as a social and ideational construct.

Why there is a need to theorize the EU as a global actor? The EU builds its presence as an influential global actor, i.e. it builds its global actoriness and confirms the fact that it is not only the states that are worth theorizing, estimating and thinking about. It is not only the states that can control or influence the situation at the international level. Moreover, the processes of deeper and wider integration in Europe have definitely increased the EU’s capabilities not only on the regional but also on the international level. Thus, the EU can be and should be theorized as a willing actor, which influences and is influenced by external processes; an actor that is constitutive of realities around it; finally, an actor that creates a new meaning of its global actoriness in the dynamic processes of external interaction. Therefore, the agent-structure formula, well-developed by A. Wendt,20 may be applied to both the state as a traditional agent in the international relations sphere and to the EU as a multi-perspectival polity and “non-traditional”21 actor.

19 Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor..., 29.
21 J. Ruggie, “Territoriality and beyond: Problematising Modernity in International Relations...,” 141.
As it was already mentioned, the external relations of the EU “go far beyond resources of CFSP machinery”\(^\text{22}\) and the EU presence in global politics and actorness should not be questioned today. The notion of presence is not exclusively about the capacity of the EU and it does not imply that “the EU should be one element of a new balance of power between equally influential agents.”\(^\text{23}\) The EU’s presence is not simply limited to a counterweight to the USA or other individual or collective powers. Rather, the importance of EU’s presence is the fact that it introduces a transnational ‘multi-perspectival’ polity; the polity which is new to the IR; finally, the polity from which other international actors could learn.

The European Union does not conform to the existing practices and types of actors in the IR and seems to be ambiguous when analyzed by using well-known formulas of the nation-state or an international organization. Especially it relates to the EU “uncommon”\(^\text{24}\) second pillar. At the same time, “viewed from the perspective of global governance the Union is both vigorous and robust.”\(^\text{25}\) Thus, it might be better to “abandon the notion that the Union is something and to consider it always in the process of becoming.”\(^\text{26}\) The EU’s presence should not be judged against the existing patterns, because there are simply no such patterns as, for instance, CFSP. Moreover, the EU’s ambiguous features and predominantly intergovernmental character of the second pillar, or the characteristics of “betweenness”\(^\text{27}\) lead sometimes to conclusions that the EU is not (or not yet) an influential international actor.\(^\text{28}\) Despite its betweenness, the EU has been able to construct a significant presence with CFSP’s instruments and to “shift the ability of the member-states to act collectively in the context of changing geopolitics,”\(^\text{29}\) and this fact should not be overlooked when theorizing about the EU as a whole or CFSP in particular.

As an example, constructivism can be applied as an overarching theoretical framework in analysis of the EU global actorness, its self-identification, “presence” and “capability.”\(^\text{30}\) It is reflected in the main official EU documents, for instance, the European Security Strategy “Secure Europe in a Better World”\(^\text{31}\) (Strategy.) Why is the EU concept of security important to study? This document articulates well in the text format the concept of Europe, i.e. the concept that indicates what the EU ‘thinks’ of itself, of a surrounding environment and of other actors. Thus, this concept reflects the ‘world view’ of the EU as a collective IR subject, which aspires to act globally. There are three components on which the concept is based on: first, it reflects a type of a world-model that the EU is building or is about to build. In accordance with this ‘world view,’


\(^{26}\) Ibid.

\(^{27}\) Ibid.

\(^{28}\) Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler,, *The European Union as a global actor...*" :12.

\(^{29}\) Brigid Laffan, M. Smith and R O'Donnell, *Europe's experimental union.. "*:214

\(^{30}\) ‘Opportunity’, ‘presence’ and ‘capability’ are three criteria offered by Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler,, *The European Union as a global actor...* 24-35.

\(^{31}\) *European Security Strategy.*
the EU ‘thinks’ ‘decides’ and ‘acts’ as a collective entity. Thus, the concept tells about
the EU’s intentions, and knowing about them could be value-added for empirical studies.
Secondly, this concept reflects the will of a collective subject, i.e. it has been supported
by member-states and it is itself the result of political discourse. The basic idea here is
that human beings construct reality through ‘speech acts’ which in turn, may, through
replication, be institutionalized into rules and norms (e.g. legal framework agreements),
reproduce or change realities and provide the meaning for action. In other words, this
‘institutionalized’ language creates the mode of thinking and has social consequences.
That is why it would be useful to find and interpret the basic elements of the Strategy as a
reflection of political discourse. Thirdly, global ambitions of the EU indicate that it steps
aside its borders and, therefore, should be considered as something more than a regional
power.

What does the Strategy’s representative language say about the EU as an actor? It
says that the EU is “inevitably a global player” increasingly “credible and effective actor”
that fully recognizes “today’s complex problems” and is responsible for “building a better
world.”

Furthermore, the external environment invokes new demands for this global
player such as new economic, environmental and security challenges and threats of the
modern age reflected in the Strategy. Simultaneously, the same environment provides the
EU with new external opportunities. Among them is probability to build an “effective
multilateralism” and a new “strategic culture,” as well as to “further [develop]…
existing institutions,” create new ones as a part of a “broader institution building.”
Consequently, the EU is not only [vulnerable] to continuous changes in the global
structure, i.e. positive and negative effects of a globalizing world, but also capable of
influencing the international environment itself.

Assistance, conditionality and trade measures named in the Strategy indicate that
the EU is faithful to a ‘soft approach’ in the sphere of global politics. Moreover, strong
adherence to the rule of law and human rights demonstrated throughout the Strategy
confirms ‘civilian’ character of the EU’s global aspirations. However, military
capabilities become increasingly important in the external activities of the EU, which is
portrayed in the document. Therefore, all these facts exemplify well an aforementioned
‘multi-perspectival’ nature of the EU.

As far as other countries concerned, be it the EU’s “neighbours in the Middle
East, [or] partners in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia,” the EU tends to establish a
connection with them. Apparently, even if the EU and other actors were very diverse and
could hardly understand each other, it would be important for the EU to include other
countries into its “space” of influence and try to build relations in which both the EU and

33 *European Security Strategy*, 1.
35 Ibid., 12.
36 Ibid., 10.
37 Ibid., 13.
38 Ibid., 2.
39 Petiteville, F. “Exploring values? EU external cooperation as a ‘soft diplomacy’.”
a third country would create new meaning for their cooperation and potentially effective outcomes.

In conclusion, “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is.” The European Security Strategy is a good example of the constructivist logic, where the EU is presented as a global actor, which acts in a structure that is based on external demands and opportunities such as new challenges and threats of the modern age, the probability to build multilateralism etc. Therefore, according to this document, the EU is portrayed as inevitably a global actor which is able to be an equal, “balanced partner” with the USA, to exert pressure with its power of purse and other ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ instruments, and be perceived as an important actor by the third parties. Additionally, the EU’s unique presence and actorness is important for the emergence of new understandings, global practices and structures that would contribute in constructing a better world. Evidently, the EU is willing to build its own ‘rational’ world order independent of the world orders constructed by other influential actors in the international relations sphere.

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42 European Security Strategy, 13.
Social Constructivism and the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Creation of CFSP as a ‘second pillar’ in the EU architecture has brought changes into the EU institutional structure but not only. CFSP has definitely increased the EU capabilities on both regional and international levels. Therefore, CFSP can be theorized as one of the major components of EU global actorness. Thus, the explanatory power of constructivism will be employed in understanding creation and development of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as an indispensable and potentially influential component of the EU global actorness.

Political processes within the EU are frequently explained and understood as processes of intergovernmental bargaining between self-interested actors, where a decision is achieved only if transaction costs are low and benefits are high. From such a perspective, CFSP is no more than “a coalition of interest, which by definition is likely to be temporary.” However, the establishment of CFSP can hardly be explained by using intergovernmental logic, which implies that domestic interests of the member-states are all, what matters. Undoubtedly, there is a link between the convergence of member-states’s positions and the EU actorness under CFSP. In this respect, the EU cannot act “actively and deliberately” when it does not achieve consensus. This problem leads to intergovernmentalist’s conclusions about ineffectiveness and formality of CFSP, or about inefficiency of the EU as of an international actor. Indeed, only because CFSP does not often demonstrate “effective outcomes’ many authors assume it is inefficient. It happens due to the focus on the analysis of the outcomes and concentration on the utility issue wide-spread in foreign policy studies. However, the forms and nature of foreign policy as well as of global actorness are changing, and a broader understanding and conceptualization is necessary to reflect process and change better. Constructivism reduces the problem since it looks at the process of formation and the role values, norms, mode of thinking and language constructions play in this process. Therefore, it is not the outcome and ‘efficiency’ that only matter. Moreover, disagreements have sometimes more power to bring change and induce development, and the CFSP’s future cannot be defined by only using such categories as success or failure.

Furthermore, it cannot be explicitly assumed that actors are egoistical and self-centered and only have the aim to maximize their self-interests. In this case, the member-states would simply not need to create and legitimize CFSP. In addition, incremental and gradual spillover, the core concept offered by another middle-range theory of European integration, namely neofunctionalism, does not reflect the dynamics of CFSP’s

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development, which has had its stalemates and considerable achievements. Therefore, the purpose of constructivism is to offer an alternative to the aforementioned dominating theoretical models in the study of EU foreign policy by addressing “relatively neglected areas of the integration process, polity formation through rules and norms, the transformation of identities, and the role of ideas and uses of language.” Thus, the establishment and development of CFSP can be interpreted by ideational factors, existence of certain values and aspirations.

The author is concerned with such questions as: why CFSP’s roles and norms matter, and what is their impact on the EU structure and actors’ behavior? How did the second pillar influence or how was it influenced by the international environment? What did CFSP add to the EU global actoriness? The goal here is to understand the action-creation and development of CFSP - in terms of meaning looking at the structure and the agent, that is the international system and the EU. Therefore, the attention will be given to CFSP’s norms and institutions and to how they eventually change the reality, constrain states’ behaviour and construct the EU global actoriness.

When speaking about such factors of CFSP environment as norms, institutions, transnational culture and ideas, it is necessary to try and specify ideational causal foundations and social or historical context in which CFSP develops. The starting point is that certain processes, specific structural conditions, relationships and perceptions are already there in the EU by the time of CFSP’s creation and they are just about to change.

First and foremost, certain context, i.e. structural conditions and ideational foundation are the necessary preconditions and something what matters when the construction of a phenomenon is examined. In this respect, the two World Wars, its disastrous effects and other factors accelerated the necessity to cooperate and provide for peace and security, stability and prosperity in Europe. These aspirations, together with common historical ideational heritage led to the establishment of the European Communities and to the consecutive attempts to create a common foreign policy. For instance, the project of the Common Foreign Policy in Europe advocated by the founder of European integration, Jean Monnet, failed at the very beginning of the integration process, perhaps, because the member-states could not operate on their sovereignty and were not ready to give in their powers in the political sphere. Yet, in 1970, the ambitious idea of integration in the political sphere gained its weight by the establishment of the Foreign Policy Cooperation, and it was institutionally strengthened with CFSP in 1992 under the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, the ideational foundation of the United, Pan-

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48 the roots of the European integration go far back to the Medieval age, when Europe was a cultural entity unified under the Rome church with the common Latin language, well-developed regional trade, a single currency (gold) and a common foreign policy and strategic military goals (at Crusades times.) The ideas of the united European confederation or Federation ruled by a central authority were formulated by the best minds of the age of Enlightenment.
European Europe was laid long ago, and the question was; what processes would stimulate the integration and how far would it go? Were it ambitions of distinguished leaders (Monnet, Fouchet and Davignon plans) or the desire by the member-states to converge more and strengthen the common European foreign policy to get greater impact on the international level, “norms do not appear out of thin air: they are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community.” Thus, certain ideational context shared by all participants was there, when CFSP was created.

Externally, the end of the Cold War provided new opportunities for the EU to play a more independent role in the international sphere. At the same time it provided a series of crises – political instability in the Balkans and the Eastern Europe, invasion of Kuwait etc - and put the pressure on the EU to respond more effectively to the changes in the international structure. Thus, new external structural opportunities and challenges required an appropriate foreign policy framework.

Secondly, when the norms go through socialization, take a generic form and become shared and perceived as moral and “appropriate,” they structure specific kinds of institutions. It is, therefore, important to take a look at these institutions in order to understand how and why new patterns in the political field are created and reproduced with time. Norms together with practices appear to be determinates of a stable functioning of institutions, their change or the establishment of new institutions. As applied to the European common foreign policy, collection of regulative norms aimed at constraining the behavior of member-states and constitutive norms aimed at “[creating] new actors, interests or categories of action” accompanied the establishment of CFSP. Consequently, the CFSP’s norms are not only regulative but also constitutive and ‘their purpose and explicit aim is to establish a clear identity and to pursue decisive collective action – indeed to create an identity and a voice for collective action.”

Interestingly, it was not so much a stable success proved by practical implications that was a driving force of CFSP; on the contrary, it was constant internal and external challenges and opportunities and growing shared understanding, which led to institutionalization, cooperation and agreement on the necessity to further develop the second pillar. CFSP’s norms and practices have become embedded into the routine agenda of the major institutions - the European Council, the Commission and the Parliament, – which provided a unity and coherence in the EU architecture. Additionally, on the “lower” levels, the Political Committee, the European Defense Agency as well as different working groups were established to provide the environment conducive for the CFSP development.

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52 Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a global actor*. 166.


54 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,”: 891.


One might criticize that due to the insufficiency of regulative, imposing norms within the second pillar, CFSP is purely intergovernmental non-binding and non-effective. The CFSP is often criticized for having a slow decision-making system and for being incapable of acting decisively, in particular in situations of international crises, such as Kosovo, Bosnia or the Gulf wars. The institutional structure suffers from the need for consensus between member states on all decisions. This takes time and may lead to somewhat insufficient results. There are also broader problems of coherence “both vertically and horizontally.”

Simultaneously, achievements are overlooked by such critique. For instance, the establishment of a so-called constructive abstention, as well as a wider implication of the qualified majority voting on CFSP issues can be found in Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. The creation of the European Defence Agency as a top-down approach to managing European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) or the incentives to establish the post of the Foreign Minister in the Constitutional Draft – all these attempts and achievements in the foreign policy area appear to be the result of construction by nation-states that regularly interact within a European social and political sphere and finally choose to coordinate their national positions. This fact strengthens the claim that “EU states have increasingly learned to define many, though certainly not all, of their foreign policy positions in terms of collectively determined values and goals. They then act on these collective positions in the form of common foreign policy statements and joint actions, and increasingly delegate these policies to EU institutions.” It is also important to mention that a comparison of the second pillar with the success and effectiveness of the economic component of the EU, i.e. the fist pillar is not adequate and all the achievements made within CFSP framework were made for a relatively short period of time.

Once established, the second pillar has started to lobby “supranational” decisions in the dialogue with the national governments and constrain their behavior. All aforementioned factors indicate that institutionalization of CFSP did have an effect on other actors’ behavior. Thus, CFSP is the institution that is established to be much more than a rostrum for bargaining. It is established to add to the EU global “presence” new institutional and normative practices, and its achievements and mistakes are the experiences to learn from. These experiences can be employed or referred to by other actors in the IR, leading to a so-called “diffusion of institutional models” “internationalization of norms,” as well as “possibility of convergence around similar models and norms, and homogenization of world politics.”

In the end, political processes within the second pillar can be and should be examined not only as short-term changes in ‘a coalition of interest’ but also as long-

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64 Ibid.
term transformations, which have constitutive effect both internally and outside the EU. Undoubtedly, the EU international actorness is influenced by convergence in the position of participants and their capacity to act in certain structural conditions. Evidently, even a relatively low degree of convergence did not impede social interaction between EU member-states; rather, it provoked more discussion and constraints in actors’ behaviour and eventually intensified development of CFSP. Thus, “political cooperation does prevail within CFSP even if it is not consistent with national interests of the member-states.”

In the very end, CFSP is a good example of how ideas create an institution that has no analogy in the IR sphere, and how this created institution constrains actors’ behavior and gradually constitutes their views and preferences in the international political field.

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Conclusion

In the context of debates between traditional mainstream and post-positivist reflective approaches, constructivists support the view that [the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual, but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place.]\textsuperscript{66} In the European context, such ideas as the European superstate, the United Europe, or Europe without borders have finally constructed normative rules and instruments of the European institutions. The ideas once expressed by outstanding individuals of the European integration finally obtained a “collective intentionality”\textsuperscript{67} and constructed further actions of either national or supranational actors. Nowadays, the European approach to global actorness would be a fully recognized role of the international player and of a global actor that is able to restructure and construct international environment by developing new understandings, practices, norms and structures in the sphere of global politics.

Moreover, by constructing and developing the second pillar, the involved actors not only transform the EU ‘internal’ environment but also alter the meaning of the EU’s presence as of an important global player. The process of integration in Europe leads to the increase in the EU’s foreign activities. Simultaneously, CFSP itself has become an instrument in strengthening and improving coherence within the EU. In addition, not only successful examples of European foreign policy initiatives, but also problems that Brussels has to tackle with, often stimulate European integration in the sphere of foreign policy. Furthermore, under the external pressure the EU has to search for better solutions in order to fill the gaps and set up new objectives. In this vein, high level of uncertainty of today’s international environment marks out advantages of the European model of global actorness. Certainly, EU political goals are long-term in their character, which gives the EU a chance to adjust methods and instruments in the process of achieving these goals.

In the end, “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free.”\textsuperscript{68} These words from the European Security Strategy demonstrate high level of self-estimation expressed by the EU. Indeed, specific features of the EU nature, its geopolitical uniqueness and goals the EU pursues in the international sphere construct the EU style in the sphere of global politics. The style, which is less noticeable and more reserved: the style, which in the long run may produce more efficiency and less destruction.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 881.
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{European Security Strategy}: Introduction.
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